

ULUSLARARASI SUÇLAR VE TARİH

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A Chronicle of Evolving Turkish–Serbian
Relations A Century After the Balkan Wars

Didem EKİNCİ

Reasons for the Neglected Khojaly Genocide in the
Neglected Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Jeylan MAMMADOVA

SSCB`de Yarı-Özerkliğin Hukuki Durumu:
Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi Örneği

**Gülşen PAŞAYEVA - Irada BAĞİROVA,
Kamal Makili-ALİYEV - Ferhad MEHDİYEV**

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Russification Policies Imposed on the Baltic People
by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union

Mehmet Oğuzhan TULUN

Şehinşa...

O. Fırat BAŞ

KİTAP TANITIMI



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Editörün Notu

Yılda bir kez yayımlanan dergimizin 2013 yılına ait 14. sayısını okuyucularımıza sunuyoruz.

Bu sayımızın bir özelliği de ya içindeki altı makaleden dördünün İngilizce olmasıdır, ancak yazarlarının ana dili Türkçedir. Bu olgu İngilizcenin bilim alanında dünyada başlıca dil haline gelmiş olmasının sonucudur. Böylelikle fiilen iki dille hale gelmiş olan Dergimizin gelecek sayısından itibaren tamamen bu niteliği kazanmasını planlıyoruz.

Bu sayımızın ilk yazısını Didem Ekinci'nin kaleme aldığı **A Chronicle of Evolving Turkish-Serbian Relations, A Century After the Balkan Wars** (Balkan Savaşlarından Yüzyıl Sonra Evrilen Türk-Sırp İlişkilerinin bir Güncesi) yazısı oluşturmaktadır. Yazar zaman içinde olaylara göre değişen ancak genelde gergin olmakla beraber kesintisiz devam eden Türk-Sırp ilişkilerini incelemektedir.

1992 yılında Karabağ'ın Hocalı kentinde yapılan katliam yalnız Azerbaycanlıların değil vicdan sahibi herkesin üzüntü ile hatırlaması gereken önemli bir olaydır. Ne var ki Türk dünyası dışında pek bilinmemekte veya savaşın normal bir sonucu olarak görülerek küçümsenmektedir. Jaylan Mammadova, **Reasons For the Neglected Khojaly Genocide in the Neglected Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict** (İhmal edilmiş Dağlık Karabağ Anlaşmazlığında Hocalı Soykırımının İhmal Edilmesinin Nedenleri) başlıklı yazısında bu çifte ihmalin nedenlerini araştırmakta ve bu arada içinde Türkiye'nin de bulunduğu bu konuda önemli rol oynayan dokuz ülke üzerinde durmaktadır.

Gülşen Paşayeva'nın diğer üç Azerbaycanlı yazarın katkısıyla kaleme aldığı **SSCB'de Yarı-Özerkliğin Hukuki Durumu: Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi Örneği** (Legal Status of Half Authonomy in USSR: Example of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region) başlıklı yazısında Türkiye'de pek incelenmemiş olan Karabağ'ın özerkliği konusunu, çeşitli dönemlerde demografik ve hukuki durumu ile birlikte incelenmektedir.

Yekta K. Noyan **Colonialism, German Experience and the Reflections on History** (Sömürgecilik, Almanya'nın Deneyimleri ve Tarihe Yansımaları) yazısında kısa sürmüş olan ve şimdiye kadar yeterince de incelenmemiş olan Alman sömürgeciliği ele alınmakta, Alman ordusunun soykırım olarak nitelendirilebilecek bazı uygulamalarına değinilmekte ve Alman toplumunun bazı kesimlerinin bu uygulamaları onayladığı belirtilmektedir.

Ahmet Oğuzhan Tulun **Russification Policies Imposed on the Baltic People by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union** (Rus İmparatorluğu ve Sovyetler Birliği tarafından Baltık Uluslarına Uygulanan Ruslaştırma Politikaları) başlıklı yazısında Rus İmparatorluğunun Baltık uluslarını Ruslaştırma politikasının Sovyetler Birliği döneminde de devam ettiği, ancak tepki olarak Baltık milliyetçiliğini güçlendirdiği ve bağımsızlık taleplerinin ortaya atılmasına neden olduğu, bu ülkelerin bağımsızlıklarını kazanmalarından sonra da Rus azınlığına uygulanan vatandaşlık politikalarının temelini oluşturduğu açıklanmaktadır.

Polonyalı gazeteci R. Kapuscinski 1982 yılında İran'a ilişkin olarak yazdığı "Şeyhinşah" başlıklı kitabının ABD'de yayınlanan İngilizce çevirisinde İran Devrimi sırasında ve Başbakan Musaddık döneminde CIA'nin rolü hakkındaki bölümleri yayınlanmamıştı. Kitabın bu İngilizce çevirisinden yapılan Türkçe çevirisi de söz konusu bölüm yer almamıştı. Fırat Baş kısaca **Şehinşa...** olarak adlandırdığı yazısında bu bölümleri özetlemektedir.

Bu sayımızda bir kitap tanıtımı yer almaktadır: Colum Murphy'nın **Aza Beast: Savaşın Köklerine İnmek** başlıklı kitabı. Yazarın Bosna Hersek olaylarını anlatan bu kitap hakkındaki tanıtım yazısı Özge Öğütçü tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Ayrıca söz konusu kitabın tanıtımı amacıyla Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi tarafından düzenlenen bir toplantıda Dışişleri Bakanlığı Balkanlar ve Orta Avrupa Genel Müdürü Büyükelçi Murat Karagöz tarafından yapılan konuşma tanıtım yazısına eklenmiştir.

Saygılarımızla

Editör.

A CHRONICLE OF EVOLVING TURKISH–SERBIAN RELATIONS A CENTURY AFTER THE BALKAN WARS

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Abstract: *Relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia, which were cordial until the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina¹, were shaped by three factors: Yugoslavia's location on Turkey's trade routes to Europe, the long history shared with the peoples of Yugoslavia, and the friendly relations that existed thus far. Diplomatic relations took a new turn for the worse with the war, whereby economic relations also ended up being victim of the war, as well as the ensuing Kosovo crisis. However, the pattern of diplomatic relations and behavior since then has been different from what takes place, which made relations a complex reality: despite the rhetoric employed by both sides, sometimes verging on the inimical, and withdrawal of or denying agreement to ambassadors, relations survived. Prospects as regards an enhanced future rapprochement point to the importance of building and maintaining mutual political willingness.*

Keywords: *Turkey, Serbia, Balkans, Balkan Wars, post-Cold War era.*

BALKAN SAVAŞLARI'NDAN YÜZYIL SONRA EVİRİLEN TÜRK-SİRP İLİŞKİLERİNİN BİR GÜNCESESİ

Öz: Bosna-Hersek'teki savaşa kadar samimi olan Türkiye-Yugoslavya ilişkileri, üç etmen tarafından biçimlendirilmiştir: Yugoslavya'nın Türkiye'nin Avrupa'ya giden ticaret yolunun üzerinde yer alması, Yugoslavya halklarıyla paylaşılan uzun tarih ve o zamana kadar var olan dostça ilişkiler. Diplomatik ilişkilerde savaşla birlikte bozulma gözlemlenmiş, bu nedenle ekonomik ilişkiler de savaşın ve sonraki

1 "Bosnia-Herzegovina" and "Bosnia" shall be used interchangeably throughout the article.

Kosova krizinin kurbanı olmuştur. Ancak, diplomatik ilişkilerin yapısı ve aktör davranışları, göze görünenden farklı bir nitelik sergilemiş, bu da ilişkileri karmaşık bir gerçekliğe sokmuştur: iki tarafça kullanılan, bazen düşmanlık eşliğinde seyreden politik söyleme, büyükelçi geri çekme ve retlerine rağmen, ilişkiler devam etmiştir. Yeniden gerçekleşebilecek uzlaşma arayışları ortak siyasi iradenin inşasının ve muhafaza edilmesinin önemine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Türkiye, Sırbistan, Balkanlar, Balkan Savaşları, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem.*

Introduction

In the twin local conflicts which came to be labeled as the “Balkan Wars” in 1912 and 1913, the Ottomans and Serbs, as adversaries, went through a bitter struggle that most overtly exposed the prevalent nationalist sentiment against the dwindling Ottoman state in the region. The Balkan Wars ended with more Ottoman territorial losses. The two adversaries once again found themselves on opposite camps in the longer and more destructive World War I. Although both wars were undisputedly waged for an “independent Serbia”, they failed in bringing this about. The outcome by 1918 was a new kingdom in which Serbia would share a common political space with its kin: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (KSCS).

After the formation the KSCS² on December 1, 1918, relations between Turkey and this Balkan neighbor had been mostly cordial until the war in Bosnia broke out in 1992. In the aftermath of World War I, Yugoslavia began to pursue a friendly foreign policy towards the regional states, including Turkey. During Turkey’s War of National Liberation (1919–22), Britain asked for Yugoslavia’s support against Ankara. However, this was turned down by Belgrade and a copy of the letter explaining the refusal was also sent to Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1881–1938) who reciprocated with the gesture of allotting land for the Yugoslav embassy in Ankara. In the course of the War of National Liberation, Mustafa Kemal also stated that Turkey would in no way enter a secret or an open alliance against Yugoslavia. The two countries tried

2 The country was renamed as “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929; “Democratic Federal Yugoslavia” in 1943; “Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia” in 1946; “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” in 1963; “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” after disintegration in 1992; “Union of Serbia and Montenegro” in 2003. Serbia and Montenegro became separate states in 2006. Throughout the study, the term “Yugoslavia” shall be used.

to improve bilateral relations during the interwar period in a multilateral framework by signing the Balkan Entente (1934) in an effort to form a bloc with security concerns in the volatile region of Balkans.³

During World War II, Yugoslavia fell to the Axis powers in April 1941, but expelled the Nazis in 1945, while Turkey successfully remained out of war. The efforts to revive the Balkan cooperation of 1934 were brought to pass once again in the 1950s with the Balkan alliance when it was seen by 1948 that Yugoslavia would remain socialist, although not in the Soviet orbit. As Turkey and Yugoslavia made efforts to formulate a cooperative framework during the Cold War, there appeared three factors that shaped this: Yugoslavia is located on Turkey’s trade routes to Europe, there is a long history shared with the peoples of Yugoslavia, and cordial relations existed, although within the limits due to the Cold War.

However, there was more to the story after the Cold War, particularly after the war in Bosnia broke out, because relations between Ankara and Belgrade seemed to enter into a precarious situation. Although the components of economic relations - the most important dimension in relations - were there, they eventually fell victim to power politics with the war. Ankara tried to break out of the vicious circle of war through diplomatic means by actively trying to make its pleas be heard by the West, but this concerned a larger picture whereby Turkey’s relations with the Balkans was not totally free, but worked in the shadow of the USA and Russia. The case study of post-Cold War relations between Ankara and Belgrade is worthwhile to ascertain how bilateral relations ended up altered, as Slobodan Milosevic’s latent designs came to surface. When ethnic problems appeared in Yugoslavia with Milosevic’s assumption of power, ensuing developments forced Turkish–Yugoslav relations to a precarious situation.

After a brief historical account of bilateral relations, this case study shall explain how diplomatic/political, economic and military relations came to evolve between the two states since the end of the Cold War and seek to find answers as to whether the relations between the two states entered a normalization process given the memory of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia,

3 Atilla Kollu, *Türkiye - Balkan İlişkileri, 1919–1939*, [“Turkish–Balkan Relations, 1919–1939”], (PhD thesis, Hacettepe, 1996), p.116. The author cites Desanka Todorovic, *Yugoslavya ve Balkan Devletleri, (Yugoslavia and the Balkan States)* (Belgrade: 1979), p.80; Borivoy Erdelyan, *Politika, [Politics]*, December 31, 1989 and January 12, 1990, p.9; and Mustafa Kemal Karahasan, “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün Barış Felsefesi İşığı Altında Türkiye–Yugoslavya Dostluk İlişkileri”, [“Turkish–Yugoslavian Relations in the Light of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Peace Philosophy”], XI. Turkish History Conference, (Ankara: TTK, 1990), pp.2525 – 70.

the twin crisis of Kosovo, and the independence bestowed upon Kosovo, mainly through US support. The article argues that the pattern of diplomatic relations and behavior throughout the whole ordeal has been different from reality. Even after the war, despite the occasional bleak rhetoric employed by both sides, sometimes verging on the inimical, and withdrawal of or denying agreement to ambassadors, relations survived. Why this is the case will be explored in the following sections. Currently, the dynamics shaping bilateral relations since 2009 can be seen as offering a prospect to talk about an improvement in a trilateral framework, which includes Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Turkey and Yugoslavia: Common Timeline until 1990

As the first attempt of their bilateral cooperation, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1925. In 1934, the two states, along with Greece and Romania, signed the Balkan Entente. The Entente intended to guarantee the signatories' territorial integrity and political independence against threat by another regional state. The Balkan states aimed to transform the Balkans into a stable and secure region. Despite hostilities among them, the Balkan states engaged in efforts to form a Balkan union. Relationships, however, loosened because of ensuing developments as the political situation in Europe deteriorated. Despite fluctuations in domestic and foreign policy, Belgrade preserved its political solidarity and continued dialogue with Ankara throughout the 1930s. In general, regional states could at least discuss issues among themselves and sometimes act together.⁴

During World War II, Britain put forward the idea of another combination of states against the German threat in the Balkans: a bloc to be established by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This was welcomed by Turkey, but somehow did not yield any results. Yugoslavia turned down the idea since it saw it as a provocative move against Germany. By 1941, the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia as well as Greece.⁵

During the initial phase of the Cold War, Turkey's quest for membership

4 Oral Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945–1965)*, [*Balkan Developments and Turkey 1945–1965*], (Ankara: Sevinç, 1969), pp.7-11.

5 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, [*20th Century Political History*], (İstanbul: Alkım, 2005), vol: 1-2; 1914–1995, pp.408-9.

in NATO disturbed the Soviet Union which was most clearly evident in a verbal note sent by Moscow in November 1951. The note stated that the responsibility to arise from joining this bloc, formed against the Soviet Union, would rest on the Turkish government. In reply, Turkey stated that although Ankara had acted in peaceful lines, the same could not be observed on the part of the Soviet Union. The second note which was also received in November 1951 did not have a less hostile tone, which prompted Turkey to seek to form new alliances in its vicinity. Although NATO stretched into the Balkans, it did not include Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was not included in the Soviet bloc, either. Therefore, it would be easier to invite Yugoslavia into a new alliance system at a time when a rapprochement had started between the two states and the Greek foreign minister visited Turkey in early 1952, which would be followed by further mutual visits. It looked as if the Balkan Entente of 1934 was to be revived with these mutual visits and Yugoslavia was also part of these contacts. Consequently, the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration was signed by Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in Ankara in 1953 and the subsequent signing of the Balkan Alliance became possible in 1954. During talks in Ankara, the parties reached a compromise that it was time to sign an alliance agreement and that Yugoslavia was not a NATO member did not form an obstacle for alliance. Eventually, a treaty was signed on August 9, 1954 in Bled, Yugoslavia. This was a military agreement which recognized all parties' liabilities concerning the United Nations (UN) as well as Greece and Turkey's liabilities *vis-à-vis* NATO. This was not an alliance agreement *per se*, yet it was an important step to that end, geared mainly by the USA. The agreement envisaged economic, cultural and security cooperation. In accordance with Article 6 of the agreement, the parties would not engage in any alliance or any act which was against the interests of one another.⁶ The pact did not last since the Soviet Union reconciled relations with Yugoslavia after Stalin's death in 1953 and the Cyprus problem began to create hostility between Turkey and Greece as of 1955.

In the 1960s, Turkey saw that Yugoslavia (and Bulgaria) supported Greek arguments concerning Cyprus. During Todor Zhivkov's assimilation campaign on the Turks of Bulgaria in the late 1980s,

6 Ibid, pp. 521-22. Celal Bayar was of the opinion that Balkan Entente had to be revived and launched a plan to this end. He thought the revival of the Entente would be a basis for a prospective Mediterranean pact. The idea of a regional pact was also supported by the USA.; Yavuz Sezer, "Demokrat Parti'nin İlk Yıllarında Balkan Politikası", ["Balkan Politics in the First Years of Democrat Party"], (Master's thesis, Dokuz Eylül, 2006), pp.54-5.

Yugoslavia criticized Bulgaria and gave asylum to Turks who escaped from Bulgaria and granted them refugee status.⁷

As seen, the chronicle of two country's relations was shaped by dynamics which did not put them on adversarial camps during the Cold War. Yet, a serious blow in relations was to come with the war in Bosnia in 1992, which had an enduring impact on bilateral relations and exacerbated ties even further with the war in Kosovo in 1999.

Post-Cold War Diplomatic and Political Relations

Slobodan Milosevic Period: the 1990s

After the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, Yugoslavia began to make efforts to be in good terms with Turkey so that Ankara would not support the secessionist movements in Yugoslavia. Subsequently, Milosevic came to Ankara in January 1992, right one week after the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia were recognized by the international community. Milosevic stated that "Turkey had shown that it followed a responsible policy by acting in accordance with the general international attitude that hoped to see Yugoslavia intact."⁸ The Serbian President was met by Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü and taken to Çankaya to meet with President Süleyman Demirel, which would be the last meeting between Demirel and Milosevic. In a 2000 interview, Demirel stated that the message given to Milosevic during this one-day meeting was plain and clear: He expressed Ankara's concerns and warned Milosevic that they (Belgrade) would not be able to bear the results of bloodshed – if that should happen. The visit was not planned; Milosevic was not invited, either. However, it appeared that the Serbian President came to express Belgrade's concerns more than to listen to Ankara's views regarding the situation. Milosevic expressed his appreciation of Turkey's non-interventionist attitude, which in fact did not last. Demirel argued that Ankara saw certain developments alarming. However, it appeared that Milosevic did not seem to have imbibed the message given by Turkey as the subsequent bloodshed in Bosnia upon Milosevic's return witnessed.⁹

7 İlhan Uzgel, "Balkanlarla İlişkiler", ["Relations with the Balkans"], Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, [Turkish Foreign Policy: Phenomena, Documents, Interpretations since the War of National Liberation], vol. II, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp.174-81.

8 Fikret Bila, "Demirel, Milosevic'i Anlatıyor", ["Demirel Speaking of Milosevic"], *Milliyet*, 7 Oct. 2000.

9 Ibid.

The Yugoslav government withdrew its Macedonian-origin Ambassador to Ankara in June 1991. From then on, Turkey’s relations with Yugoslavia displayed a dual course: while the relations were strained due to the war in Bosnia and the anti-Turkish attitude of ultranationalist Serbian leaders, the fact that Yugoslavia was the gateway for Turkish trade routes to Western Europe was the primary concern in Turkey’s policy formulation.¹⁰ Equally importantly, Turkey made efforts to avert any perception of Orthodox–Muslim conflict in the region and was careful not to antagonize Serbia’s main ally, Greece, when the two states already had strained relations due to constant bilateral conflicts.¹¹ While most criticism came from religious–nationalist circles, the official viewpoint in Turkey maintained that the developments should be attributed to the Serbian government and not the Serbian population, and that a differentiation should be made between them.¹²

During the war in Bosnia, Yugoslavia’s policies were hinged on Serbian nationalism based on an anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic attitude.¹³ According to Ivo Banac, this anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic attitude had its roots in the fall of individual South Slavic national elites and states to the Ottoman rule with the process that began in 1389 with the Battle of Kosovo and ended in 1459 with the abolition of the vassal Serbian despotate.¹⁴ Serbian uprisings against the Ottomans in the nineteenth century assumed hostility towards religious and national diversity,¹⁵ and were in fact not very different from other uprisings in the Balkan Peninsula at that time. Through the end of the 20th century, the opposition to diversity and the pursuit of homogenization materialized in the attempt to establish ethnic unity which gave its initial signs in Milosevic’s speech at Kosovo Polje on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, as follows:

I ... ask the critics of homogenization, why are they disturbed by the homogenization of peoples and human beings in general if it

10 Şule Kut, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikası”, (“Turkey”’s Balkan Policy”), Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Türkiye’nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri*, [*Turkey’s New World: The Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*], (İstanbul: ALFA, 2002), p.110.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Osman Karatay, “Milosevic Dönemi Yugoslav Dış Siyaseti: Başarısız Bir Mirasyedilik Olayı”, [“Yugoslav Foreign Policy in the Milosevic Era: An Unsuccessful Case of Prodigality”], Ömer E. Lütem and Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun (eds.), *Balkan Diplomasisi*, [*Balkan Diplomacy*], (Ankara: ASAM, 2001), p.148.

14 Ivo Banac, “Nationalism in Serbia”, Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşı (eds.), *Balkans – A Mirror of the New International Order* (İstanbul: Eren, 1995), p.133. See Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995), pp.11-21.

15 Banac (1995), p.133.

*is carried out on the basis of just, humane, and progressive ideas, in one's own interests, and is no harm to others? Is this not the meaning, the aim, to which humanity has always aspired? Surely, the sense of the human community is not to be inhomogeneous, divided, even when its aspirations are progressive and humane?*¹⁶

The unity Milosevic had in mind was opposed to Muslims and Turks in the region. Therefore, it was difficult to understand Yugoslavia's policies which were simultaneously based on Turcophobia and Islamophobia while having close relations with states such as Iran.¹⁷ Moreover, the official Yugoslav argument in the first half of the 1990s was based on the belief that Washington wanted to help establish a new Ottoman state through Turkey, which laid the basis of NATO attacks to build the alleged "green corridor" – the line densely populated by Muslims crossing Bosnia, Sandjak, Kosovo, Macedonia and Western Thrace.¹⁸ In a 1992 interview, Milosevic stated that Muslims in the Balkans were getting more and more fundamentalist as Alija Izetbegovic, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1990 - 92, was in cahoots with radical Islamic states such as Iran, Libya, and Sudan. He accused Izetbegovic of being a fascist fundamentalist, "who was jailed in 1947 for his membership in the underground organization 'Young Muslims' and his sympathies for the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hitler's war-time ally. We call it the Green Snake of Islam. It is crawling westward through the Balkans via Turkey, Kosovo and Macedonia."¹⁹

Despite such hate-speech, Turkey did not pursue a policy which would antagonize Serbia. It did not label the war as a "Christian-Muslim conflict" but a humanitarian crisis in all international platforms. It repeatedly stated that it was against any unilateral intervention which would be outside the UN framework. It made serious diplomatic efforts to convene the parties for a negotiable solution. Most significantly, it was the first state to devise and submit to the UN an "action plan" as early as August 1992, the essence of which was seen in the eventual NATO military operation *modus operandi*.

After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, Serbia and Turkey tried to make amends in relations, although this remained at minimum levels

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.149-50.

¹⁷ Karatay (2001), pp.149-52.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Robert Kroon, "Serbs Will Not Be Cowed Leader Sees Need for Separate State within Bosnia", October 19, 1992, *International Herald Tribune*.

until at least four years after the Accord was signed. Bilateral contacts resumed in 1996.²⁰ Subsequently, Onur Öymen, then Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went to Belgrade. The Turkish delegation touched upon the statement by the Office of Chief-of-Staff that Serbia appeared on the list of countries providing the terrorist organization PKK with missiles. The Yugoslav officials said they were prepared and willing to cooperate against terrorism. This was the second high level visit after former Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, Uluç Gürkan’s visit to Belgrade. The second and equally important issue on the agenda of this visit was the economy whereby Turkish officials expressed their hope to see transit passages facilitated through Serbia.²¹ This visit was interpreted as being part of new openings within the framework of regionalism in foreign policy which had been introduced by former President Turgut Özal. Ostensibly, there was no reason that could potentially impede the normalization of relations between Ankara and Belgrade given that the war in Bosnia had ended and that it was seen that the Milosevic government wanted to open a new page in bilateral relations.²² Senior Turkish diplomats also confirmed that the Serbs were willing to hold further high level contacts.²³

Turkey also reciprocated and invited Serbia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC).²⁴ Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s talks with Milosevic during the 1997 Balkan Summit in Crete gave signals of normalization in relations.²⁵ However, relations were strained once again when the crisis broke out in Kosovo in 1998 which put Turkey and Yugoslavia on opposite camps. Turkey saw the Kosovo crisis as another grave mistake of the Serbian government, although Ankara did not articulate the matter as fervently as when it called for international support during the war in Bosnia as well as due to the sensitivity of the issue because of the importance Turkey attaches to territorial integrity.

This policy received criticism from different circles in Turkey and also from the Kosovar Albanians. First, critics asserted that Kosovo would already be an independent state based on US policies about restoration and aid plans toward the region.²⁶ Second, it was argued that Turkey tied

20 Kut (2002), p. 111.

21 “Belgrad: PKK’yı Desteklemiyoruz”, [“Belgrade: We do not Support the PKK”], *Milliyet*, July 28, 1997.

22 Sami Kohen, “İyi Komşuluktan Öte”, [“Beyond Good Neighbourliness”], *Milliyet*, August 1, 1997.

23 Taha Akyol, “Balkanlar ve Türkiye”, [“The Balkans and Turkey”], *Milliyet*, September 24, 1997.

24 Kut (2002), p. 111.

25 “Girit’te Olumlu Sinyaller”, [“Positive Signals in Crete”], *Sabah*, November 4, 1997.

26 “Ankara – Bağdat – Belgrad”, [“Ankara – Baghdad – Belgrade”], *Sabah*, June 13, 1999.

itself too much to the view that Serbia was Turkey's trade gateway to Europe. Third, Turkey conducted much self-restraint so as not to be seen as attempting to revive the Ottoman heritage. The critics alleged that Kosovo was already swayed into bloodshed while Turkish officials emphasized the importance of its territorial integrity.²⁷ The content and relevance of these arguments were debatable but what was not was the crisis had intensified even more.

As the crisis deepened, Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic described relations between the two countries as quite 'normalized' in economic, cultural and scientific venues but not as much in the political venue.²⁸ It seemed that the PKK problem resonated in bilateral relations as print media pointed to an alleged 'Serbian–Greek–PKK' alliance in 1998 by writing how terrorists were financed and equipped with the provision of missiles and weaponry in Greece and Serbia, and later sent to Damascus after being trained. It was alleged that IGNA missiles were obtained by the PKK owing to close relations between Milosevic and Abdullah Öcalan, PKK's leader.²⁹ Since relations had already been in a precarious condition, alleged links between Serbia, Greece and PKK concerning the most sensitive security issue for Turkey served to add another negative dimension in bilateral relations.

Another sensitive issue was Kosovo and the two states' respective stances towards the issue. When the Kosovo crisis peaked by 1999, Darko Tanaskovic, the former Yugoslav Ambassador to Ankara, stated that although there were approximately 30 places in the world similar to Kosovo, the West had chosen to point its finger at Kosovo and that the entry of the Turkish Army to Kosovo after 300 years was not something to be desired. According to Tanaskovic, if there was a commonality to be established between Kosovo and Southeastern Turkey, terrorism was the only issue common to both cases. Although Tanaskovic refuted analyses in news reports which reflected his views as seeing a full

27 "İğneyi Kendimize ...", ["Criticizing Oneself ..."], *Sabah*, April 11, 1999; "Kosova", ["Kosovo"], March 25, 1999, *Sabah*. See "Ankara'dan Siyasi Operasyon", ["Political Operation from Ankara"], March 8, 1998, *Milliyet*; "Balkanlar Atağı", ["The Balkans Move"], *Cumhuriyet*, March 8, 1998; "Cem Ziyaretten Memnun Döndü", ["Cem Returns Content from Visit"] *Cumhuriyet*; March 9, 1998; "Cem'den Çözüm Önerileri", ["Cem's Recommendations for Solution"], *Milliyet*, March 9, 1998; E. Özkök, "Milosevic: Arnavutça Fizik Dersi Olmaz", ["Milosevic: There cannot be Physics Course in Albanian"], *Hürriyet*, March 9, 1998; Sami Kohen, "Türkiye'nin Ağırlığı", ["Turkey's Weight"], *Milliyet*, March 10, 1998; Yavuz Gökmen, "Akan Kanları Artık Durdurun", ["Stop the Bloodshed"], *Hürriyet*, March 10, 1998; and "Milosevic Cem'in Ziyaretinde Kosova'yı Yok Saydı", ["Milosevic Ignores Kosovo in Cem's Visit"], *Cumhuriyet*, March 10, 1998.

28 Sami Kohen, "Sorun Ayrılıkçı Terörizm", ["The Problem is Separatist Terrorism"], interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Zivadin Jovanovic, *Milliyet*, June 9, 1998.

29 "Sırp – Yunan – PKK İttifakı", ["Serb – Greek – PKK Alliance"], *Sabah*, May 5, 1998.

similarity between the situation in Kosovo and the Southeastern Turkey,³⁰ it was not clear whether he compared the two regions in terms of the existence of secessionist acts or geographical/administrative status or level of development or in terms of all of these indicators.

In overall terms, it may be argued that if NATO's response to Bosnia was too late, it was too much and too soon for Kosovo. Turkey participated in the Kosovo operation with a relatively cautious attitude when compared to the war in Bosnia due to the preparedness of the international community to take harsh measures as opposed to the Bosnian experience.³¹

Post-Milosevic Period: the 2000s

Following mounting public and political opposition against him mainly because he tried to amend the constitution to secure him another term of office and because he caused a second defeat (in Kosovo), Milosevic was ousted in 2000 and Vojislav Kostunica was elected president the same year. This raised hopes and expectations in bilateral relations about a fresh start and a clear break with the Milosevic period given that Kostunica was an opponent of Milosevic and his policies. In Ankara, Kostunica's assumption of power was expected to reverse ruined relations and in such a conjuncture of favorable prospects – although it was not an air of total euphoria – the first meeting between the two states took place in October 2000 at the unofficial meeting of presidents and heads of government during the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) in Skopje. After holding contacts with Kostunica, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that regional states were willing and ready to support Belgrade, to which Kostunica reciprocated by stating that they also wanted to see improvement in bilateral relations.³² It seemed that there was consensus at least in the verbal exchanges.

Kostunica's participation constituted the most important aspect of this meeting by way of which Belgrade showed that it was willing to integrate with the rest of Southeast Europe. It was also argued that if

30 “ABD Bölgeyi Karıştırıyor”, [“USA, Muddying Waters in the Region”], *Cumhuriyet*, June 27, 1999. For a general account on territory and how it has come to shape the Serbian policies and identity, see G. White, “Place and Its Role in Serbian Identity”, Derek Hall and Darrick Danta (eds.), *Reconstructing the Balkans – A Geography of the New Europe*, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), pp.36-52.

31 Kut (2002), p. 112. Turkey participated with eighteen F-18s in the operation which began on March 24, 1999. It also opened its borders to host approximately 20,000 refugees.

32 “Dirsek Teması”, [“Close Contact”], *Hürriyet*, October 26, 2000.

there were burdened relations between Belgrade and Ankara, this stemmed from Milosevic's unilateral policies and that bilateral relations have indeed been friendly ever since the end of World War I.³³ Whether Ankara shared this view was questionable.

Eventually, relations came to the verge of breaking pursuant to NATO attacks in which Turkey also took part and the new period of conciliation took two years that began with Foreign Minister İsmail Cem's visit to Belgrade on March 2, 2001. It was the first high level visit after October 5, 2000 when Milosevic was ousted in Belgrade and replaced by Kostunica.³⁴ Cem held contacts with Kostunica, Prime Minister Zoran Zinzić, and State Minister Rasim Ljajić after which it was decided that there would be increased cooperation between the two states. Diplomatic sources stated that the invitation extended to Cem by Kostunica for a separate meeting was interpreted as a sign of cordiality.³⁵ Although in Turkey this was occasionally interpreted as a "new white page" in relations, it did not prove to be too effective later on, due mostly to the fresh memory of the war in Bosnia and the Kosovo issue.

Following this, Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović paid an official visit to Ankara in April 2002, which was seen as part of Serbia's efforts to erase the vicissitudes of the Milosevic period and to become a member of international community. Svilanović referred to Cem's visit in 2001 as the starting point of future cooperation and said they supported the initiative for dialogue between religions and cultures as well as the combat against terrorism. When asked how to restore the memories of Bosnia and Kosovo, two issues which shadowed relations, Svilanović had positive expectations as he said the two states preserved economic relations even during the war. According to Svilanović, it was time to take economic relations even further.³⁶ Svilanović visited Turkey again in early February 2003 to hold contacts with Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış. The Serbian Foreign Minister was quite hopeful concerning the new state of 'Serbia and Montenegro' and that he expected to see Serbia and Montenegro in the EU in ten years' time.³⁷

33 Semih İdiz, "Balkanlar'da İstikrarın Önemi", ["Importance of Stability in the Balkans"], *Star*, October 26, 2000.

34 "Belgrad"la Yeni Dönem", ["New Era with Belgrade"], *Hürriyet*, March 2, 2001.

35 "Belgrad"la Beyaz Sayfa", ["White Page with Belgrade"], *Hürriyet*, March 4, 2001.

36 "Yugoslavya ile Yeni Başlangıç", ["New Start with Yugoslavia"], *Hürriyet*, April 11, 2002.

37 "İstanbul'da Başka Ülkenin Bakanı Oldu", ["Svilanović Becomes Minister of another State in İstanbul"], *Milliyet*, February 6, 2003. Svilanović came to Turkey as the Foreign Minister of the Federation Republic of Yugoslavia. The name of the country was changed as Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003. Svilanović left Turkey as the Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro.

The same expectation was voiced also by the new President of Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic, during his visit to Ankara in early December 2004. Marovic pointed out the imprint on Southeast Europe of Turkey and argued that Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey had common strategic priorities such as EU membership which could be accelerated if the two states made joint efforts.³⁸ In fact, the EU-related themes were something common in Turkey’s relations with the Balkan states after 1995 and those with Serbia and Montenegro did not display a different context: Turkey supported the integration of every Balkan country into Euro-Atlantic structures for the consolidation of stability in the larger European geography and that included Serbia and Montenegro as well.

During this 2004 visit, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s remark that “Turkey and Serbia and Montenegro have announced themselves as neighbors although they do not share borders” was affirmative of the importance attached to regional security³⁹ because this visit was particularly important on the part of Serbia and Montenegro to emphasize their resolve to join NATO and to ask Turkey for due support.⁴⁰ By September 2004, Turkey stated it strongly wished to see Serbia and Montenegro overcome possible obstacles to its entry into the Euro-Atlantic integration processes as soon as possible. However, it was added that Serbia and Montenegro must first meet the requirements for entry, including full cooperation with the UN War Criminals Tribunal at The Hague.⁴¹

Similarly, contacts continued in 2005 during Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s visit in Serbia and Montenegro which took place following a visit to Kosovo which had been administered by the UN and NATO since 1999. President Boris Tadic and Gül discussed the situation in Kosovo, EU integration and other topics. Given that Serbia and Montenegro wished to retain at least formal control over Kosovo, Tadic stated that Kosovo should remain part of Serbia and Montenegro and called for protection of all minorities in the province.⁴² The official stance of Serbia

38 “Kıbrıs’a Örnek Olabiliriz”, [“We Can be a Model for Cyprus”], *Hürriyet*, February 12, 2004.

39 “Savaştan Barışa”, [“From War to Peace”], *Milliyet*, February 13, 2004.

40 “Srbistan’a NATO Desteği”, [“NATO Support for Serbia”], *Hürriyet*, February 13, 2004.

41 “Serbia–Montenegro, Turkey Sign Agreement on Military Cooperation”, *Southeast European Times*, September 7, 2004 as retrieved on http://www.mfa.gov.yu/FDP/set_070904-e.html on 28 February 2006; and “Relations of Serbia, Turkey as Precondition for Stability, Tadic”, *Tanjug*, August 20, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b200804_e.html#N4.

42 “Turkey’s Foreign Minister Visits Serbia and Montenegro for Talks”, *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, October 12, 2005, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=20653>, as retrieved on February 28, 2006.

and Montenegro was affirmed by Tadic's statement that an independent Kosovo would have serious implications for the region.⁴³ Turkey wanted Kosovo to have a democratic and multiethnic structure where everyone was fairly represented.⁴⁴ For further improvement of economic relations, Gül and his counterpart Vuk Draskovic signed two agreements on the prevention of double taxation and on social security.⁴⁵ In the final analysis of the policy agenda at that time, Kosovo issue would prove to be the most sensitive topic in the two states' relations in the ensuing years.

As regards European integration, there remained a set of issues awaiting solution on Serbia's road to the EU and the rest of Southeast Europe. The EU declared that there were still some obstacles to start accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro in early October 2005 (and the prospective membership of Serbia and Montenegro was pronounced as 2010). In Turkey, this was interpreted as too early a date when compared to Turkey's relevant experience and expectations. Belgrade's foreign policy had to resolve two major issues: 1) its Kosovo policy and 2) the 2006 separation of Montenegro from Serbia. Last but not least, there was overwhelming pressure and criticism towards Serbia and Montenegro concerning the handover of war criminals such as Ratko Mladic.⁴⁶

As far as the status of Kosovo was concerned, international attitude, and mainly the USA, became supportive of independence while calling upon the Albanians to give Serbs minority rights.⁴⁷ Turkey continued to contribute to the security and stability in Kosovo in Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission with military existence and police force⁴⁸ while Serbia wished to retain at least formal control over Kosovo. Since the declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008, Serbia has been prompted to reshape its Kosovo policies. Domestically, it exacerbated the rift between the pro-EU and conservative groups in the Serbian parliament which resulted in early elections in May 2008.

43 "Gül'le Gece Diplomasisi", ["Night Diplomacy with Gül"], *Radikal*, October 13, 2005.

44 "Gül Leaves for Kosovo", October 11, 2005, http://archive.turkishpress.com/news.asp_id=74375.

45 "Gül'le Gece Diplomasisi", ["Night Diplomacy with Gül"], *Radikal*, October 13, 2005; and "Gül Leaves for Kosovo", October 11, 2005, http://archive.turkishpress.com/news.asp_id=74375.

46 "Srbistan Karadağ Pazarlığı", ["Serbia Montenegro Bargain"], *BBC Turkish* October 10, 2005.

47 Live interview with Richard Holbrooke, on CNN International after Milosevic was found dead in his cell, March 11, 2006.

48 "Tükiye, Sırbistan – Karadağ ve Kosova İlişkileri", ["Relations between, Turkey, Serbia – Montenegro and Kosovo"], <http://www.bilimastirmavakfi.org/html2/yayinlar/yayinlargiris.html> as retrieved on February 22, 2006, 06:13:49 GMT.

Internationally, it divided many of the actors influential in the region. Turkey was among the first states to recognize Kosovo’s independence while trying not to strain relations with Serbia and Russia over the issue, which undisputedly, was a daunting task.

The second and equally important matter for the country was the separation of Serbia and Montenegro. In accordance with the agreement between Serbia and Montenegro dated March 14, 2002, both states were entitled to hold a referendum for independence as of February 2006.⁴⁹ Accordingly, Montenegro submitted an official proposal of separation in February 2006 stating that the union did not function effectively and its institutions were sluggish. The draft document signed by the Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, said that Montenegro favored a new, permanent and a more stable model which would eliminate the shortcomings. Prime Minister Gjukanovic further stated that due to its previous problems related to nationalism and the Kosovo issue, Serbia overshadowed the efforts of Montenegro to join the EU.⁵⁰ While the EU preferred to see a union in which the two states took part on the eve of the referendum,⁵¹ the USA supported an independent Montenegro, since from Washington’s viewpoint, the union would not work with more than one prime minister, foreign minister and internal borders.⁵² By March 4, 2006, all of the 68 members of parliament present out of 75 at the session voted for a referendum to be held on May 21, 2006 in Montenegro. Polls before the referendum showed that 41.4 per cent of the population supported independence; 32.2 per cent were against; 14.9 per cent abstained and 11.4 per cent did not comment on the issue.⁵³

While Serbia and Montenegro made efforts to restore the country’s

49 Erhan Türbedar, “Karadağ’ın Bağımsızlığına Yeni Bir Engel”, [“New Obstacle before Montenegro’s Independence”], February 12, 2005, <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat=53&yazi=169>.

50 “Karadağ, Sırbistan’dan Ayrılmak İstiyor”, [“Montenegro Inclined for Separation from Serbia”], *BBC Turkish* February 23, 2005, *Deutsche Welle*, <http://www.turkatak.gen.tr/index.php?option=content&task=view?id=71&Itemid=2> as retrieved on February 23, 2006, 00:11:52 GMT.

51 Erhan Türbedar, “Karadağ’ın Bağımsızlığına Yeni Bir Engel”, [“New Obstacle before Montenegro’s Independence”], February 12, 2005, on <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat=53&yazi=169>

52 Live interview on CNN International after Milosevic was found dead in his cell, March 11, 2006. See Can Karpat, “Sırbistan ve Karadağ: Mutsuz Çift Boşanma Yolunda mı?”, [“Serbia and Montenegro: Unhappy Couple on the Road to Divorce?”], on <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=596> as retrieved on March 3, 2006, 01:13:37 GMT.

53 “Sırbistan Karadağ Yol Ayrımında”, [“Serbia – Montenegro at the Parting of the Ways”], *Yeni Mesaj*, 4 March 2006, http://www.yenimesaj.com.tr/index.php?sayfa=dünyadan&haber=10095&tarih=2006_03-04 as retrieved on March 6, 2006, 16:10:27 GMT. For more information, see Erhan Türbedar, “Sırbistan’ın Listesi Karadağ’ı Kızdırdı”, [“Serbia’s List Enrages Montenegro”], June 21, 2005, on <http://www.avsam.org/TR/gunlukyazdir.asp?ID=636> as retrieved on June 24, 2005, 06:20:49 GMT.

image and become integrated to the international community, the news that Milosevic was found dead in his cell where he was on trial in The Hague evoked various arguments as to divine justice, total defeat of Serbia, and elevation of Milosevic to a hero status. It is dubious that the tribunal in The Hague had any considerable effect upon the ultranationalist Serbs⁵⁴ bearing in mind that Milosevic remained somehow a symbol of Serbian nationalism so much so that Kostunica, whom the opposition swept into power, initially balked at handing him over to The Hague. Just as there are people in Russia nostalgic for Stalin and those in Germany nostalgic for Hitler, Milosevic also had supporters, although a few.⁵⁵

As the last shred of former Yugoslavia, Montenegro declared independence, forming a new state and separating on June 2, 2006. The independence ceremony was not attended by any Serbian officials and Prime Minister Kostunica did not congratulate Montenegrin leaders on the results.⁵⁶ In face of the possibility that with Milosevic dead, there was an opportunity that Milosevic supporters would not miss the chance to elevate him to a national hero. That implied a remaining threat to the security of the Balkans, particularly in respect of Kosovo's independence, which Turkish foreign policy-makers duly took into account. Serbian reaction came forth with attacks on the Turkish embassy in Belgrade after Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008. Ankara chose to downplay the incidents.

The course of bilateral relations, which was low-profile, has been shaped with a new discourse which is "strategic partnership" since 2009. In this context, Turkey has tried to play a pioneering role by initiating a trilateral mechanism which involves Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, and advocated the idea that such a process would contribute remarkably to the stability in the region and to the relations between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular. The first tangible outcome of this process has been the decision to send an ambassador from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, which can be regarded as a very important step towards the normalization of relations between the two states, upon Turkish efforts of mediation. However, despite its conciliatory moves, it is still too soon to expect Serbia to alter its Kosovo policies. Put more clearly, Serbia is not likely to accept a unilateral declaration of independence but at least

54 "The Death of Milosevic", *International Herald Tribune*, March 14, 2006.

55 Milan Panic, (a Serbian-American biomedical entrepreneur who was Prime Minister of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1993), "For Serbs, Milosevic's Death Removes a Stain", *International Herald Tribune* March 15, 2006; and Ferai Tınç, "Milosevic, Ölümüyle de Sorun", ["Milosevic, Problem also With His Death"], *Hürriyet*, March 13, 2006.

56 Predrag Milic, "Montenegro Declares Its Independence from Serbia", June 4, 2006, *The Washington Post*.

supports a dialogue process on the issue.⁵⁷ The official statements left aside, the extent to which Serbia welcomes such a Turkish mediation is also debatable, however one thing that is not, is this mechanism has led to fruitful outcomes within the span of only one year, including the decision on sending a Bosnian ambassador to Serbia, and maybe more importantly, Serbia’s apology for Srebrenica massacre in March 2010, despite being done for restoring the Serbian image in the EU.⁵⁸ In overall terms, Turkish-Serbian relations have taken a new turn since 2009 via the trilateral process and prospects give hints that they are likely to be handled in the framework of this new process in at least the medium-term. If duly explored, the new acceleration in relations may lend itself most efficiently to the economic sphere.

Post-Cold War Economic Relations

Turkey had sound economic relations with Yugoslavia even on the eve of the war in Bosnia. Indeed, the criticism that Turkey did not take an active stance in the initial phases of the war harbored this economic fact. Turkey had good economic relations with Yugoslavia as the country is situated on Turkey’s trade routes to the West. Economic cooperation between the two states was still on track shortly before the war in 1990 when State Minister Cemil Çiçek went to Belgrade to attend an economic meeting.⁵⁹ Bilateral economic cooperation at the time was advanced so much so that it included possibilities concerning joint ventures to sell products to third parties.⁶⁰ However, this potential was disrupted with the coming war. The legal framework of economic relations is based on Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation (2003), Agreement on Mutual Assistance between Customs Administrations (2003), Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation (2003) and Agreement on Cooperation in Tourism (2004)⁶¹ and the Free Trade Agreement (2010).

57 “Türkiye, Bosna-Hersek, Sırbistan Üçlü Danışma Toplantısı”, [Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina – Serbia Trilateral Consultation Meeting”], February 9, 2010, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-bosna-hersek-sirbistan-uclu-danisma-toplantisinin-metni.tr.mfa>.

58 The relevant voting in the parliament was carried out with 173 MPs out of 250. The motion was passed with a narrow majority of 127 showing how divisive the issue was at the parliament level. The motion was criticized by the Bosnian Muslims as well as Muslims in Serbia because it does not describe the events as genocide.

59 *Türkiye*, May 8, 1990.

60 *Milliyet*, October 14, 1990.

61 “Sırbistan-Karadağ Ülke Bülteni”, [“Serbia and Montenegro Country Bulletin”], May 2006, <http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/200662810157Bul06may.pdf> as retrieved on October 9, 2006, 01:55:24 GMT.

Following the resumption of trade activities in 1996 with the lifting of the UN embargo on Yugoslavia, the Kosovo crisis came as the second episode in the recession of trade relations. Although there is currently no such crisis or violence to cause an impediment, current bilateral economic relations still do not reflect satisfactory levels. Just about when the trilateral mechanism was introduced, Turkish exports to Serbia were already more than \$ 390 million while Serbian imports were \$ 52 million. The major export items are textile fibers and by-products, vegetables, fruits, metal products, electrical machines, tobacco while import items include iron and steel, textile fibers, rubber and by-products, leather, vitamins, antibiotics, medical equipment, vegetables, fruits.⁶² To give a few examples of Turkish investment, *Efes Pilsen* bought the Pancevo brewery for six million Euros in 2003 and Zajecar brewery for 12 million Euros in 2004. *Gintaş* concluded an agreement with the Montenegrin government to build a trade center in Podgorica worth \$ 30 million.⁶³

Representatives of the economic venue, both from the business and state agencies, have come to acknowledge that they are significant economic partners and that the two states should speed up the promotion of economic cooperation in various bilateral meetings, particularly between 2000–2005. The unsatisfactory bilateral trade volume was spelled out by Serbia and Montenegro International Economic Relations Minister Branko Lukovac during a meeting held in the Serbian Chamber of Commerce in Belgrade. Faruk Cengic, the representative of the Turkish part of the Business Council of Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, conveyed the same message by stating that the existing trade volume did not reflect real possibilities of economic cooperation.⁶⁴

Turkish businessmen are interested in taking part in the building of infrastructure in Serbia which was most recently demonstrated by one of the eminent Turkish businessmen, Şarık Tara.⁶⁵ Turkish companies have shown interest in the privatization of large scale textile companies there as manifest by Turkish companies' participation in the Textiles Fair and

62 "Türkiye–Sırbistan Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri", ["Turkey– Serbia Trade and Economic Relations"], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-sirbistan_ticari-ve-ekonomik-iliskileri.tr.mfa, as retrieved on June 25, 2008. The figures and trade items do not cover Montenegro.

63 "Sırbistan - Karadağ Ülke Bülteni", ["Serbia and Montenegro Country Bulletin"], May 2006.

64 "Turkey, Important and Prospective Partner of Serbia – Montenegro", *Tanjug*, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Bilateral/Turkey/activities_e/290503_1/_e.html as Last accessed on September 27, 2006, 06:43:06 GMT.

65 "Improving Economic Cooperation of Serbia–Montenegro and Turkey" <http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti.php?id=9122&q=srbia+turkey>.

Leather and Footwear Fair in Belgrade in October 2006, which made up half of the participating 45 states.⁶⁶

Fields of cooperation remain to be developed given the fact that export possibilities of Serbia are appealing for Turkey’s import possibilities. In addition to textiles, they include domestic appliance, automotive and components, electronic items, and chemical products. There are large pharmaceutical factories in Serbia. Future projects can be launched for pharmaceutical production for Turkey in Serbia, which would decrease costs. Finally, hotels privatized in Montenegro may offer significant opportunities for Turkish tourism companies, if they are duly explored.⁶⁷

The recent “strategic partnership” rhetoric on both sides since 2009 heralded more investment prospects by Turkish entrepreneurs in Serbia. In October 2009, the two states signed an agreement on the reconstruction of a 66km road between Novi Pazar and Tutin, 85 per cent of which was to be financed by Turkish banks and the remaining 15 per cent by the Serbian budget.⁶⁸

According to Süha Umar, former Turkish ambassador to Belgrade, the investments to be made in Serbia are subject to state guarantee since Serbia is the most institutionalized state in the region and Turkish investors should take this fact into consideration in their business deal prospects. A large portion of industrial investments of former Yugoslavia is located in Serbia and there are still privatization prospects for some of these facilities. If made, investment in Serbia is likely to have a double effect for Turkish entrepreneurs: they will not only benefit in the country itself but since the country has a free trade agreement with Russia and Eastern Europe, they will be able to sell their products without customs obligations to Russia and Eastern Europe. The only obstacle, if there is one to be named, is Turkish entrepreneurs’ prejudice according to Ömer Şimşek, Head of the Serbian-Turkish Businessmen Association in Belgrade.⁶⁹ It can be expected that the prospects offered by Serbia’s investment potential will outweigh the prejudices with more investment. Abolition of the visa regime and the operationalization of the free trade

66 “Textile Companies to be privatized”, *Beta News (BE92)*, October 13, 2006, <http://www.b92.net/eng.news/economy-article.php?nav-id=37308&fs=version=print>.

67 “Srbistan–Karadağ Ülke Bülteni”, [“Serbia and Montenegro Country Bulletin”], May 2006, <http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/200662810157Bul06may.pdf>.

68 “Gül: Turkey Eyes Investment in Serbia”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, October 27, 2009, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=gul-turkey-eyes-investment-in-serbia-2009-10-27.

69 “Srbistan, Türkiye’nin Yeni Pazarı Olacak”, *Zaman Online*, July 19, 2010, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazdir.do?haberno=1006572>.

agreement in 2010 had positive impact on the bilateral trade volume. This has led to a win-win outcome for both countries: while Turkey will benefit both through the free trade agreement and enjoy the opportunities that Serbia's free trade agreements with Russia and Eastern Europe offer; through the Serbian perspective, Turkey can function as a springboard for Asian markets.⁷⁰ How the existing potential in the economic sphere will be used will depend on the competence of the entrepreneurs and the state support that they receive.

Post-Cold War Military Relations

No rapprochement effort, if we can talk about one, would be accomplished without cooperation endeavors in the military realm, and Turkish-Serbian relations were no exception in this sense. Arguably, military cooperation is quite instrumental for building mutual confidence, especially upon a background of antagonism. To this end, Turkey and Serbia and Montenegro signed an agreement on military cooperation in July 2004. This is rather a belated date compared to the conclusion of similar strategic agreements with other regional states, which already started in the 1990s. This agreement was the first of its kind that Serbia and Montenegro had with a NATO member. In accordance with the agreement, Serbia and Montenegro would receive military equipment supply support from Turkey. Defense ministers of the two countries, Vecdi Gönül and Prvoslav Davinic, agreed on future mutual visits by military representatives of each country. The deal was expected to provide opportunities for the Serbian military industry which did not find a market for its products.⁷¹ The same year, President Sezer voiced support for plans to include Serbia and Montenegro in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. NATO officials said Serbia and Montenegro could be invited to join NATO's program on the condition that it cooperates in the hunt for war crimes suspects, defense reforms and dropping the complaint at the international court over NATO's raid during the 1999 Kosovo War.⁷²

Through 2005, the agreement on cooperation in military scientific and technical fields was put into effect. The agreement envisages cooperation

70 "Serbia, Turkey Trade Deal Comes Into Force", *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 2, 2010, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=serbia-turkey-trade-deal-comes-into-force-2010-09-02.

71 "Serbia – Montenegro, Turkey Sign Agreement on Military Cooperation", *Southeast European Times in Belgrade*, September 7, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/FDP/set_070904_e.html, Last accessed: 9 March 2007.

72 "Turkey Backs Serbia and Montenegro's NATO Partnership", *Turkish Daily News*, February 14, 2004.

in the following fields: military training, cooperation between the armed forces, organization, equipment and structure, personnel management, environmental issues, military observer exchange for exercises, logistics management, cooperation in defense industry, military medical services, topography and mappings, military history and military museums, military publications and archives, social, sports, cultural activities between the armed forces, cooperation in undertaking scientific research and projects to develop new defense-military equipment, cooperation in exports to third countries.⁷³ The Serbian Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Zdravko Ponos, proposed to Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, to sign a military and defense cooperation agreement in September 2007 and asked for Turkey’s support in Serbia’s bid for NATO.⁷⁴

This and similar attempts by Serbia were made in the context of modernizing Serbia’s military posture and advocating better relations with NATO just as the rest of the regional states. To give some examples, Serbian military annulled conscription and began creating a professional army, which was announced to be completed during Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac’s term of office. Serbia is a member of the PfP program of NATO since 2006 and it is the biggest weapon and military equipment exporter country in the region which makes it an important military actor in its neighborhood.⁷⁵ In this process, Turkey and Serbia entered a new phase in 2010 which involves military cooperation in the larger context of building a strategic partnership which was realized with the signing of a military training agreement in April 2010. The agreement envisages training in specialized centers and exchange of trainers, among other foreseen activities.⁷⁶ A similar agreement was signed in 2011 as well.

There is no need to go too far back to remember that Turkey and Serbia were on opposite camps during NATO’s Kosovo operation in 1999.

73 “T.C. Hükümeti ile Sırbistan ve Karadağ Bakanlar Konseyi Arasında Askeri–Bilimsel ve Askeri–Teknik İşbirliği Konusunda Anlaşmanın Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Tasarısı ve Dışişleri Komisyonu Raporu”, [“Draft Law and Foreign Affairs Commission Report on the Approval of the Ratification of Military Scientific and Military Technical Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro”], <http://www.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/yil01/ss938.htm>.

74 Serkan Demirtaş, “Serbia Proposes a Military Agreement with Turkey”, *Turkish Daily News*, September 12, 2007

75 “Modernizing Serbia’s Military”, *SETimes*, November 10, 2010 http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/11/10/feature-03

76 “Serbia and Turkey Sign Agreement on Military Training”, April 13, 2010, <http://www.pioneer-investors.com/news2.asp?newsid=14181> and “Military Medical Cooperation Between Serbia and Turkey”, April 28, 2009, http://vma.mod.gov.rs/cms/en/meni_link/23/strana/12/tekst/539/.

However, military relations have been improving recently in the strategic partnership discourse although they have not reached the levels achieved with other regional states. To reiterate, strategic cooperation serves as a very essential tool in the initial phases of restoring relations as it inspires confidence. The recent military gestures could be viewed as fulfilling such a long-term purpose. Still, the two states are likely to wait to see some initial results in this field.

Concluding Remarks

In hindsight, since the Balkan Wars, relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia developed on a friendly basis after the formation of KSCS in 1918 right until the war in Bosnia broke out. The serious blow in relations came with the war Bosnia in 1992. Although Ankara acted in accordance with the West by assuming a non-interventionist attitude, this did not last long. Thereafter, relations followed a dual course which connoted a complex reality: relations were strained but Ankara had to take into account the fact that Yugoslavia was the gateway for Turkey's trade routes to Europe. Meanwhile, Turkey had to avert the arguments that it tried to play the Muslim card in the Balkans. After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, Turkey and Serbia embarked on a process of reconciliation in 1996. However, relations were severed once again with the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and did not lend themselves to a meaningful rapprochement until at least 2009.

The economic ties which were strong even on the eve of the war in Bosnia are currently not satisfactory as they have fallen victim of power politics with the outbreak of war. As for the military sphere, unlike Turkey's military relations with other Balkan states, military options with Serbia display a dim picture. The outcomes of current gestures in economic and military fields remain to be seen.

In the final analysis, the war in Bosnia and the divergences over Kosovo stand as the two main factors that led to conflictual relations between the two countries after the Cold War. After Kosovo declared independence and was recognized by Turkey, Ankara was determined to maintain good relations with Belgrade. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Serbia had an important role and responsibility in the future of the Balkans and that Turkey attached importance to improving relations and cooperation with Serbia both on a bilateral and a regional basis. However, Serbian officials did not balk at withdrawing Vladimir Curgus,

Serbian ambassador to Ankara in protest when Turkey decided to recognize Kosovo's independence.⁷⁷ The Serbian ambassador left Turkey few days after Kosovo's declaration of independence by handing out a note of protest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Expressly stating that bilateral relations should not be expected to be the same any more, the ambassador said that they expected Turkey to revise its decision concerning Kosovo's independence.⁷⁸ The first ostensible sign of this policy was Serbia's refusal to allow Süha Umar, former Turkish ambassador to Belgrade, to submit his credentials to be able to start his official duty in May 2008, not to mention Serbian demonstrators' pelting stones earlier at the Turkish embassy in Belgrade only few days after the declaration of independence.⁷⁹ The Turkish ambassador began his term of office however, as such he was not expected to receive high level acceptance.⁸⁰

The timing of the twist in the nature of relations has come about in such a crisis environment and ended up negotiated in a trilateral mechanism only a year later which can be viewed in the context of the recent “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Whether the policy would be applicable in all the regions surrounding Turkey was and is still questionable, however, the fact remains that almost half of Turkey's foreign trade is with the EU and Serbia is a strategic point for Turkey in this respect.⁸¹

Currently, Serbia's foreign policy agenda rests on Kosovo issue, EU integration, handing over war criminals, restoring relations with the Bosnia-Herzegovina and restoring Serbia's international image. In the light of these, Belgrade is making efforts for bolstering its place in local, regional and international politics. Although it is too early for bold expectations, the course of ongoing efforts can be expected to continue in the established trilateral mechanism as long as no essential

77 “Turkey Recognizes Kosovo, Advises Parties to Stay Calm”, *Turkish Daily News*, February 20, 2008.

78 “Serbian Envoy Leaves Turkey in Protest”, February 21, *Turkish Daily News*, 2008.

79 Barçın Yinanç, “Serbia Snubs Turkish Envoy”, *Turkish Daily News*, May 2, 2008

80 Umar started his duty and unlike expectations, he could overcome the bureaucratic hurdles quite soon and was able to establish contacts with the country's ministers without even submitting his credentials. In an interview he stated that the timing of Turkey to recognize Kosovo was not well-arranged and is of the opinion that Ankara should have waited for some time, at least until he was posted to Belgrade. He also says that the Serbian administration felt betrayed by Ankara because during previous contacts in 2007, the Serbian officials were told by their Turkish counterparts that Turkey would recognize Kosovo, but not soon. Umar states that the immediate recognition of independence created a feeling of betrayal on the part of the Serbs and led to a crisis with Serbia; Leyla Tavşanoğlu, “Yugoslavya Kulağımıza Küpe Olsun”, [“Yugoslavia Should be a Lesson for Us”], *Cumhuriyet*, January 4, 2011.

81 Annually, more than 120 thousand Turkish lorries pass through Serbia.

divergences arise in agenda-setting and policy implementation as well as future topics. Turkish-Serbian relations have not attracted new enmities after 2008. The main determinant in shaping the future course of relations towards either an enhanced rapprochement or a return to limited prospects will be the degree of political willingness on both sides as well as how Serbia accommodates its policies towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Given the current state-of-affairs, Turkish-Serbian relations seem to reflect a picture not totally free from political problems, whilst harboring many chances for advancing economic links. How and when the two governments will be able to elevate the level of relations to at least those achieved between Turkey and other regional states and whether the trilateral mechanism cooperation will last, remain to be seen in the medium term.

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REASONS FOR THE NEGLECTED KHOJALY GENOCIDE IN THE NEGLECTED NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Jeylan MAMMADOVA

Abstract: *If “more than 600 people were killed” intentionally by one group of people on February 26, 1992 in Khojaly, Azerbaijan, why is it that the dominant member states of the international community—specifically the European Union (EU), the Organization of Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—have not accepted that the massacre was genocide, while only three states, Mexico, Pakistan and Colombia, have already recognized it as such (“Pakistani Senate Recognizes” 2012)? Global powers do not recognize the case as genocide, not because the killings were not committed at a level of genocide, but because of two key factors: first, confirmation of the occurrence of the genocide does not benefit their international political and economic interests and second, recognition does not benefit their internal political interests (defined by interest groups). This research paper develops an existing argument of the primacy of the theory of Realpolitik in light of neglected human rights issues, in this case the Khojaly massacre. The paper builds on the main theory of the clash between human rights and realism and then outlines the shortcomings of the limited literature on the Khojaly massacre. The paper focuses on nine countries that have played an important role in the discussion of the recognition of the massacre (U.S., Russia, France, Germany, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, Mexico, and UK), and observes their current approach to the issue through expert opinion and data that strongly yields evidence for the realist approach of certain countries in discussing the Khojaly massacre.*

Keywords: *Hodjaly, Massacre, Genocide, Nagorno-Karabakh, Realism, Human Rights.*

İHMAL EDİLMİŞ DAĞLIK-KARABAĞ ANLAŞMAZLIĞINDA, HOCALI SOYKIRIMI'NIN İHMAL EDİLMESİNİN NEDENLERİ

Öz: Eğer, 26 Şubat 1992 tarihinde Hocalı, Azerbaycan'da 600'den fazla insan kasıtlı olarak bir grup tarafından öldürüldü ise; neden uluslararası camianın baskın üye ülkeleri [özellikle de Avrupa Birliği (AB), Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı (AGİT), ve Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK)] katliamın soykırım olduğunu kabul etmedi de; Meksika, Pakistan ve Kolombiya bu şekilde tanıdı? Küresel güçler, cürümün soykırım düzeyinde işlenmemesinden değil, iki anahtar sebep ile vakayı soykırım olarak tanımamaktadırlar. Bunların birincisi, olayların soykırım olarak teyit edilmesinin uluslar arası siyasi ve ekonomik çıkarlarına yararı olmaması; ikincisi ise, ikrarın iç siyasi çıkarlara (çıkar gruplarınca tanımlanan) fayda sağlamamasıdır. Bu çalışma, var olan Realpolitik teorisinin önceliği savını, ihmal edilmiş İnsan Hakları meselelerinin ışığında (Bu hususta Hocalı Katliamı), geliştirmektedir. Çalışma insan hakları ve realizm arasındaki çarpışma teorisine dayanmaktadır ve Hocalı Katliamı üzerine yazın sınırlılığının eksikliğini özetlemektedir. Çalışma, katliamın tanınmasında önemli rol oynayan dokuz ülkeye odaklanır (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Rusya, Fransa, Almanya, Türkiye, İsrail, Pakistan, Meksika ve Birleşik Krallık), ve bu ülkelerin meseleye şimdiki yaklaşımlarını; Hocalı Katliamını tartışırken belirli ülkelerin realist yaklaşımına güçlü kanıtlar sağlayan uzman görüşü ve veriler ışığında gözlemler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Hocalı, Katliam, Soykırım, Dağlık Karabağ, Realizm, İnsan Hakları.*

Background

1. Historical Overview

After gaining their independence in 1991, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated. Because they had “retain[ed] their old borders,” Nagorno-Karabakh remained part of Azerbaijan. Aware that any claim on Karabakh would risk its international standing, Armenia recognized it as an “independent” state.¹ This led to war, in which the Armenians

¹ Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), p.161.

attacked the town of Khojaly² On 25-26 February, the Armenians along with the Soviet 366th Regiment surrounded the town. With “only one exit [open] out of Khojaly,” the civilians in an attempt to escape “emerged onto” the Armenian village of Nakhichevanik, where they were shot.³ The statement by Serzh Sarkisian, the Armenian military leader, that the Armenians were “able to break” the Azerbaijani stereotype that “the Armenians...could not raise their hand against the civilian population” made the massacre appear as an intentional act of killing.

2. International Stance

It is vital to understand the role of the nine countries observed in the Khojaly massacre before analyzing the reasons behind their approach to the issue.

USA—The “commercial interests [of the U.S.] in the region” shape its interest in having “a favorable business investment climate rather than” resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh” conflict.⁴ It signed the “Bilateral Investment Treaty with Azerbaijan,” which specifies that it would aid Azerbaijan “to develop its economy” through “conditions more favorable to U.S. private investment”.⁵

Russia—Russia has continuously sought “military presence,” as well as a part in the “oil and natural gas concessions in Azerbaijan”.⁶ As a “regional power,” it “kept Turkish ambitions in check”.⁷ Armenia has been its “reliable ally” in the Caucasus.⁸

France—Initially, France participated ‘without any knowledge in the region, the core of the conflict, without any tools of pressure on the parties’.⁹ It now is mostly interested in creating energy agreements with Azerbaijan.¹⁰

2 Ibid. pp. 169-170.

3 Ibid. p. 170

4 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) p. 31.

5 William J. Clinton, 2002. “Letter of Transmittal” *Investment Treaty With Azerbaijan* (Washington : U.S. G.P.O, 2000) p. 2.

6 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. pp. 31-32.

7 Ibid. p. 32.

8 Ibid. p. 31.

9 Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), p. 229.

10 Svante Cornell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2011), p. 15.

Turkey—Turkey has supported Azerbaijan and recognizes “Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory”.¹¹ The Armenians have tried to improve relations with Turkey¹², primarily because the reopening of “the closed borders” would reduce “transport costs between Armenia and Turkey...by between a third and a half”.¹³

UK—UK has had “interests in oil equipment, communications and agriculture, and they are poised for further investment in banking and insurance” in Azerbaijan.¹⁴

Germany—The Republic has acted mainly through the EU and seeks energy supply from Azerbaijan.¹⁵

Israel—Azerbaijan had been an area of asylum for Jews during World War II, for which the Israelis have been very grateful.¹⁶ There has been an escalation in the trade relations between the two, as Azerbaijan recently purchased 1.6\$ billion worth of military goods from Israel. Azerbaijan supplies 30% of Israel’s energy.¹⁷

Mexico—Mexico is one of the three countries that has recognized the Khojaly massacre as genocide. It has interests in improving trade relations with Azerbaijan.¹⁸

Pakistan—Pakistan is also one of the three countries that has recognized the Khojaly massacre as genocide and has not recognized Armenia.¹⁹

11 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) p. 33.

12 Ibid p. 33.

13 Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003) p. 277.

14 Gerard Chaliand, *The Caucasian Knot: History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabak*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) p. 35.

15 Federal Foreign Office, “Azerbaijan” *Auswaertiges*, 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Aserbajdschan_node.html. Last Accessed: February 2012.

16 “Researchers of Holocaust Visit Exhibition Devoted to Khojaly Genocide,” *Contact*, February 24 2012, <http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Politics/02242287en.html>, Last Accessed: February 27, 2012.

17 Sheera Frenkel, “Israel’s New Ties to Azerbaijan” *The Miami Herald*, April 26 2012, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/04/26/2768826/israels-new-ties-to-azerbaijan.html>, Last Accessed: February 17, 2012.

18 “Azerbaijan, Mexico to Boost Energy Cooperation” *New Europe*, November 15, 2009, <http://www.neurope.eu/article/azerbaijan-mexico-boost-cooperation>, Accessed March 10 , 2012.

19 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Pakistan Worldview: Report-21: Visit to Azerbaijan* (December 2008), http://www.foreignaffairscommittee.org/includes/content_files/Report%2021%20-

Conceptual Framework

The seeming appropriateness of the definition of “genocide” (provided by the Convention of Genocide) to the case of Khojaly is what initiated my questioning of why the massacre—the “killing [of] a number of usually helpless...human beings under circumstances of atrocity”²⁰ — has not been officially recognized as genocide. Genocide is “any...act... committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (Convention on Genocide). These “acts” include: “killing members of the group”; “causing serious ...harm to...the group”; intentionally “inflicting on the group conditions of life...to bring about its physical destruction”; prescribing “measures...to prevent births within the group”; and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Convention on Genocide). Since the Convention states “any of the following acts,” the killing of 613 people, instructed by the Armenian government²¹, appears to at least apply to the first condition, making this massacre (as defined by Merriam-Webster) an act of genocide.

The clash between human rights and realism further contributed to my questioning of the reasons behind the lack of attention attributed to the case of the massacre in the international community. (As noted in the introduction, the international community refers to the member states of the EU, OSCE, and the UNSC—bodies that have been active in addressing the issue.) In *Diplomacy of Conscience*, Ann Marie Clark discusses this clash, conveying “human rights norms as challenges to sovereignty”²². If as Clark notes “the legal force of human rights claims...has grown”²³, why is it that only three states have recognized the Khojaly massacre? Thus, the state seems to remain dominant, as explained by the theory of political realism—a theory that “consider(s) the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests” and view “the relevance of ethical norms to” state relations with “skepticism”.²⁴

²⁰ Visit%20to%20Azerbaijan.pdf, Last Accessed April 3, 2012.

²⁰ “Massacre,” *Merriam-Webster*, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/massacre?show=0>, Last Accessed March 14, 2012.

²¹ Besir Mustafayev, “Ermeni Devlet Terörünün Eseri: 26 Subat 1992 Hocalı Soykırımı Üzerine,” *KaradenizArastirmalari* 29, trans. JeylanMammadova (2011). <http://search.proquest.com/docview/865320136?accountid=12605>, Last Accessed February 17, 2012, pp. 23-41.

²² Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 22.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 23.

²⁴ Julian W. Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University, 2010) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>, Last Accessed 17 Feb. 2012.

Clark challenges this theory through the case of the success of Amnesty International in “elicit[ing] expectations of governmental accountability”.²⁵ The notion that states are influenced by international norms and institutions “because of a sense of obligation” further counters the theory behind the primacy of states.²⁶ However, still bearing in mind that multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN) are run by states, Dani Rodrik’s argument on the dominance of the nation-state in an age of globalization appears more convincing (especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, in which it was states and not global institutions that carried the responsibility to deal with the issue). He indicates that “economic, social, and political activity remains clustered on the basis of... needs...that vary around the globe.” For him, “solutions” to “challenges” still remain in the nation-state.²⁷

Thus, “international recognition” of those who “seek to conceal their crimes” is “difficult,” as diplomats are constrained by “*Realpolitik* strategies that place a higher value on protecting national security than on” human rights.²⁸ While all differ in the degree of violence conducted, why is it that international “diplomacy” failed in East Timor and Rwanda? Alvarez answers, saying that “since most states practice variants of *Realpolitik*, a policy that values...self-interest through the pursuit of power, individual states may be [unsuitable] agents for genocide identification”.²⁹ Hence, it appears that the state, although challenged by human rights norms, still remains dominant. Human rights norms, established in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights³⁰ are too new to have a strong effect on the nation-state—a product of the French Revolution”.³¹ This may mean that it is the lack of the state interest in the Khojaly massacre that has resulted in the few official recognitions of it as genocide.

What then influences the nation-states’ interests? Some like Thomas Amboriso and Eric M. Uslaner claim that “ethnic interest groups” (in the U.S.) influence American foreign policy. These groups (in the U.S.)

25 Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*, p. 17.

26 Ibid. p. 30.

27 Dani Rodrik, “The Nation-State Reborn,” *Project Syndicate*, (2012) <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rodrik67/English>, Last Accessed February 17, 2012.

28 Alex Alvarez, Governments, *Citizens and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) p. 137.

29 Ibid. p. 142.

30 Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*, p. 11.

31 Dani Rodrik, “The Nation-State Reborn,” *Project Syndicate*.

will be evaluated as “political organizations established along cultural, ethnic, religious or racial lines which seek to directly and indirectly influence American foreign policy in support of their homeland and/or ethnic kin abroad”.³²

Others, such as Robert Dalziel and Takayuki Yoshioka, agree that interest and pressure groups influence policymaking; these groups will be evaluated (in areas specified in the introduction) as “often voluntary organizations representing the views of individuals that share some political, social or other goals”.³³ “Lobbying” is what “interest groups” do “to influence public policy”.³⁴

As active actors, diasporas—“people with a common origin who reside...outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland”—also have an impact on their hostland’s foreign policy.³⁵ Barth and Shain explore the “aspects affecting the efficiency of diasporic influence” through factors of “degree of motivation,” nature of homeland and hostland, as well as the “strength [of] relations between the hostland and homeland”—concepts that are difficult to quantitatively measure. Therefore, this study identifies diaspora organizations (any advocacy groups that are organized by one diaspora), population, and political parties (that support the cause of or are led by a diaspora) as measures of the diaspora’s impact on the hostland’s foreign policy. Besides such internal political influences, the states’ economic interests will also be evaluated through their total trade (exports and imports) with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Because Azerbaijan has oil and natural gas, any country’s economic activity in Azerbaijan will impact that country’s approach towards the massacre.

This study will also examine the role of media (newspapers) in addressing the issue. While newspapers provide information appealing to the public opinion, if popular and credible, they will also address important issues in foreign affairs.

32 Thomas Ambrosio, “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups,” *Review of International Affairs* 2 (1), 2002, pp. 24-45, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/60474963?accountid=12605>, p. 26.

33 Robert Dalziel, “Interest and Pressure Groups,” *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Anheier K. Helmut and Toepler Stefan. Springer Science and Business Media, LLC, 2010. Last Accessed February 17, 2012. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/p8261g22480k2h4m/fulltext.html>, . Last Accessed: February 17, 2012, p. 1.

34 Yoshioka Takayuki, “Lobbying” *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler (Springer Science and Business Media, LLC, 2010) Last Accessed: February 17, 2012, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/g99275524517601g/fulltext.html> p.1.

35 Aharon Barth and Shain Yossi, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory” *International Organization*, Volume 57, Issue 03, pp 449-479 (The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press, July 24 2003) Last Accessed: March 25, 2012, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573015>, pp. 452-453.

IV. Literature Review

Mustafayev Besir presents a historical account of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in his “Armenian State’s Work of Terror: On the 26 February 1992 Khojaly Genocide.” He highlights the relationship between the Armenians and the West by noting that “using their religion...the Armenians have always... pulled the West to their side... and always sided with the strong”.³⁶ For him, they took advantage of any opportunity they found in the West (U.S. and Western Europe), as they “did with the Byzantines, Iranians and the Ottomans”.³⁷

Furthermore, he emphasizes that despite the decisions of the Council of European Union (CEU) and the UNSC, Armenians continue to occupy the Karabagh territory.³⁸ However, while he notes that “the countries defending international law... [and] having criticized Turkey for the [Armenian] genocide...have...ignored the [Turk-Azeri] genocide”³⁹, he does not stress the lack of decisions by the CEU and the UNSC on the Khojaly massacre. Also, while he suggests that “those who are responsible” for the killings in Khojaly should be prosecuted through international law to make the other states become aware of the massacre⁴⁰, he does not specify what “international law” is and by whom it should be enforced.

In another piece, the “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups,” Thomas Ambrosio highlights the “role of ethnic interest groups in the foreign policy process”.⁴¹ He stresses that Armenian lobbyists were the cause of Congress’s support “for the...annexation of...15[%]...of Azerbaijani territory,” contrary to” official US policy” that supports the” territorial integrity of all Soviet successor states”.⁴² Ambrosio notes that the “American-Armenian lobby” is fortunate, as no one really knew the issues that they were promoting in the 1990s.

36 Besir Mustafayev, “Ermeni Devlet Terörünün Eseri: 26 Subat 1992 Hocalı Soykırımı Üzerine,” p. 2.

37 Ibid. pp. 2-3.

38 Ibid. p. 13.

39 Ibid. p. 16.

40 Ibid. p. 16.

41 Ibid. p. 25.

42 Thomas Ambrosio, “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups” p. 25.

He further stresses that Azerbaijani lobbying “only [began] in 1993,” and “grew once... [Azerbaijan’s] oil exports and...[its] alliance with some pro-Israeli lobbies” garnered U.S. interest⁴³, indicating the link between U.S. interests and its foreign policy. Still for the most part of the early 1990s, the U.S. supported Armenia due to the “perceptions of Azerbaijan promoted by the Armenian-American” lobbyists,”⁴⁴

However, while Ambrosio prefers to maintain a diplomatic stance⁴⁵, he does not do so as he points to the Armenian takeover of Khojaly, Shusha, and Lachin and their one-sided report on the abuses the Armenians faced.⁴⁶ Noting the “defeat” of the Wilson Amendment, which would have allowed the Clinton Administration to provide more aid to the Azerbaijanis, Ambrosio conveys the “greater importance” of holding “a tough stance against Azerbaijan” over providing aid to “the one million Azeri refugees”.⁴⁷

Evgeny Finkel’s “In Search of Lost Genocide: Historical Policy and International Politics in Post-1989 Eastern Europe” introduces a new notion “discuss[ing] the tendency of many post-communist states to present their past sufferings as genocides”⁴⁸ in four cases, including the Khojaly massacre.⁴⁹ He exemplifies the “commemoration day,” 31 March, on which events are arranged for “the highest state officials” to “attend,” as an occasion that has gathered much attention.⁵⁰ Although, he discusses the support provided by the “Turkish Diaspora and the Turkish state” as well as the growing attention to the massacre in the Capitol Hill and in Israel,⁵¹ he presents these advancements as part of a “genocide narrative”.⁵²

While Finkel states that his article does not aim “to determine whether the killings” were committed at the level of genocide⁵³, he presents the Khojaly massacre as a case of “post-Soviet historical narrative

43 Ibid. p. 30.

44 Ibid. p. 33.

45 Ibid. p. 37.

46 Ibid. p. 38.

47 Ibid. p. 39.

48 Ibid. p. 51.

49 Ibid. p. 57.

50 Evgeny Finkel, “In Search of Lost Genocide: Historical Policy and International Politics in Post-1989 Eastern Europe,” *Global Society* 24 (1), pp. 51-70. 2010, doi:10.1080/13600820903432027, p. 58.

51 Ibid. p. 59.

52 Ibid. p. 60.

53 Ibid. p. 52.

construction”⁵⁴, which correlates with his definition of “historical mythmaking” or “historical policy”—reviving “public discourse about the past by means of different forms of institutionalizing it” for purposes, such as “state-building”.⁵⁵ Hence, he implies that the claims of genocide are not authentic. The comparison of the Khojaly to the claims of genocide in other areas of Eastern and Central Europe ignores the reasons (such as Armenian-American lobbyist activities) to the Azerbaijani struggle in promoting its cause. He also ignores whether or not the international community identifies the “narratives” as genocides.

In *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, Svante E. Cornell provides a detailed account of Azerbaijan since its independence from USSR. He observes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in light of the foreign (primarily Western and Middle Eastern) involvement in Azerbaijan. He highlights the failure of the international community to resolve the the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (hence, also the Khojaly massacre). Cornell questions the efficiency of the Minsk Group (whose co-chairs are France, U.S. and Russia) in dealing with the issue by emphasizing that the Group is where diplomats (even though they do not) have to make decisions apart from their political leadership. He also notes Azerbaijan’s “sensitiv[ity] to political changes in Russia, Turkey, Iran, and...the United States”.⁵⁶ He further underscores Turkey’s failure to “achieve its full potential for a strong Turkish presence in Azerbaijan”⁵⁷, pointing to Turkey’s fear that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. could cause Congress to “ban...military aid to” it.⁵⁸ Cornell justifies this fear by noting Section 907a that banned “all government...assistance by the United States to Azerbaijan” until the Azerbaijani government “cease[d] all...offensive uses” against the Armenians⁵⁹⁻⁶⁰. The strength of Armenian lobbies is further shown with the ignorance of Senator John F. Kerry (who drafted the act) about the conflict⁶¹. Essentially, the West (U.S. and Western Europe) had failed as it also continued “development cooperation,” focusing on everything but the conflict⁶².

54 Ibid. p. 57.

55 Ibid. p. 53.

56 Svante Cornell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, p. 172.

57 Ibid. p. 172.

58 Ibid. p. 370.

59 Ibid. p. 405.

60 Ibid. p. 370.

61 Ibid. p. 406.

62 Ibid. p. 196.

Overall Cornell does an excellent job in conveying the interests of great powers in Azerbaijan. However, he addressed everything about Azerbaijan, but the Khojaly massacre—a vital part of Azerbaijani history. Although he discusses the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he fails to mention a key event that very much shapes Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy.

As shown, the shortcomings of the literature on this topic convey the lack of research exploring the direct link between states' interests and their obligation to the international community. Most literature focuses on failed diplomacy in dealing with state violations of human rights. Also, due to the recent occurrence of the massacre, the literature on this topic is still very limited.

Research Methodology—

I employed mixed methods (a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods). I relied on available data and unstructured interviews for my qualitative methods, and used descriptive statistics for my quantitative data. This research paper focuses on Russia, U.S., France, UK, and Germany—the key countries that have the power to influence the views of other states in the international community regarding this issue. It also examines the roles of Mexico and Pakistan (to see why they accepted the Khojaly massacre as genocide) as well as Israel, whose trade relations with Azerbaijan have recently escalated. (Colombia is not included as it recognized the massacre recently, leaving no time for careful analysis.)

I conducted unstructured interviews with two diplomats from the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Together they were expected to provide a diplomatic and a legal view of the issue. These diplomats have served in Europe and in the Middle East and thus have a thorough understanding of the different approaches of the designated countries to the issue. (For security purposes the names of the two diplomats are not provided.)

To balance the Azerbaijani interviewees, I also interviewed five professors specializing in different aspects of international relations, including Russian and Eurasian Studies, Politics, International Security and Human Rights, and Mexican History. (Again, the names of the professors are not provided for security purposes). Each professor was

expected to provide an objective view that may be lacking in the information provided by the other interviewees. The seven interviewees were each asked to describe the role of the countries observed in the Khojaly massacre.

Unfortunately, I did not have access to Armenian sources, as their embassy officials are very sensitive to any discussion of the topic. Existing interviews proved to also be insufficient as they primarily focus on Armenian officials and academics rejecting the massacre.

After conducting all of the interviews, responses were categorized into overlapping subjects of discussion. For each of the countries observed there were three to four categories that were most widely addressed in all of the interviews. These categories were then reorganized into broader categories, such as economic, religious and other factors shaping the state approach to the issue (Table 1). The fact that all of the interviewees have knowledge of the issue, but have a different vocational focus, adds validity to the identified categories.

For descriptive statistics, data was compiled regarding the Azerbaijani and Armenian diaspora activity in the countries observed. Data regarding the current number of main diaspora organizations, political parties, and population were collected to analyze the impact of each diaspora on the designated countries. "Diaspora organizations" were chosen according to their significance, which was identified by whether they supported either diaspora. (Because Azerbaijani and Armenian organizations are commonly opposed to one another, the activities of one strive to inhibit the activities of the other). All of the organizations identified themselves either Azerbaijani or Armenian, and transnational organizations were not included.

To measure the importance of the case in the media, newspapers were chosen from a list provided by "4 International Media and Newspapers" on the 200 most popular world newspapers. This source ranks the newspapers through data from an algorithm of three "independent web metrics".⁶³ The newspapers selected have an English version, to ensure that they are accessible to an audience beyond their local one. Lexis-Nexis was used to find how many times the Khojaly massacre was covered in "all news" from the years of 1990-2012. Such would show how many times the massacre was addressed and indicate any existing trend.

63 "About Us," *4IMN (4 International Media & Newspapers)*, 2012, <http://www.4imn.com/menu/about.htm#ranking>, Last Accessed: March 20, 2012.

Data were also collected on the total trade (exports and imports) of each country with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Different sources had to be used, as all of the data could not be provided by one source. However, for accuracy, sources containing data for the same years were compared and if the difference was none or negligible, only then were the new data sources used. Then the mean of all of the total trade was calculated and ranked. (Because data for trade in 1997-2010 was not available for all of the countries, to ensure consistency the mean was calculated only for the years of 2008-2010 (Appendix II).

Finally, using all of the descriptive statistics, a scale was created to measure the involvement of each country in the issue and its economic relationship with Azerbaijan. If the economic interest was 50% or higher than any of the other factors accounting for the overall involvement of the country in the issue, then it was assumed that there is little interest in the massacre. (Because there is no information on the specific investment of each country in the Khojaly massacre, the “economic interest” was measured by the country’s total trade with Azerbaijan as the percentage of its overall involvement in the issue.) The overall involvement was determined by other factors: the resolutions passed (state, local, country), total trade with Azerbaijan, military interests in Azerbaijan, media coverage (data used from the top newspapers) and finally recognition of the issue by individuals in the political realm of each country (collected through news articles in the “all news” search of Lexis-Nexis).

Findings:

Qualitative: The interviews show a strict emphasis on economic and political factors (measured by the impact of the Armenian lobby, regional dominance/influence, and fear of another power) (Table 1). In all of the interviews, interest in Azerbaijani oil and natural gas was mentioned for every country and by at least 50% of the interviewees. For eight of the nine countries, 83.33% of the interviewees or higher discussed the countries’ interest in Azerbaijani oil and natural gas. Moreover, the impact of the Armenian lobby appears strongest in the U.S. and France and somewhat in Turkey, conveying the strength of the Armenian lobby in those areas. Religion was a factor discussed (for five of the nine countries observed), but there was no agreement as to where it would have a strong influence. There appears to be an emphasis on the “past” for Russia and Pakistan. (Russia was treated as the ally of Armenia, whereas Pakistan was treated as the ally of Azerbaijan).

Table 1: Responses (by % of Interviewees) Arranged Into Categories

Factors	Religion	Economic Interest (Oil and	Impact of AR Lobby	Past	Regional Influence	Fear Larger Power	Military	Human Rights
Countries								
USA	33.33%	100%	100%	33.33%	50%	0	0%	14.27%
UK	0	100%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	50%	83.33%		0	0	50%	0
Russia	50.00%	100%	50%	83.33%	100%	0	50%	0
France	33.33%	83.33%	83.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Turkey	14.27%	83.33%	50%	50%	83.33%	33.30%	0.00%	0.00%
Germany	0	100%	0	33.33%	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	16.66%	83.33%	0	83.33%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Mexico	0	100%	0	0	0	0		14.27%

However, there also appears to be no consensus on the factors of military, human rights, or fear of larger powers. Moreover, while most of the emphasis is on economic and internal political influence (lobby groups), external political factors, such as the past allegiances, as well as fear of a stronger power, show the importance of the political interests of these countries.

Quantitative:

Table 2: Diasporic Influence (See Appendix I for details on measurement) All in Single Units

Column 1	AZ MD Orgs.	AR MD Orgs.	AZ P. P.	AR P. P.	AR P	AZ P
UK	6	13	0	0	15-20,000	70,000
Germany	30	40	0	0	40000	300,000
France	6	500	0	0	450-500,000	70,000
US	20	29	0	3	1,200,000	1,000,000
Russia	10	*	0	0	1182388	603070
Turkey	21	35	0	0.5	82,000	3,000,000
Mexico	0	0	0	0	400	26,000
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	350,000
Israel	1	5	0	0	13000	-


As shown in Table 2, Armenian diaspora organizations (AR MD Orgs.) heavily outnumber Azerbaijani organizations (AZ MD Orgs.) in all of the countries. The difference is largest for France, where Armenian diaspora organizations outnumber the Azerbaijani organizations by a ratio of 250: 3. As for the population, the Armenian diaspora is mostly dominant in France, U.S. Russia, and Israel. Likewise, the Azerbaijani population is comparatively larger in the UK, Germany, Turkey, Mexico, and Pakistan. This corresponds to the current political relations between Azerbaijan (AZ P) and the four countries in which its population is larger than the Armenian population (AR P). However, even though Armenia has a smaller population than that of Azerbaijan in Turkey, the direct support for its diaspora by a political party⁶⁴ in Turkey is indicative of stronger political activity by the Armenian diaspora. Likewise, the three Armenian political parties in the U.S. provide the Armenian diaspora with a strong and accessible political platform.

With a stronger Armenian political presence in the U.S. and in Turkey, it would be difficult to pass any parliamentary resolutions on the Khojaly massacre. Likewise, with the stronger Armenian lobby presence in France, it seems almost impossible to address the Khojaly massacre at a political level. In Pakistan and Mexico, where the Armenian presence is smaller (in population), stronger political activity regarding the Khojaly massacre is possible without much Armenian protest. UK, Germany, and Israel appear to be less influenced by either diaspora.

Furthermore, the Khojaly Massacre has been increasingly addressed by world newspapers within the past seven years. As shown in Figure 3, before 2008 the issue was addressed minimally. This could correspond to the increasing interest in Azerbaijani oil and natural gas supplies particularly in the past five years (see appendix 1).

64 Vercihan Zifioglu, "Forgotten Community Seeks to Join Elections With New Party" *Hürriyet Daily News*, May 5, 2011, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=a-forgotten-community-seeks-to-join-elections-with-a-new-party-2011-05-16>, Last Accessed: April 2, 2012.


Figure 3: How Many Times the Khojaly Massacre Addressed in World Newspapers (1992-2012)



Source: Data compiled from AllNews.“Khojaly” LexisNexis.
[http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?](http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/)

Turkey’s *Hurriyet* addressed the massacre the most; Russian *Kommersant* and U.S.’ *The New York Times* were the second and third newspapers in addressing the massacre the most. All of the other newspapers (shown in Figure 4) hardly addressed the issue, conveying a lack of importance placed on the topic in the political agenda of the corresponding country. Moreover, the English editions of the newspapers didn’t address the issue at all (except *Hurriyet Daily News*), meaning that the issue wasn’t important enough to be shared with an international audience.

Figure 4: Number of Times Khojaly Was Addressed in the World’s Most Popular Ranked Newspapers (since 1992)



As shown in Figure 5, Azerbaijan’s major trading partner is the U.S., whereas Armenia’s major trading partner is Russia. The U.S. (the fourth largest trading partner of Armenia), does not have high trade attachments to Armenia, as it does to Azerbaijan. However, the trade relations of Armenia with Russia convey the openness of the Armenian economy to Russian trade (which is much less welcome in Azerbaijan)⁶⁵. Azerbaijan

65 Svante Comell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, pp. 349-353.

has the smallest trade with Turkey, while Turkey ranks as the third largest trading partner of Armenia. This could explain the reluctance of Turkey to officially recognize the Khojaly massacre, and the continuous desire of the Armenians to maintain and improve relations with Turkey. Germany in terms of (trade relations) appears to be a neutral party, as it ranks second for both. Pakistan’s trade relations with Azerbaijan (which are much higher than with Armenia) imply another factor of its support for Azerbaijan in the larger Karabakh conflict.

Table 5: Trade Relations in thous. USD (Ranked From Smallest to Largest)

AZERBAIJAN			ARMENIA	
Country	Mean (thous. USD)		Country	Mean (thous. USD)
Turkey	4902.48		Pakistan	3819.8
Russia	5019.74667		Mexico	4706.83333
UK	961271.463		Israel	20777.6667
Israel	1129643.44		UK	51996.7333
Mexico	1888909.65		France	100453.133
France	2167945.65		USA	217611.633
Pakistan	2269046.99		Turkey	220185.667
Germany	2829274.68		Germany	357756.667
USA	2999685.96		Russia	984931.6

Finally a scale was created to measure each country’s involvement in the issue, including each country’s economic involvement in Azerbaijan (Figure 6). For most of the countries, economic interest in Azerbaijan surpasses any of the other factors accounting for their overall involvement in the issue. Some 26.47% of the U.S. involvement is economic interest and about 43% is accounted for by the resolutions passed. The rest of the involvement in the issue comprises of media and individual statements of recognition. (This is a relatively balanced involvement in the issue.) Some 50% of UK’s involvement is solely economic and the rest of its involvement in the issue is through the media. About 58.33% of Israeli involvement is economic and therefore, having little to do with the issue itself. 50% of Russian and 54.54% of France’s involvement is economic and the rest of the involvement in the issue is based on media coverage. Turkey is the most balanced between the five indicators with no primacy in either of the categories (22.22% of its involvement is economic). Mexico’s and Pakistan’s involvement is mostly based on the resolutions they passed (as their economic interest is less than 20%).

Figure 6: Scale on Each Country's Involvement in Khojaly in %

Country2	Economic Interest (Total Trade)	Military	Recognition	Media	Resolution
USA	26.47%	5.88%	5.88%	8.82%	52.94%
UK	50%	16.66%		33.33%	
Israel	58.33%	33.33%		8.33%	
Russia	50.00%	10%		40%	
France	54.54%	0		18.18%	
Turkey	22.22%	27.77%	22.22%	27.78%	
Germany	72.72%	18.18%		9.09%	
Mexico	9.09%	0		9.09%	54.55%
Pakistan	15.38%	30.77%		7.69%	46.15%

Moreover, because involvement in the issue is still small (see appendix I), it could be concluded that UK, Israel, Russia, France, and Germany are involved due to economic reasons (meaning more interested in Azerbaijan's resources than in resolving the current conflict). Although the U.S. has a more balanced involvement in the issue, it is important to note that resolutions passed were at state level, which is not likely to influence America's national stance on the issue. Also, although Mexico's and Pakistan's involvement is based on the resolutions they have passed, it is important to bear in mind that each has indicated interest in establishing an economic partnership with Azerbaijan⁶⁶. Only Turkey appears to be the country upholding a balance between the economic, political, and other factors accounting for its involvement. However, Turkey is still more interested in improving economic relations with Armenia than officially recognizing the issue, as its trade costs would markedly decrease if it does so.⁶⁷

Conclusion

As shown by the interviews conducted and the data collected, most of the countries observed have not increasingly addressed the issue, as trade and internal political interest groups are of primary interest to them. Figure 1 and 6 show a very futile overall involvement in the issue (except by Mexico and Pakistan, countries that have officially recognized the massacre). The findings of this research are applicable not only to the case of the Khojaly massacre, but also to other neglected human rights issues whether those that have already experienced failed diplomacy, such as the conflicts in East Timor, Bosnia, and Rwanda or

66 "Pakistan and Azerbaijan to strengthen economic ties" *New Europe*, August 17, 2011, <http://www.neweurope.eu/article/pakistan-and-azerbaijan-strengthen-economic-ties>, Last Accessed: March 3, 2012.

67 Thomas de Waal, *Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*, p. 277.

those that are currently experiencing it, such as in Syria. Resolving this issue and the like is thus, essential for understanding and preventing similar conflicts. In order to resolve issues dealing with genocide, the approach of the international community to cases of genocide must first be observed, as it is unlikely (in the case of the Khojaly massacre) that the Azerbaijani nation will ever accept a resolution of the conflict without first addressing the massacre it underwent. Moreover, by observing the approach of key countries (France, Germany, UK, USA, and Russia) in the international community (UNSC, OSCE, and EU) as well as those that are influenced (Turkey and Israel) and that are not influenced (Pakistan and Mexico) by that international community, this research paper sheds light on the role of international bodies (UN, OSCE, and EU) in human rights issues. Further considering that the Armenians were backed by Russian forces in committing such killings⁶⁸, this case resembles a situation where the perpetrators are supported by a global power. What is then the practicality of The Hague and Geneva Conventions as well as of the International Criminal Court if atrocities are not analyzed within a legal context? Ideally, war criminals should be brought to trial when needed and not just when a global power decides it is in its interest to do so, but state interest appears to be an inevitable obstacle at least for the time being. As this study shows, our world is in need of institutions that are not solely based on states, as state interests always outweigh other factors in human rights violations.

68 Besir Mustafayev, "Ermeni Devlet Terörünün Eseri: 26 Subat 1992 Hocalı Soykırımı Üzerine" p. 16.

Appendix 1-Scale of Involvement in Khojaly massacre in Relation to Economic Interest in Azerbaijan

SCALE	Economic	Military	Recognition (statements)	Media	Resolution
USA 34	9	2	Maryland, North Carolina 2	3	Massachusetts, Georgia, Maine, New Jersey, Texas, California=18
UK 6	3	1		2	
Israel 12	7	4		1	
Russia 10	5	1		4	
France 11	6	0		2	
Turkey 18	4	5	4	5	
Germany 11	8	2		1	
Mexico 11	1	0		1	resolution 6
Pakistan 13	2	4		1	resolution 6

Sources: NEWS 2012, ADPRA 2012, TREND 2012, NEWS 2012, NEWS 2012, APA 2012, Today 2012, AZTV 2012, Pakistani Senate 2012

*Economic Interest was ranked by the mean of the total trade of each country for 2008-2010 on a scale of 1-9 (based on Table 5)

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*Military Interest was ranked on a scale of 1-5:

0-No support/No explicit support found

1-Discussion of military aid and stronger cooperation

2-Military cooperation (aid, naval programs, etc.)

3-Civil-military cooperation

4-Military defense cooperation (technology provisions)

5-Guarantor-treaties

6-Full statement that in case of war (Karabakh will support Azerbaijan)

(Russia was given a 1 as there is discussion of increasing cooperation and cooperation whose details are unknown.)

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*Recognition statements (noting the occurrence of the massacre in its commemoration) were ranked on a scale of 1-5

1-statement by statesman or congressman

2-leading political figures encouraging the state to commemorate the event

3-leading political figures encouraging the state to make a public statement regarding the massacre

4-leading political party makes a public statement of recognition

5-leading political party makes an official statement of recognition

*Media is ranked on a scale of 1-5 based on the chart (based on the following Table)

Column1	Original Language
USA: The New York Times	7
UK: The Guardian	4
Ynet News	0
Russia: Kommersant	14
France: Le Monde	3
Turkey: Hurriyet	216
Germany: Bild	0
Mexico: El Universal	0
Pakistan: Dawn	1

Sources: The New York times 2012, The Guardian 2012, YNET, Kommersant, Le Monde 2012, Hurriyet, Bild, El Universal, DawnNEWS

Note: Number that are close to each other like 0 and 1 for Germany and Pakistan and like 3 and 4 for France and the UK, the same rankings were given. (A scale of 1-5 was used to simplify and not exaggerate the impact of the media when evaluating the total involvement of each country).

1-(0-1)

2-(3-4)

3-(5-7)

4-(8-16)

5-(above)

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*Resolution passed (1-6)

1-written statement of commemoration

2-written statement by a party of recognition

3-written statement by state/locals of recognition

4-working paper on parliamentary recognition in discussion

5-woking paper on parliamentary on conditional recognition passed

6-written statement of parliamentary recognition

Appendix 2-Data collected for trade with Armenia and Azerbaijan in thsd. USD

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	Annual 1996	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Means of Trade (2008-2010)
Armenia [bisd. USD]																
USA Export	4366.1	7110	11566.9	16008.4	37861.1	52268.2	46238.3	56105.2	70646.2	62219.1	65055.7	51400.3	52831.1	66961	82710.6	
USA Import	103564.5	116086.6	96301.2	85669.3	102675.1	84152.7	52722	111248	88948.8	111310.6	106271.3	144995.7	218755.4	120760.8	110816	
Total Trade	107930.6	123196.6	107868.1	101677.7	140536.2	136420.9	98960.3	167353.2	159595	173529.7	171327	196396	271586.5	187721.8	193526.6	217611.6333
France Export	420.8	42.4	66.2	520.9	466.3	748.4	1123.6	1932.3	1835	2015.3	4128	9427.2	10595.3	5662.9	7485.6	
France Import	12021.1	19460.7	27413.5	12339.8	17558.7	12047.8	12195.8	15455.4	18818.5	47421.5	71070.2	150217.2	127369.6	73539.4	76706.6	
Total Trade	12441.9	19503.1	27479.7	12860.7	18025	12796.2	13319.4	17387.7	20653.5	49436.8	75198.2	159644.4	137964.9	79202.3	84192.2	100453.1333
Germany Export	3682.6	9281.6	9303.1	10200.8	12917.9	11122.3	28164.1	44419.2	83179.6	152108	148027.8	169676.9	183710.5	114963.2	132616.3	
Germany Import	17365.2	26222.2	34037	34244.2	36486.9	33962	42860.8	43761.5	79166.5	141355.8	145334.5	221144.6	255221.9	176046	210712.1	
Total Trade	21047.8	35503.8	43340.1	44445	49404.8	45084.3	71024.9	88180.7	162346.1	293463.8	293362.3	390821.5	438932.4	291009.2	343328.4	357756.6667
UK Export	3198.7	1160.9	8097.8	9443.9	10099.2	20115.5	51091	42566.7	1193.5	419.3	7618.4	2794.6	40840.9	1753.9	382.6	
UK Import	7105.7	10450.5	69136	67031.3	59480.7	91225.2	28239.5	83261.1	11181.5	11279	22117.5	42253.4	44841	30366.4	37805.4	
Total Trade	10304.4	11611.4	77233.8	76475.2	69579.9	111340.7	79330.5	125827.8	12375	11698.3	29735.9	45048	85681.9	32120.3	38188	51996.73333

Sources: WisefTrade, Armstat.

Armenia (USD)	Annual 1996	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Mean Trade (2008-2010)
Mexico Export												16.4	0.1	0.1	71.3	
Mexico Import												1240.3	2940.4	3697.3	7411.3	
Total Trade												1256.7	2940.5	3697.4	7482.6	4706.833333
Pakistan Export						105.8						3.2	203.4	94.8	412.5	
Pakistan Import						753.5						5620.5	3823	2792.3	4133.4	
Total Trade												5623.7	4026.4	2887.1	4545.9	3819.8
Russia Export	96141	62898.5	39986.3	33855.5	44559.9	60501.3	64634	94418.2	77897.7	119004.2	121155.6	201542.5	208174.9	107426.3	160507.8	
Russia Import	125497.2	215862.1	191403.2	149877.7	137157.5	173648	192897.6	203374.1	159687.2	242632.4	304170.8	720440.4	851172.5	792241.6	835271.7	
Total Trade	221638.2	278760.6	231389.5	183733.2	181717.4	234149.3	257531.6	297792.3	237584.9	361636.6	425326.4	921982.9	1059347.4	899667.9	955779.5	984931.6
Turkey Export	6031.2	7152.7	2987.5	1128.5	1527.9	1130	1435.8	1154.7	2021.2	2473.4	2370.5	3033	1850.9	1197.5	1291.3	
Turkey Import	6254.5	38395.6	56779.8	40152.2	40462.4	33755.9	38232	36731.8	44804.7	66928	95422.9	130631.3	268187.3	177648.8	210381.2	
Total Trade	12285.7	45548.3	59767.3	41280.7	41990.3	34885.9	39667.8	37886.5	46825.9	69401.4	97793.4	133664.3	270038.2	178846.3	211672.5	220185.6667
Israel Export					17300	33390.8	87713.2	142347.4	98356	112240.6	87447.6	26432.6	4957.9	406.2	4211.3	
Israel Import					19578.1	27593.2	82695.5	123660.4	98416.9	103796.9	87776.9	34755	28242.1	10471.3	14044.2	
Total Trade					36678.1	60984	170408.7	266007.8	196772.9	216037.5	175224.5	61187.6	33200	10877.5	18255.5	20777.66667

Sources: WiserTrade, Armstat, Census with Armenia, NSS RA

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Azerbaijan (USD)	Annual 97	Annual 98	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Means Trade (2008-2010)
USA Export	122,826,000	62,286,000	55,008,000	210,301,000	64,543,000	69,641,000	119,782,000	158,792,000	132,463,000	231,094,000	177,608,000	239,101,000	185,237,000	252,628,000	
USA Import	5000	5600	26200	20900	20600	34400	9500	38100	45400000	716,100,000	1,887,400,000	4,360,907,608	1,972,636,406	1,988,547,704	
Total Trade	127,826,000	67,886,000	81,208,000	231,201,000	85,143,000	104,041,000	129,282,000	196,892,000	45,532,463,000	947,194,000	2,065,008,000	4,600,008,608	2,157,873,406	2,241,175,704	2,999,685,906
France Export	37,446,705	37,446,705	32,673,706	28,064,506	30,792,809	105,813,101	55,871,408	96,872,103	180,871,303	58,867,804	148,125,102	222,576,804	145,770,080	138,537,601	
France Import	1,130,660	1,130,660	86,003,000	173,383,000	121,098,000	148,791,400	168,838,500	109,484,800	492,141,900	1,130,552,608	2,275,763,209	2,372,256,709	1,787,438,509	1,637,257,000	
Total Trade	38,577,400	38,577,400	118,676,706	201,647,500	151,891,800	254,604,500	224,710,000	206,356,900	673,013,203	1,189,420,500	2,423,888,400	2,794,833,508	1,933,208,600	1,775,794,700	2,167,945,600
Germany Export	109,001,000	109,001,000	69,970,807	81,864,705	80,951,506	122,019,800	211,473,300	290,326,000	544,177,806	609,130,800	608,784,600	774,930,200	600,650,700	970,329,800	
Germany Import	12,785,200	12,785,200	182,988,800	224,787,500	245,646,500	272,038,200	221,440,700	210,775,200	396,747,300	784,628,500	1,473,970,200	2,756,921,500	1,672,710,000	1,712,281,500	
Total Trade	121,786,200	121,786,200	252,959,700	306,652,500	326,598,000	394,058,100	432,914,100	501,101,200	940,925,106	1,393,759,300	2,082,754,800	3,511,851,700	2,273,360,800	2,682,611,400	2,829,274,600
UK Export	92,731,300	92,731,300	44,972,900	53,691,000	52,678,200	84,090,000	224,769,600	470,318,500	374,087,600	870,975,300	481,181,500	565,479,300	429,210,400	669,071,600	
UK Import	8,112,200	8,112,200	9,421,600	18,432,900	7,295,800	14,065,800	23,596,200	20,345,400	70,278,900	611,515,100	622,597,400	456,493,600	656,220,200	127,339,000	
Total Trade	100,843,000	100,843,000	54,394,500	72,123,900	59,974,100	98,155,800	248,365,800	490,664,000	444,366,500	1,482,490,400	1,103,779,000	1,021,973,000	1,065,430,600	796,410,600	961,271,400
Russia Export															
Russia Import															
Total Trade															1888909,603

	Annual 1997	Annual 1998	Annual 1999	Annual 2000	Annual 2001	Annual 2002	Annual 2003	Annual 2004	Annual 2005	Annual 2006	Annual 2007	Annual 2008	Annual 2009	Annual 2010	Means of Trade (2008-2010)
Azerbaijan (USD)															
Israel Export												3605829.6	1236197.29	1744821.9	
Israel Import												80049.48	80876.78	59365.91	
Total Trade												3685879.08	1317074.07	1804187.81	2269046.987
Pakistan Export												24.81	140	85.46	
Pakistan Import												6317.78	5947.78	2543.41	
Total Trade												6342.59	6087.78	2628.87	5019.746667
Mexico Export												4.64	21.24	94.9	
Mexico Import												1320.42	10336.5	2929.74	
Total Trade												1325.06	10357.74	3024.64	4902.48
Turkey Export												626157.2	107587.65	170893.74	
Turkey Total Import												807121.29	905980	771190.45	
Total Trade												1433278.49	1013567.65	942084.19	1129643.443

Sources: WISER Trade, Census with Azerbaijan, Devlet Gonnuk Komitesi

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SSCB'DE YARI-ÖZERKLİĞİN HUKUKİ DURUMU: DAĞLIK KARABAĞ ÖZERK BÖLGESİ ÖRNEĞİ

Dr. Gülşen PAŞAYEVA

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Abstract: *The article examines the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh's Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) - one of the quasi-autonomous entities in the former USSR. It begins with a brief historical background which provides the reasoning behind the establishment of autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh when Azerbaijan became part of the USSR. Subsequently, the authors review the level of autonomy of NKAO, focusing on the changes achieved through the consecutive USSR and Azerbaijani SSR constitutions. The research shows that the complex and entangled hierarchy of the Soviet Union governance had a formal legal structure reflecting the strictly centralized nature of the state, and a parallel political structure in the form of the communist party and all its branches and bodies that exercised the actual power and decision-making. In this context the decentralization of power in the form of autonomy was a myth, and the quasi-autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh was subject to the same system of centralized decision-making as any other administrative unit in the Soviet Union. That said, the authors argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and its population received the same treatment as any other place in the USSR precisely due to the aforementioned regime. The discrimination towards autonomy by the authorities of Azerbaijani SSR was simply impossible due to the centralized decision-making and bureaucratic formality from Moscow, which precluded real legislative and administrative decentralization of power.*

Keywords: *autonomy, USSR, Azerbaijan, Armenia, irredentism, status, constitution, minority rights.*

LEGAL STATUS OF HALF AUTHONOMY IN USSR: EXAMPLE OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH AUTONOMOUS REGION)

Öz: Makale eski SSCB'nin yarı-özerk yapılarından biri Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi'nin (DKÖB) yasal statüsünü inceliyor. Makale Azerbaycan'ın SSCB'nin bir parçası olduğu dönemde Dağlık Karabağ bölgesinin özerklik statusunu kazanma nedenleri tarihsel arkaplanı incelenmesi ile başlamıştır. Daha sonra yazar Azerbaycan SSC ve SSCB anayasası esasında DKÖB'nin özerklik statusunu inceliyor. Araştırma Sovyetler Birliği yönetiminin karmaşık ve dolaşık hiyerarşik yapısı birliğin sert bir şekilde merkezden yönetilmesini neden olmuş ve Komünist Partisi'nin ve onun kollarının devletin karar verme mekanizmasında paralel bir güc yapısı oluşturmuştur. Bu anlamda eski özerk bölgelerde yönetimin yerelleştirilmesi sadece bir mitem ibarettir ve SSCB'nin yarı-özerk yapısı DKÖB'de Birliğin diğer idari yapılarında olduğu gibi aynı sistemin subjesi olmuştur. Yazar DKÖB ve yukarıda belirtilen yönetim sistemi nedeniyle SSCB'nin diğer idari yapılarının gördüğü muameleye maruz kalmıştır. Azerbaycan SSC'nin DKÖB'ne yönelik ayrılcı tutumu iddiaları Moskova'da karar verme sürecinin aşırı merkezleştirilmiş olması ve bürokratik yapısı nedeniyle en basitinden mümkün değildi.

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Anahtar Kelimeler: özerklik, SSCB, Azerbaycan, Ermenistan, irredantizm, status, Anayasa, azınlık hakları.

Giriş

Uluslararası İlişkiler tarihinin büyük bölümünde toprak hâkimiyeti siyasi anlaşmazlıkların odağıydı. Daha büyük toprak elde etmenin ulusal tatmini veya kutsal toprakların kaybindan doğan ulusal yoksunluk duygusu, milliyetçiliğin doğuşundan yapılan kanlı savaşların çoğunun nedeni olmuştur. Bölgesel yayılmanın, ulus devletlerin saldırgan davranışlarını yönlendiren temel güdü olduğunu söylemek abartılı değildir.¹

Azerbaycan-Ermenistan arasındaki Dağlık Karabağ sorunu eski Sovyetler Birliği coğrafyasında ortaya çıkan ilk ve en uzun süren silahlı çatışma olmuştur. Bazı tahminler her iki taraftan sivil kayıpların sayısı 30 bin olarak açıklamıştır.

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives*. BasicBooks, 1997, s.37.

Doğası itibariyle bu savaş toprak anlaşmazlığından ziyade *irredantizmin* sonucu olarak değerlendirilebilir. Bu çatışmanın ortaya çıkmasına ve genişlemesine birçok iç ve dış etken neden olurken, iki çok önemli neden gösterilebilir. Birincisi, bu bölgeyi kendi etki alanının bir parçası olarak gören ve savaşan tarafları kontrol etmek için kullanan geleneksel sömürgeci güç, Rusya. İkincisi, Ermenistan`ın büyük oranda destek gördüğü iyi organize olmuş ve Batı`da bulunan Ermeni diasporası.

AGİT dâhil birçok uluslararası aktörün arabuluculuk çabalarına rağmen sorunun politik çözümü belirsiz olarak kalmaktadır.

Kısa tarihsel arkaplan

Karabağ (Karabağ-Azerbaycan Türkçesine “kara bahçe” olarak tercüme olunmaktadır), Azerbaycan`ın en eski bölgelerinden biri olarak Küçük Kafkas Dağları, Kür ve Aras nehirleri arasında bulunmaktadır. Milattan önce ve orta asırlarda Karabağ günümüzdeki Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti`nin sınırları içinde yer alan Kafkas Hıristiyan Alban Devleti`nin (IV c. BC - VIII c. AD.), bir parçası olmuştur. Bölge kuzeyde Kafkas Dağlarından güneyde Aras Nehrine kadar uzamaktadır. Karabağ`ın dağlık bölgesi Kafkas Albanyası`nın Artsakh Orkhistine olarak bilinen vilayetinin parçasıdır.² Onun yerli ahalisi Hıristiyan Albanlar olmuştur. 17. yüzyılda Arap istilasından sonra bir kısım halk İslamı kabul ederken, büyük bir kısım Hıristiyan olarak kalmıştır. Arap Halifeliyi`nin ve Alban Kilisesi`nin dogmatik parçası olan Ermeni Kilisesi`nin yoğun çabaları sonucu Artsakh ahalisinin büyük bir kısmı Grigoryanlaşmış ve aynı zamanda Ermenileşmiştir.

Orta Asırlarda bölge Osmanlı ve Fars İmparatorluğu`nun bir parçası olmuştur. XVIII. yüzyılda Nadir Şahın iktidarını kaybetmesi sonucu, Azerbaycan coğrafyasında birden fazla hanlık kurulmuş ve bunlardan biri Karabağ Hanlığı olmuştur. 1750 yılında Karabağ Hanı Azerbaycan Türkü Penah Ali Han`ın Şuşa kalesini yaptırması ile Şuşa şehri Karabağ Hanlığı`nın başkenti olmuştur. XVIII. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Şuşa`nın yöneticileri ve ahalisinin çoğunluğu Müslüman Azerbaycan Türkleri olmuştur.

2 Movses Kalankatutcy, *The History of the Caucasian Albanians*, London, 1961, s.26; F. Mamedova. Politicheskaya istoriya i istoricheskaya geografiya Kavkazskoy Albanii. Baku, «Elm», 1986, ss.104-105.

Çatışmanın kökeni

1804–1813 ve 1826 -1828 yıllarındaki Rusya-İran Savaşlarından sonra Rusya Çarlığı Azerbaycan hanlıkları üzerinde kontrolü tamamen ele geçirmiştir. Karabağ Hanlığı 1813 Gülüstan Anlaşması ile Rusya Çarlığına birleştirilmiştir. Rusya Çarlığı otoriteleri bölgeye egemen olan Müslüman Türkleri sadık olmayan nüfus olarak gördüğü için yeni kontrolüne geçirdiği bölgelerde etnik ve dini değişmeye başlamıştır. Her iki tarafın da Hıristiyan olması nedeniyle aşırı şekilde Ermeni toplumuna karşı bir eğilim içinde olmuştur.

Bu nedenle Çarlık Rusyası Ermenilerin bu bölgeye yerleştirmekte istekli olmuştur. Ermeniler Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ve İran'dan bölgeye göç ettirmek için cesaretlendirilmiş ve sınır bölgelere yerleştirilmiştir. 1828–1829 Rusya-Osmanlı Savaşı'ndan sonra 1829'da Rusya ve Osmanlı arasında imzalanan Edirne Anlaşması ile Osmanlı ve İran coğrafyasında yaşayan Ermeniler Güney Kafkasya'ya Azerbaycanlıların çoğunlukta yaşadığı bölgelere yerleştirilmiştir. 1853–1856 Kırım Savaşı ve 1877–1879 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'ndan sonra büyük sayıda Ermeni nüfusu Güney Kafkasya'ya özellikle Karabağ'a yerleştirilmiştir. Bu nedenle XIX. yüzyıl boyunca Güney Kafkasya'daki Rusya'nın yayılması bölgenin demografik ve politik durumunda köklü değişimlere neden olmuştur. Karabağ özelinde 1831–1916 yılları arasında göç nedeniyle Ermeni nüfusun sayı 19 binden 119 bine kadar artmıştır.³

Rusya'nın göç politikasından başka, Azerbaycan ve Ermeni halkları arasında ortaya çıkan ticaret, ekonomik teritoryal ve etnik rekabet gelecekteki düşmanlığın temelini koymuştur. Taraflar arasında bir asırdan fazla bir dönemi değerlendirdiğimiz zaman karşılıklı katliam şeklinde ortaya çıkan kitlesel şiddetin ilk defa 1905 Rusya Devrimi zamanı ortaya çıktığı ve Rusya devleti krizde olduğu sırada –sivil savaşın olduğu 1918 yılında - ve perestroika dönemi olarak tanımlanan 1988 yılında yeniden canlandığı bilinmektedir.⁴

3 Obozreniye Rossiyskih vladenyi za Kavkazom, chast I, SPb, 1836; Svod statisticheskoy dannih o naselenii Kavkazskogo kraya, izvlechennih iz possemeynih spiskov 1886. Tiflis, 1893; kavkazskiy calendar na 1917 god. Tiflis, 1916, ss. 190-197.

4 T.Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, s.8.

Sorunun çözümü için Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti ve SSCB`nin Çabaları

Dağlık Karabağ üzerine Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasındaki anlaşmazlık 1918 yılında İslam âleminde ilk demokratik laik cumhuriyet olan Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti ile (1918–1920) Ermenistan (Ararat Cumhuriyeti) arasında başlamıştır. 15 Ocak 1919 yılında, Paris Barış Konferansı`ndan çözüm bulunuluncaya kadar, AHC yönetimi Hosrov Bey Sultanovu Karabağ`ın ve Zengezur`un Valisi olarak tayin etmiştir. Onun adaylığı Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Müttefikleri Bakü`de temsil eden İngiliz General W. Thomson tarafından da kabul görmüştür.

Ağustos 1919`ta Karabağ Ermenileri ile AHC arasında Ermenilerin yaşadığı Karabağ`ın dağlık kısmının AHC sınırları içinde yer aldığını öngören geçici anlaşma imzalanmıştır.⁵ Çözüm Karabağ`ın Ermeni nüfusunun “kültürel kendi kaderini tayin hakkı”nı tanıyan temele dayanmıştır.⁶ Dönemin gazetesi olan *Borba* bu anlaşmayı, Karabağ`ın Müslüman ve Ermeni ahalisi arasındaki anlaşma somut bir gelişmedir. Şu anki durumda, biz Ermeni-Müslüman çatışmasının şiddet yoluyla değil, müzakereler yoluyla çözümü için ciddi bir adım görüyoruz”,⁷ olarak değerlendirmiştir. 1920`lerin başında Paris Barış konferansı Karabağ`ı Azerbaycan toprağı olarak tanımıştır. Bu tanıma muhtemelen yeni Rusya`ya ve Bolşevizm tehdidine karşı kuvvetlendirmek için Azerbaycan`a verilen bir ödül olmuştur.⁸

Fakat XI. Kızıl Ordu 28 Nisan 1920`de Azerbaycan`da ve 29 Kasım 1920`de ise Ermenistan`da Bolşevik yönetimi kurmuştur.

Dağlık Karabağ üzerine toprak anlaşmazlığı Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan`ın Sovyetleştirilmesi döneminde devam etmiştir. 5 Temmuz 1921`de Rusya Komünist Partisi`nin Kafkas bölgesel komitesi, Kavbüro, bölgenin nihai statüsünü belirlemiştir.

4 Temmuz`da yapılan uzun tartışmalar sonucu Kavbüro`da Karabağ`ın Ermenistan`a devredilmesi yönünde karar alınmasına rağmen, bir sonraki gün yani 5 Temmuz`da Ermeni asıllı Komünistler Orconikidze

5 Vremennoye soglasheniye arman Nagornogo-Karabakha s Azerbaydjanskim Pravitelstvom, 26 avgusta 1919 g., parag. 2 // K istorii obrazovaniya NKAO Azerbaycanskoy SSR, Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Baku, 1989, s. 25.

6 A.e. s. 12.

7 “Borba”, 1919, September 5.

8 A.Altstadt. The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian rule. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1992, ss .102-103.

ve Nazaretian bir önceki gün leyhine oy verdikleri karara yeniden bakılmasını istemiştir.⁹ Yeniden yapılan oylamada önceki karar iptal edilirken yeni bir karar alınmıştır: Bölgenin Müslüman ve Ermeni halkı arasındaki milli barışın zorunluluğundan, dağlık ve aran Karabağ arasındaki ekonomik bağ ve bölgenin Azerbaycan`la bağını dikkate alarak Dağlık Karabağ`a yönetim merkezi Şuşa olmak kaydıyla Azerbaycan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti sınırları içinde geniş bölgesel özerklik statüsü (oblast) verilmiştir.¹⁰

Fakat bu karar özerk bölgenin sınırlarının çizilmesinde yaşanan anlaşmazlık ve Transkafkasya Sovyet Federatif Sosyalist Cumhuriyet`i Parti aygıtının işgal edilmesinden dolayı uygulanamamıştır.¹¹

7 Temmuz 1923`te Azerbaycan SSC Merkezi Yürütme Komitesi Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi`nin Kurulmasına ilişkin kararname yayınladı.¹² (AONK ve 1936`tan itibaren NKAO¹³). Fakat toprak ve su paylaşımı üzerine fikir ayrılığı, göçebelerin yer değişmesi ve sınır anlaşmazlığı bir yıl sürdü.¹⁴ Fakat Kasım 1924`te Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi Azerbaycan SSC`nin bir parçası olarak onaylandı.¹⁵

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20`li ve 30`lu yıllarda Azerbaycan`ın diğer bölgelerinde yaşayan Ermeniler kendi talepleri üzerine Dağlık Karabağ`da yerleştirildi. Bu yer değişimi bölgenin tekrar etnik yapısının değişmesine neden oldu. 1917 yılında bölgede 97.800 Ermeni (%52.3), ve 85.800 (% 40.2) Azerbaycanlı yaşarken,¹⁶ 1926 nüfus sayımına göre, bölgede yaşayan 116.274 kişinin 108.487`si (% 93.3) Ermeni, 7.188`i (% 6.2) Azerbaycan Türkü ve 604`ü (% 0.5) ise diğer etnik gruplardan oluşmuştur.¹⁷

Bölgede Azerbaycan nüfusun sert şekilde azalmasının nedeni Karabağ`ın Ermeni yöneticilerin Bolşevizmi kullanarak kırsal alandaki

9 Arhivi politicheskikh dvijeniy pri Upravlenii Delami Prezidenta Azerbaidjanskoy Respubliki, ADP UDPAR. F. 64, op. 2, d. 1, l. s. 122.

10 A.e., s. 94.

11 A.Altstadt., a.g.e., s. 119.

12 Sobraniye uzakoneniy i rasporyajeniy Raboche-Krestyanskogo pravitelstva AzSRR za 1923 g., Baku, 1923, ss. 384-385.

13 SSCB 1936 Anayasası; <http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons02.html#chap03>

14 A.Altstadt., The Azerbaijani Turks, s. 126.

15 Istoriya nacionalno-gosudarstvennogo stroitelstva v SSSR, 1917-1926, t.1, M., «Misl», 1972, s.268-270; Sobraniye uzakoneniy i rasporyajeniy Raboche-Krestyanskogo pravitelstva AzSRR za 1924 g., Baku, 1926, ss. 333-335.

16 "Kavkazskiy kalendar" na 1917 r., Tiflis, 1917, ss.100-107.

17 Vsesoyuznaya perepis naseleniya ot 1926 g., Zakavkazskaya SFSR. t. XIV, M., 1929, ss. 11-13.

çoğunluğu oluşturan Azerbaycanlı nüfusun sayısını azaltmak için toprak ve su arazilerinin kamulaştırması olabilir. Bu olayları Dağlık Karabağ`ın köylerinde Ermeniler ve Azerbycanlılar arasında devam eden etnik çatışmalar takip etmiştir. Bu çatışmalar Azerbaycanlıların toplu şekilde köyleri boşaltmasına neden olmuştur.¹⁸

Sovyet döneminde (1926-1989) Dağlık Karabağ`ın nüfusu %62.6 artarak 1970 yılında 150 bin 300, 1979`ta 162 bin 200 ve 1989`ta 189 bin 100 kişi olmuştur.¹⁹ 1970, 1979 ve 1989`ta yapılan nüfus sayımına göre, bölge nüfusunun %80.5 - %75.9 - %76,9`nu etnik Ermeniler, % 18 - % 23 - % 21.5`ni etnik Azerbaycanlılar ve %1.3 - %1.1 - %1.5`ni ise diğer etnik azınlıklar oluşturmuştur.²⁰ 70`li yıllarda Dağlık Karabağ`da Azerbaycanlı nüfusa oranla Ermeni nüfus azalma eğiliminde olmuş (1970`te Ermeni nüfus % 80.5 ve 1979`ta ise % 75.9`e düşmüştür)²¹, ve bu azalma eğilimi daha sonra Ermeni politikacıların Azerbaycan yönetimini Dağlık Karabağ`da Ermenilere karşı ayrımcılık yapmakla suçlamalarına neden olmuştur. Fakat gerçekte bu azalma eğilimi demokratik faktörlerle izah edilmiştir. Özellikle Azerbaycanlı ailelerde doğum oranı 3.1, Ermeni ailelerde 2.6 ve Rus ailelerde ise 1.6 olmuştur. Ayrıca Ermenilerin yurt dışına göçü eski SSCB içinde %34.4 ile en yüksek orana sahip olmuştur.²²

Ermenilerin nüfusunun artırılması yoluyla Dağlık Karabağ`da nüfus dengesini değiştirme politikası XIX. yüzyılda başlamış ve Sovyet döneminde de devam etmiştir. Sovyetler Birliği tarafından özerk bölgenin kurulmasına rağmen Ermenistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti`nin (Ermenistan SSC) Ermeni yönetimi tarafından beslenen ayrılıkçı hareketleri SSCB tarafından merkezi yönetimi kuvvetlendirmek, planlı ekonomi ve enternasyonalizm ile bastırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Buna rağmen bu tür yaklaşım olumlu sonuçlar doğurmamış ve durumun daha da karmaşıklaşmasına neden olmuştur.

18 Məmmədov N.R. Azərbaycan SSR-in Dağlıq Qarabağ muxtar vilayəti (1923-1991). Bakı, 2008, ss.246.

19 Itogi vsesojuznoj perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda, tom 4. Nacionalniy sostav naseleniya, Moskva, 1973; Nacionalniy sostav naseleniya SSSR. Po dannim vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989 g. M., Finans i statistika, 1991, s. 120.

20 Itogi vsesojuznoj perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda, tom 4. Nacionalniy sostav naseleniya, Moskva, 1973; Chislennost i sostav naseleniya SSSR. Po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda. Moskva, 1985; Goskomitet SSSR po statistike. Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda. Moskva, 1989.

21 Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v Azerbaidjanskoy SSR (Stat. sbornik). Bakı, 1975, s.192.

22 İmanov R.Ə., Azərbaycanın ərazi bütövlüyünə qəsd - qondarma DQMV-i. Bakı, 2005, s.170.

Sovyet döneminde Hami devlet müdahalesi

Sovyet döneminde Ermenistan SSC Dağlık Karabağ'ın yönetiminin Ermenistan'a devredilmesi konusunu defalarca Moskova'da talep olarak gündeme getirmiştir. Bu olay 1945, 1964 ve 1968 yıllarında gündeme getirilmiş ve bir nebze Moskova'nın desteği ile Azerbaycan tarafından dirençle karşılanmıştır. Fakat bu konuda Moskova'nın onayını almak için Ermenistan'ın girişimleri devam etmiştir. 1980'lerin sonunda Gorbaçov'un ilan ettiği *glasnost* ve *perestroyka* politikaları Dağlık Karabağ'ın Ermenistan'a birleştirilmesi taleplerinin yeniden gündeme getirilmesi için uygun ortam sağlamıştır.

20 Şubat 1988'te Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi Halk Temsilciler Sovyeti Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyete ve Ermenistan SSC'ne müracaat eden ve DKÖB'nin Azerbaycan SSC'den Ermenistan SSC'sine geçmesini öngören kararı kabul etmiştir. Fakat 24 Mart 1988'te kabul edilen "1988–1995 yılları arasında Azerbaycan SSC'nin Dağlık Karabağ bölgesinin sosyo-ekonomik durumunun kalkınmasının yoğunlaştırılması hakkında önlemler" kararını esas alan SSCB Bakanlar Kurulu bu müracaatı ret edilmiştir.²³

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Bu karardan sonra Ermenistan, Dağlık Karabağ Özerk Bölgesi ve Azerbaycan'da gösteriler ve çatışmalar başladı. 13 Haziran 1988'de konuyla ilgili karar alan Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti DKÖB'nin bu müracaatını kabul edilemez olduğunu belirterek ve SSCB Bakanlar Sovyeti'nin 24 Mart 1988 tarihli kararını desteklemiştir. Fakat 15 Haziran 1988'te Ermenistan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti, DKÖB'nin Azerbaycan SSC'den Ermenistan SSC'ne devredilmesinde ısrar eden yeni bir karar almıştır.

12 Temmuz 1988'te DKÖB Azerbaycan SSC'den ayrıldığını ilan etti, Azerbaycan SSC ise bu kararı yasadışı eylem olduğunu ilan etti. 18 Temmuz 1988'te SSCB Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu Ermenistan SSC'nin DKÖB'nin Ermenistan SSC'ne devredilmesine dair talebi ret etti. Aynı zamanda alınan karar DKÖB'nin özerkliğini kuvvetlendirmek ve geliştirmek ve durumu gözlemlemek için özel bir komisyonun kurulmasını kararlaştırdı.²⁴ SSCB Prezidyumu ve Merkezi Komitesi temsilcisi A. Volski kurulan Özel Komisyonun Başkanı oldu. Sıkıyönetim ve Özel komisyon aracılığı ile DKÖB'nin doğrudan

23 Izvestiya. Nagorniy Karabakh: Programma razvitiya, korr. «İ» // 1988 №85 – 25 marta 1988 g.

24 A.Altstadt. *The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian rule.* Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1992, s.198.

yönetimi Azerbaycan`dan alındı fakat resmi açıklamalarda DKÖB`nin Azerbaycan`ın bir parçası olarak kaldığı yönündeydi.²⁵

Volski Komisyonu üstüne düşen görevleri başarı ile yapamadığı için 15 Eylül 1989`ta Azerbaycan SSC DKB`nin Özerkliğini lağvetme kararını aldı. Bu karar 28 Kasım 1989`da Mihail Gorbaçov tarafından alınan “DKÖB`nin yönetiminin normalleştirilmesine dair Kararname” ile desteklendi. Azerbaycan SSC`ye DKÖB ile birlikte eşit koşullarda idari komite ve Halk Temsilcileri Sovyeti`ni yeniden kurmak için sorumluluk verildi.

Fakat Ermenistan Yüksek Sovyeti bir daha bu krize müdahil olarak 1 Aralık 1989`da Ermenistan SSC ve DKÖB`nin birleştirilmesine dair karar almıştır. Ermenistan Yüksek Sovyeti`nin almış olduğu bu karar SSCB Anayasası ilkelelerinin ciddi şekilde ihlali anlamına gelmiştir.

7 Aralık`ta Azerbaycan Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu bir karar alarak Ermenistan SSC`nin almış olduğu bu kararı Azerbaycan`ın iç işlerine kabul edilemez bir müdahale ve toprak bütünlüğüne müdahale olarak değerlendirmiştir. Bu politika 1991 yılında bağımsız olduktan sonra da devam etmiştir. Hami devlet olarak Ermenistan`ın *irredandist* iddiaları ve etnik dayanışma leyhine müdahalesi komşu devletin topraklarının işgalında aracı rol oynamasına neden olmuştur.

Azerbaycan liderliği ile çatışmadan faydalanan Karabağlı ayrılıkçılar 2 Eylül 1991`de DKÖB`nin ve Azerbaycan SSC`nin Şaumyan bölgesinin de dâhil olduğu “Dağlık Karabağ Cumhuriyeti`nin” bağımsızlığını ilan ettiler. Buna cevaben 23 Kasım 1991`de Azerbaycan DKÖB`nin özerkliğini ortadan kaldırdı.²⁶

Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan bağımsızlığını kazandığı 1991 yılından sonra Ermenistan`la birleşme düşüncesi ile Karabağ Ermenileri “kendi kaderini tayin hakkı” ve Azerbaycan`dan ayrılma talebinde bulundular.

Silahlı çatışmanın tırmanması ve 1992–1994 yılları arasında devam eden ilan olunmamış savaş sonucu Ermeni güçler uluslararası toplum tarafından Azerbaycan toprağı olarak bilinen DKÖB ve özerk bölge dışındaki yedi bölge (Lâçin, Kelbecer, Ağdam, Cebraıyl, Fizuli, Kubadlı ve Zengilan) yaklaşık Azerbaycan`ın 1/5`ni işgal edilmiş ve bu işgal sonucu 1 milyon insan göçkün durumuna düşmüştür. 1994 yılından

25 A.e. s.198.

26 <http://en.president.az/azerbaijan/karabakh>.

itibaren Ateşkes Anlaşması imzalanmış ve sorunun barışçıl yolla çözümü için bazı girişimler yapılmıştır.

SSCB`de DKÖB`nin yasal statüsüne dair analiz

Çalışmanın bu kısmı çeşitli yasal düzenlemeler çerçevesinde DKÖB`nin yasal statü ve özerklik düzeyini incelemek için ayrılmıştır. Özerklik konusu Anayasaların önemli parçasını oluşturan yasal düzenlemeler üzerinden düzenlenmiştir. DKÖB statüsü her iki anayasa, SSCB fakat daha çok Azerbaycan Anayasası üzerinden düzenlenmiştir.

SSCB İdari Sistemi

Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri SSCB`nin temel parçası olmuştur. Birleşik Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri 1922 yılında Rusya Sovyet Federative Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti (RSFSR), Ukrayna Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti, Beyaz Rusya Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti ve Transkafkas Sovyet Sosyalist Federasyonu tarafından kurulmuştur. 31 Ocak 1924`te SSCB`nin ilk anayasası kabul ve ilan edilmiştir.

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SSCB güçler ayrılığı ilkesi formal olan bir federasyon olmuştur. Bütün yönetici sistem SSCB`de merkezleşmişti, yönetim yapısı, SSCB yasaları ve Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri çok basitti. Teoride SSCB`de geleneksel bir sistem vardı ve 1924 Anayasası`nın 8. ve 9. maddelerine göre, esas güç Sovyetler Konseyi`nin elinde toplanmıştı.²⁷ Yılda bir defa toplanan Sovyet Konseyi Guberniyalar`ın Sovyetler Konseyleri ve Şehir Konseyleri`nden seçilmiş delegelerden oluşuyordu. Sovyet Konseyi toplantısı yapılmazsa güç SSCB Merkezi Yürütme Komitesi`ne (MYK) devrediliyordu. Komite iki kamaradan oluşuyordu; SSCB Birlik Konseyi ve Milletler Konseyi.²⁸

Birlik Konseyi Sovyetler Kongresi tarafından Cumhuriyetlerden onların nüfuzuna uygun olarak temsilciler seçiliyordu.²⁹ Milletler Konseyi`nde ise cumhuriyetlerden, özerk bölgelerden ve vilayetlerden 124 kişi bulunuyordu. SSCB Anayasası`nın 17. maddesine göre, MYK SSCB`nin

27 Sovyet ve Bolşevik ideolojisi nedeniyle, SSCB`de devlet iktidarı farklı düzeylerde "Konsey" anlamına gelen "Sovyetler" tarafından yapıldı. Böylece SSCB`de nihai güç Sovyetler Kongresi ya da "Syezd Sovetov" tarafından yapıldı. Aslında, Sovyetler Kongresi`nin bir organ olarak yasama organı işlev yoktu, ama çoğunlukla komünist ideoloji içinde genel bir politika oluşturulması hedeflenmiştir.

28 Merkez Yürütme Kurulu iki ayrı odaları ile parlamentoya benzer bir devlet organı oldu.

29 1924 Anayasası`nın 14. maddesi.

yasama organı niteliğinde idi. MYK, MYK Prezidyumu kararı ile yılda üç defa toplanıyordu. MYK Prezidyumu Milletler Konseyi ve Birlik Konseyi`nin ortak toplantısında seçiliyordu. Anayasanın 29 maddesine göre. MYK aynı zamanda yürütme gücü olan Halk Komiserleri Sovyetini de seçiyordu.³⁰ Fakat hiyerarşik olarak Prezidyum Halk Komiserlerini salıverme yetkisine sahip olduğu için yürütme hiyerarşisinde en yüksek yerde olmuştur. Fakat gerçekte yürütme işi dışişleri bakanı, ihracat bakanı, askeri ve denizcilik, maliye ve yerel yönetim bakanından oluşan Halk Komiserleri`nin yetkisi dâhilinde olmuştur. SSCB Anayasası`nın 43. maddesine göre, yargı yetkisi MYK tarafından seçilen Yüksek Mahkemesi tarafından temsil edilmiştir.

SSCB 1924 Anayasası`nın 10 fashlı üye Cumhuriyetlerin statüsünün düzenlemesine ayrılmıştır. Yasama ve yürütme organları 64–68. maddelerle düzenlenmiştir. Cumhuriyetlerin yetkilerine dâhil olan ve Federasyon (SSCB) yetkisi kapsamında olmayan tüm konular SSCB Anayasası`nın 1. maddesi ile düzenlenmiştir. Fakat eğitim, iş verme, toprak ve mülk statusu, ekonomi ve bütçe, askeri, sivil, cinayet ve usul gibi kararlar Birliğin yetkisinde olmuştur.

Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri`nin yetkileri önemli ölçüde sınırlanmıştı. Stalin Birliği çok ciddi merkezleştirilmiş bir şekilde yönetmiştir. Bazı konularda merkezi düzeyde Komünist Parti aktiviteleri tarafından zorlanmıştır.

1924 Anayasası`nda özerk bölgeler çok az memnun edilmiştir. Anayasa RSFSR`de özerk bölgelerden genel olarak bahsetmiş ve Azerbaycan ile Gürcistan sınırları içinde beş otonom bölgeden bahsetmiştir.³¹ 15. madde Özerk bölgelere bir temsilci ile Milletler Konseyi`nde temsil yetkisi vermiştir. SSCB yasama sürecinde varlıklarını devam ettirdiği için bu yetki DKÖB açısından çok önemli bir düzenleme olmuştur. Nahçıvan dışında diğer bütün bölgeler azınlıkları temsil etmek amacıyla kurulmuştu. Sovyet ideolojisi işçi sınıfının diktatörlüğü ve halkların kardeşliği düşüncesi üzerine kurulu olduğu için kesin milli farklılıkları ret ediyordu.

Özerk bölgeler ile özerk vilayetler veya kraylar arasında önemli bir fark bulunmuyordu. En önemli fark düzenleyici yapılar arasında idi. Bütün özerk yapılar SSCB ve Cumhuriyetlere tabi olmak zorunda idiler. Ne

30 Halk Komiserleri Sovyeti Bakanlar Kurulu`na benzer bir yapı idi.

31 Gürcistan`da Özerk Cumhuriyetler Abhazya ve Acaristan, Özerk Bölge ise Güney Osetya idi; Azerbaycan için Nahçıvan ve Dağlık Karabağ Özerk bölgeler olmuştur.

özerk cumhuriyetler, ne de oblastlar eğitim, sağlık, iş ve sosyal güvenlik gibi alanlarda yasa yapma yetkisine sahip değildi. Özerklik kültürel kendi yönetim, devlet memurunun atanması, yazışmaların yapılması, medya ve azınlıkların eğitim hakları gibi konularda karar verme yetkisine sahip olmuştur.

Sovyetler Birliği'nde hiç bir toprak parçasına ayrıcalık yapılmadan bütün özerk yapılar için aynı statü uygulaması yapılmıştır. Bu nedenle SSCB'de DKÖB'ye tasis edilmiş statü diğer özerk bölgelerle aynı olmuştur.

1924 Anayasası'nın 6. maddesinde, Birlik üyesi cumhuriyetin sınırlarında o cumhuriyetin onayı olmadan hiç bir değişiklik yapılamayacağı belirtilmiştir. Bu nedenle özerk bölgelerin yasal düzenlemeleri ve özellikle DKÖB yasal statüsü cumhuriyetin yasaları ile düzenlenmiş ve 26 Mart 1927'de kabul edilen Azerbaycan SSC'nin anayasası ve "Dağlık Karabağ Bölgesinin Özerkliğine İlişkin Düzenleme" oldukça önemlidir.

DKÖB'nin yasal statüsüne ilişkin ilkin düzenlemeleri (1923–1936)³²

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Azerbaycan SSC'nin 1927 Anayasası'nın 55. maddesinde³³, DKÖB Azerbaycan'ın bir parçası olarak gösterilmiştir.³⁴ 56. Madde DKÖB'nin yasal statüsü ile ilgili bilgiler içeriyordu.

Azerbaycan Sovyetleri Kongresi'nin orantılılık temeline göre, DKÖB'nin temsilcileri Azerbaycan devlet kurumlarında temsil edilmişlerdir. DKÖB'nin Halk Komiserleri Konseyi Başkanı Azerbaycan Halk Komiserleri Konseyi üyesi idi ve oy hakkı bulunuyordu.³⁵

Azerbaycan SSC'nin birinci Anayasası'nda Azerbaycan SSC ile DKÖB arasında kuvvetler ayrılığı ile ilgili düzenleme bulunmuyordu. Daha detaylı normlar "Dağlık Karabağ Bölgesi'nin Özerkliği üzerine Düzenleme" de yer almıştır. DKÖB'nin Azerbaycan'ın bir parçası

32 1936 yılına kadar böylece DKÖB olarak kısaltılmıştır.

33 AZSSC 1921 Anayasası'nda Dağlık Karabağ'ın statüsü düzenlenmemiştir.

34 Azerbaycan SSC 1927 Anayasası; http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf.

35 Konstituciya (Osnovnoy zakon) Azerbaycanskoy Socialisticheskoy Sovetskoy Respubliki (Uverjdenmaya Vseazerbaycanskim Syezdom Sovetov V soziva 26-ro marta 1927 goda). Izdaniye Az.TsIK, Baku, 1927, s.21.

olmasına rağmen bütün resmi belgeler, yargı sistemi ve eğitim Rusça ve Ermenice yürütülüyordu.³⁶

Yasama yetkisi: Azerbaycan SSC`nin 1927 Anayasası DKÖB`de devlet otoritesinin esas kurumunun DKÖB Sovyetler Kongresi olduğunu belirtmiştir.³⁷ Düzenlemeye göre, Sovyetler Kongresi DKÖB`nin yasama organıydı ve yılda en az bir kere toplanmalıydı. Düzenlemeye göre, DKÖB`nin Merkezi Yürütme Komitesi Sovyetler Kongresi tarafından seçiliyordu. Yürütme kurumu olan Halk Komiserleri Konseyi`ni tayin etmek MYK`nın yetkisinde olmuştur.³⁸ Gerçi 1924 SSCB Anayasası'nın 64. maddesine göre, bu düzenleme bütün Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri için geçerliydi.

Yürütme yetkisi: 7 departman (bakanlıklar) içişleri, adalet, eğitim, sağlık, tarım, ekonomi ve nüfus kayıt bakanlığı Halk Komiserleri Konseyi`nin bir parçası olarak oluşturulmuşlardı.³⁹ Adalet ve İçişleri bakanı dâhil bakanlar Azerbaycan MYK`ya değil, DKÖB MYK`ya karşı sorumlu idiler.⁴⁰ Sadece askeri komiser, çalışma ve maliye bakanı DKÖB Halk Komiserleri onayı ile Azerbaycan SSC MYK tarafından atanıyordu. Devlet güvenliği konuları da Azerbaycan istihbarat bakanlığı yetkisine dâhildi.⁴¹

Fakat gerçekte Komiserlerin sorumluluğu DKÖB`nin Komünist Partisi komitesine idi. DKÖB KPK bütün Komiserliklerin aktiviteleri üzerinde denetleme yetkisine sahip olmuştur.

Yargı yetkisi: 1925 yılına kadar DKÖB`nin kendi temyiz mahkemesi bulunmuyordu ve Azerbaycan Yüksek Mahkemesi DKÖB mahkemeleri için temyiz mahkemesi özelliğini taşıyordu.⁴² DKÖB`nin Bölge Mahkemesi (DK illerinin mahkemeleri için temyiz mahkemesi) 1 Ekim 1925 yılında kurulmuştur.⁴³

36 ADP UDP AR, F. 1, op. 169, d. 249, Protokol 1 Zasedaniya Komissii po virabotke Polojeniya avtonomnoy oblasti Nagornogo-Karabakha, list 63.

37 A.e., Article 57.

38 Sobraniye uzakoneniy i rasporyajeniy Raboche-Krestyanskogo pravitelstva AzSRR za 1924 g. Baku, 1926 g. s. 334.

39 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opis 74, Delo 137, Protokoli Zasedaniy Prezidiuma Centralnogo Komiteta KP (b) Azerbaydjana, list 99.

40 Decision of NK Oblast Executive Committee on 2 March 1937. TsGASR, Fond 379, Opis 3, yed.hr 5613, list 50.ay

41 A.e.

42 A.Karakozov (Şubat 1921'de Zengezur ve Karabağ için Olağanüstü Komiseri olarak atandı) S.Kirov`a müracaat ederek Özerk Nahçıvan için olduğu gibi AONK için Yargıtay kurulmasını istedi.

43 Sobraniye uzakoneniy i rasporyajeniy Raboche-Krestyanskogo pravitelstva ASSR za 1924 g. Baku, 1926 g. s. 334.

Yerel yönetim: Bütün SSCB`de olduğu gibi yerel yönetimler İşçiler Konseyinden, çiftçilerden ve Kızıl Ordu milletvekillerinden oluşuyordu. Bütün SSCB`de olduğu gibi yerel otoriteler İşçiler, Çiftçiler ve Kızıl Ordu milletvekilleri Konseyi`nden oluşmuştur. Bu konseyler de kendi MYK`larını ve Prezidyumlarını seçen toplantılarda toplanıyorlardı.

DKÖB kanunlarında yerel yönetimler ile merkezi yönetim arasında güç dağılımı tam olarak net yapılmadığı için bu durumlar Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası temel alınarak genel düzenlemeler yapılmıştır.

DKÖB`de yerel yöneticiler çoğunlukla Ermenilerden oluşuyordu. Nitekim 1924 verileri Parti içinde Ermenilerin %94.2, Azerbaycanlıların ise %4 olduğunu göstermiştir.⁴⁴ Bu durum DKÖB`deki nüfus açısından geçerli olmuştur. Genel olarak 1926`ta DKÖB`de nüfusun %93.3 Ermenilerden, %6.2 ise Azerbaycanlılardan oluşuyordu.

Ekonomi: DKÖB`nin ekonomisi üzerindeki yetki resmi olarak Halkın Ekonomi Konseyi`nin yetkisinde olmuştur. Fakat Kanunlara göre, DKÖB Halkın Ekonomi Konseyi`nin çalışmaları SSCB Merkezi Ekonomi Planlamasına uyumlu olmalı ve Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Ekonomi Konseyi tarafından kabul edilmeliydi. Fakat kolhozların ve diğer sanayi tesislerinin üretim düzeyinin belirlenmesi, otlak arazilerin dağıtımının yapılması ve bölgenin bütçesinin tasarısının hazırlanması DKÖB MYK`nın yetkisinde olmuştur.⁴⁵

DKÖB`nin bütçesi Azerbaycan SSC tarafından onaylanmalıydı, çünkü DKÖB`nin harcamaları Azerbaycan SSC tarafından karşılanıyordu. 1927 Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası DKÖB`nin bütçesinin, bütün kazanç ve harcamalarının Azerbaycan SSC bütçesi ile birleşmesini öngörmüştür.⁴⁶

Azerbaycan MYK`da kabul edilmiş kararlara göre, DKÖB ve diğer bölgeler teknik yardım ve mali yardım almıştır. Örneğin, “Yukarı ve Aran Karabağı Komisyonu” tarafından Azerbaycan MYK`ya ünvanlanmış yazışmalarda DKÖB`nin devlet borcundan 21.456 rublesi silinmiş, hükümet organları için 10 binanın yapılması fonu Dağlık Karabağ`ın bütçesine eklenmiştir.⁴⁷ DKÖB MYK`sının da kararından

44 Niftaliyev I., «Azerbaydjanskaya SSR v ekspansionistkikh planah arman», Baku, 2009, s. 220.

45 30 Ekim 1937 tarihinde NK Oblast İcra Komitesi Kararı.

46 *A.e.*, madde 88.

47 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opus 74, Delo 136, Protokoli Zasedaniy Prezidiuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KP (b) Azerbaidjana, list 50.

görüldüğü üzere Hankendi Hastanesi Azerbaycan SSC`nin mali desteği ile yapılmıştır.⁴⁸

DKÖB için Ara dönem düzenlemeler (1936–1978)

SSCB`nin 1936 Anayasası`na SSCB içindeki Özerk Cumhuriyetler ve bölgelerle ilgili yeni düzenlemeler öngören hükümler eklenmiştir. 1936 Anayasası`nın 24. maddesi DKÖB`yi Azerbaycan SSC`nin bir parçası olarak tanımlamıştır.⁴⁹ Diğer düzenleme özerk bölgelerin SSCB devlet kurumlarında temsili ile ilgili olmuştur; DKÖB`nin SSCB Milletler Konseyi`nde 5 temsilci bulundurma hakkı kazanmıştır.

Bu düzenlemeyi 14 Mart 1937`de kabul edilen Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası`nda da yapılan değişiklikler takip etmiştir. Özellikle, Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası`nda DKÖB dâhil bütün Azerbaycan`da idari bölümle ilgili yeni ayrıntılar yer almıştır. (14. madde).⁵⁰ Dahası 1937 Anayasası`nın VII. Bölümü DKÖB`nin hükümet organlarıyla ilgili düzenleme içermiştir. Yalnız Azerbaycan SSC 1937 Anayasası`nın VII. Bölümü`nden de görüldüğü üzere yerel yönetimleri ilgilendiren hükümler değişmeden kalmıştır.

Aynı zamanda Azerbaycan SSC`nin kendi coğrafyasını yönetmesi ile ilgili yetkileri önemli ölçüde genişletilmiştir. Örneğin, Azerbaycan SSC kendi coğrafyasında özerk bölgelerin oluşturulması için SSCB Yüksek Sovyete öneride bulunabilirdi.⁵¹ Azerbaycan SSC devletin yüksek organları üzerinden DKÖB`nin sınırları ve bölgeleri hakkında karar verme yetkisi kazanmıştır.⁵² Örneğin, Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu`nun Şubat 1939`ta “Hankendi Şehri Konseyi`nin DKÖB Yürütme Komitesi`ne doğrudan bağlanmasına dair” kararı vardır.⁵³ Yine de 1937 Anayasası`na göre, DKÖB`ne Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyum Başkanlığı`na bir temsilci atama yetkisi vermiştir.⁵⁴ Azerbaycan SSC 1937 Anayasası Azerbaycan devletine DKÖB ve diğer özerk bölgeler üzerinde denetleme gücü vermiştir. Örneğin, Azerbaycan

48 NK Oblast İcra Komitesi`nin 2 Mart 1937 tarihli kararı. TsGASR, Fond 379, Opis 3, ed.hr 5613, list 53.

49 SSCB 1936 Anayasası <http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons02.html#chap03>, Articles 24, 35.

50 Azerbaycan SSC 1937 Anayasası; http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf.

51 *A.e.*, madde 19.

52 *A.e.*

53 TsGASR, Fond 2941, Opis 7, list 147.

54 *A.e.*, madde 31.

SSC Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu DKÖB'nin Azerbaycan kanunlarına uygun olmayan kararlarını veto edebilecekti.⁵⁵ Bu anlamda Azerbaycan SSC Bakanlar Sovyeti'ni DKÖB'nin yürütme komitelerini (oblast, bölge, şehir, köy) kontrol etmekle sorumluydu.⁵⁶ Azerbaycan SSC Bakanlar Sovyeti DKÖB Sovyeti'nin almış olduğu kararları askıya alabilir veya DKÖB'nin her hangi yürütme kurulunun kararlarını feshedebilirdi. Aynı kurallar Nahçıvan Özerk Bölgesi için de geçerli olmuştur.⁵⁷ Azerbaycan SSC yasaları DKÖB ve Nahçıvan Özerk Bölgesi'nde de geçerli olmuştur. DKÖB'de seçimler Azerbaycan SSC yasalarına göre yapılmış ve DKÖB'de seçimler Azerbaycan'da seçimler yapıldığı gün yapılmıştır.⁵⁸

Yürütme gücünün sınırlarını gerçekliğini göstermek için bazen Cumhuriyetlerin federativ cumhuriyetlerin - üye devletlerin - statülerinden yeteri kadar fayadalanamadıklarını da hesaba katmak gerekiyor.

Örnek olarak, SSCB Halk Komiserleri Konseyi (HKK) ve Komünist Partisi Merkezi Komitesi'nin (KPMK) Sovyet Cumhuriyetlerinde tarım departmanlarının fonksiyonlarının geliştirilmesine dair 26 Kasım 1939 tarihli kararnameye bakabiliriz. Bu Kararnameye çerçevesinde, 5 Aralık 1939 tarihinde Azerbaycan SSR Halk Komiserleri Konseyi Kanun Hükmünde Kararname çıkarmıştır. Kararname tarım departmanları, onların yapıları ve personeli hakkında detaylı düzenleme sağlamıştır.⁵⁹ Kararname ve Azerbaycan SSC HKK ve KPMK'nin kararları onaylanmak için Moskova'ya gönderilmiştir.⁶⁰ Moskova yönetimi ve Komünist Partisi'nin bu denetim yetkisi DKÖB'nin kendi-yönetim yetkisinin hayali olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu politik gerçeklikte Azerbaycan Demiryolları Başkanı SSCB HKK ve KPMK tarafından onaylanmıştır.⁶¹ Devlette ve toplumda kapsamlı etkisi olan bütün devlet işleri KP'nin inceleme alanındaydı. KP'nin baskın rolü 1937 Anyasası'na göre, Azerbaycan HKK ve Komünist Partisi'nin 31 Mart 1959'da "Karyagin ilinin Fizuli ili olarak değiştirilmesi" teklifi Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu tarafından önerilmiştir.

55 Yüksek Sovyetin notu, no. 42, madde 33.

56 *A.e.*, madde 46.

57 *A.e.*, madde 47.

58 Postanovleniye Prezidiuma VS ASSR ot 23 Oktabra 1939 goda, TsGASR, Fond 2941, Opis 7, yed.hr 7, list 110.

59 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 74, Delo 596, list 23-25.

60 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 74, Delo 596, list 47.

61 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 46, Delo 70, list 1.

Anayasa`ya göre, bu yetki Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti`ne verilmiş fakat uygulamada Komünist Partisi`nin onayına ihtiyaç duyulmuştur.

1937 anayasasına göre Azerbaycan Yüksek Sovyeti`nin yetkisi dâhilinde olmasına rağmen 1959`da 31 Mart tarihinde Azerbaycan Yüksek Sovyeti`nin önerisi ile “Karyagin” yer isminin “Füzuli” ile değiştirilmesi için Moskova tarafından onayı gerekmiştir ki, bu belirgin şekilde Komünist Partisi`nin baskın rolüne bir başka örnektir.

Bu durum DKÖB için de geçerli olmuştur. Nahçıvan Özerk Bölgesi ve DKÖB Genel Sekreteri Moskova tarafından onaylanmıştır.⁶² SSCB federal devletinde yönetimin merkezleştirilmesi gerçeği DKÖB`nin Yürütme Komitesi Başkanının Moskova tarafından atanması ile gösterilebilir. Örneğin, 13 Eylül 1939`ta Azerbaycan SSC Komünist Partisi Merkezi Komitesi G. Petrosyan`ın atanması için aday olarak Staline`e sunmuştur.⁶³ SSCB`de birçok devlet organı Parti resimleri ile kaynaşmıştı (örneğin Yürütme Kolları Başkanlığının statüsü Komünist Partisi sekreteri ile aynı idi) yürütme organının denetlenmesi parti kontrolü ile sağlanmaktaydı.

25 Ekim 1938 tarihinde DKÖB Komünist Parti Komitesi Genel Sekreteri Manukyns örneğinde olduğu gibi yıllık izinler de Azerbaycan SSC Komünist Partisi Merkezi Komitesi tarafından kararlaştırılmıydı.⁶⁴ Diğer örnek 31 Mart 1959 tarihinde Grigory Kalantarov`un DKÖB Parti Komitesi`nin önerisi ve Azerbaycan KPMK`nin kararı ile DKÖB`nin Yürütme Komitesi Maliye Departmanı Başkanı olarak atanmasıdır.⁶⁵

Yasama yetkisi: DKÖB`nin yasama organı milletvekilleri bölgenin halkı tarafından iki yıllığına seçilmiştir.⁶⁶ Milletvekilleri vazifelerini SSCB ve Azerbaycan SSC`nin her iksinin yasalarının vermiş olduğu yasalar çerçevesinde sürdürebilmiştir.⁶⁷ Bütçe, planlama, kültür, ekonomik gelişmişlik, savunma girdileri, kolluk kuvvetleri ve yetkisi dahilindeki kurumları denetleme gibi yetkisi vardır.⁶⁸ Genellikle DKÖB milletvekilleri Sovyeti iç tüzük çıkartmak yoluyla yasama yetkisini kullanmıştır.

62 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 46, Delo 70, list 149.

63 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 74, Delo 581, list 7.

64 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 74, Delo 531, list 267.

65 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 46, Delo 70, list 154.

66 Yüksek Sovyetin notu. no, 42, madde 75-76.

67 A.e., madde 78.

68 A.e., madde 77.

DKÖB'nin Meclis kararları hem Ermenice hem de Azerbaycan Türkçesinde yayınlanmıyordu.⁶⁹

Yürütme yetkisi: Milletvekilleri Sovyeti Yürütme Komitesi'ni seçmiş (IspolKom) ve Komite'nin kendi departmanları ve memurları vardı.⁷⁰ Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası'nın 46. ve 81. maddelerine göre, DKÖB'nin Yürütme kolu Azerbaycan SSC ilgili Bakanlıklarının sıkı gözetimi altında olmuştur. Yürütme Komitesi milletvekilleri Sovyeti'ni yılda en az dört kez toplamakla görevlendirilmiştir.⁷¹

Yargı yetkisi: 1937 Anayasası'nın en ilginç düzenlemelerinden biri DKÖB'de yargı yetkisi ile ilgili olmuştur. Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası'nın 110., 115., maddelerine göre, yargı yetkisi Millet vekilleri Sovyeti tarafından beş yıllığına seçilen bölgesel mahkeme tarafından (regional court) yürütülmüştür. Ancak DKÖB'nin bölgesel mahkemesi Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Mahkemesi'nin gözetimi ve kontrolü altında olmuştur.⁷²

Yargı yetkisi kuvvetli şekilde savcıların kontrolüne tabi olmuştur. Bir çok kez yargısal inceleme mahkemeler tarafından,, değil Savcılar tarafından yürütülmüştür. Örneğin, Azerbaycan Anayasası'nın 120. maddesi Savcı'nın devlet organlarının ve vatandaşların fonksyonları üzerinde üstün güce sahip olduğunu göstermektedir; Örneğin, Cumhuriyetlerin Baş Savcıları SSCB Baş Savcısı tarafından tayin ediliyor; Cumhuriyetlerin Baş Savcıları ise bölge ve oblastların Baş Savcılarını tayin etmiştir. Bu nedenle DKÖB'nin Baş Savcısı SSCB Başsavcısı tarafından atanmıştır.⁷³

Azerbaycan SSC 1937 Anayasası'na göre, DKÖB'de yargısal işlemler genellikle Ermenice yürütülmüştür.⁷⁴ Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası'na göre, sadece DKÖB'de değil Ermeni ve Rusların yaygın olduğu diğer bölgelerinde de onların dili mahkemelerde kullanılmıştır.

Ekonomi: DKÖB'nin bütçesi Azerbaycan bütçesinden ayrılmıştır. Fakat bütçe uygulamalarını kontrol etmek Azerbaycan SSC devlet yetkileri alanında kalmıştır.⁷⁵

69 A.e., madde 78.

70 A.e., Madde 79-80. NKAO IspolKomu'nun 13 üyesi vardı. Ispolkom bölümlerinin sayısı, bölgeleri ve departmanların işlevleri AzSSR Bakanlar Kurulu tarafından onaylanması gerekiyordu. Bu departmanların çift itaat vardı -NK üst organları ve Azerbaycan merkezi departmanları.

71 A.e., madde 82.

72 Yüksek Sovyeti, note 42, madde 112.

73 A.e., madde 122.

74 A.e., 1937 Azerbaycan SSC, madde 117.

75 Yüksek Sovyeti note 42, madde 48.

1937 anayasasının 109. maddesi DKÖB`de bütçe oluşturulmasının detaylarını içermiştir. Bu maddeye göre, yerel yönetimlerin bütçesi yerel ekonominin girdilerinden (kolhozlar), merkezi devletin tahsisinden, yerel vergi ve ücretlerden oluşmuştur.

Bu maddeye göre, Sovyetler ve Azerbaycan SSB`nin mevzuatına uygun olarak yerel yönetimlerin bütçeleri yerel ekonomiden gelen gelirler (kolhozlar), merkezi devlet bütçesi ve vergi ve harçların tahsislerinden oluşmaktadır. Fakat Moskova`nın bu alanda da incelemeleri oldukça hassas olmuştur. Örneğin, kolholzarda yenden yapılanması veya fonksyonları ile ilgili değişiklik kararları Moskova ile birlikte alınmalıydı.⁷⁶

DKÖB`nin bütçesinin oluşturulmasında Bakü ve Moskova`dan yapılan tahsislerin çok önemli rolü olmuştur, bütçenin diğer kısmının oluşturulması ise DKÖB`nin Yürütme Kurulu tarafından olmuştur. Genellikle bütçeye ilave harcamalar için istekler Bakü`deki merkezi hükümete iletilmiştir.

Örneğin, 1946–1960 yılları arasında DKÖB`e 68 milyon ruble kabul edilmiştir. Bu miktar Ağdam, Terter ve Fizuli illerinden üç defa ve Nahçıvan Özerk bölgesinden ise 10 milyon ruble daha çok olmuştur.⁷⁷

DKÖB için final Düzenlemeler (1978–1988)

1977 Anayasası SSCB özerk birimleri için daha fazla bir düzenleme getirmemiştir. Bu anayasada DKÖB bir daha Azerbaycan SSC özerk bölgesi olarak gösterilmiştir. DKÖB Milletler Konseyi`nde beş temsilci ile temsil olunmak yetkisini korumuştur.⁷⁸ Sonuncu Milletler Şurası`nın toplantısında beş temsilciden üçü Ermeni, ikisi ise Azerbaycan Türkü olmuştur.⁷⁹

DKÖB aynı zamanda Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti`nde de temsil olunmuştur. Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti`ne yapılan son seçimlerde 10 DKÖB`den toplam 30 Ermeni seçilmiştir.⁸⁰

76 Stalin ve Bagirov arasında yazışmalar, АПД УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 74, Дело 596, лист 84.

77 Nadirov A.A., Nuriyev Ə.X., Muradov Ə.S., Nahçıvan İqtisadiyyatı XX əsrdə, Bakı 2000, s.32.

78 A.e., 1977 SSCB Anayasasının 110. Maddesi.

79 Deputati Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR. Odinadtsatiy soziv, M., «İzvestiya», 1984 g., ss. 507-543.

80 Azerbaidjanskaya SSR. Verhovniy Sovet. Odinadcatiy Soziv, B., Azerneshr, 1985, s. 6.

1977 SSCB Anayasası'nın 86. maddesine göre, özerk birimlerin yerel meclisleri (DKÖB ve Nahçıvan Özerk Bölgesi) birimin statüsüne ilişkin yasa teklif edebilir ve onay için ilgili cumhuriyetin Yüksek Sovyeti'ne sunabilirdi.

Daha sonra 21 Nisan 1978'de kabul edilen Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası önceki Anayasa'daki DKÖB'ye ilişkin düzenlemelerin çoğunu yeniden onaylamıştır. 1978 Anayasası hükümleri bir daha DKÖB'yi Azerbaycan'ın bir parçası olarak göstermiş ve yönetimi ile ilgili bir sıra idari düzenlemeler yapmıştır.⁸¹

DKÖB'nin statüsüne ilişkin yasa 16 Haziran 1981'de Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti tarafından kabul edilmiştir. Fakat gerçekte DKÖB birimleri hiç bir tasarı hazırlanmamıştır, çünkü "DKÖB üzerine Yasa", "Eyaletlerin, Vilayetler ve Özerk bölgelerin Halk Sovyetlerinin milletvekillerinin Esas Yetkilerine dair SSCB Yasası"nın küçük versiyonu niteliğindedir. DKÖB'nin birimlerine, yetkilerine ve fonksiyonlarına ilişkin detaylı düzenleme bu yasa ile tanımlanmıştır. Gerçekte, sıradan vilayetlerin ve özerk bölgelerin yetkileri çok basitti.

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Yasal yetki: Halk Sovyeti Bölge ile ilgili bütün konularda karar verme konusunda en üst mercidir. Yasa diğer yetkilerin yanısıra DKÖB Halk Sovyeti'ne tahmini bütçeyi hazırlamak, hesaplama ve yönetme (madde 17), fiyatları düzenleme (madde 18), sanayi (madde 19), mimarlık, ziraat, doğal kaynaklar, konut, ticaret, eğitim, sosyal güvenlik, sağlık ve iç işleri (madde 20–34) gibi alanlarında yetki vermiştir. Diğer taraftan polis gücü üzerinde önemli yetkiye sahip olan Bölge Mehkemesi Bölgenin Halk Sovyeti tarafından seçilmekle yetkilendirilmiştir.

Ayrıca, Azerbaycan SSC'de en yüksek karar verme yetkisine sahip olan Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu Başkanının üç yardımcısından biri DKÖB'den seçiliyordu.⁸²

Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyeti DKÖB'nin sınırlarını ve idari yapısını değiştirme gücüne sahip ana yasama organı olduğu için üç Başkan yardımcısından birinin Ermeni olması oldukça önemliydi.⁸³ Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Sovyet, DKÖB'nin Halk Sovyeti'nde kabul olunan, Azerbaycan SSC ve SSCB yasalarına aykırı bütün yasaları feshetme yetkisine sahip olmuştur.⁸⁴

81 Azerbaycan SSC 1978 Anayasası, 78. madde; http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf.

82 Yüksek Sovyeti, note 76, madde 113.

83 *A.e.*, madde 114 (8).

84 *A.e.*, madde 114 (10).

Yürütme gücü: DKÖB`nin Halk Sovyeti Yürütme Komitesi bölgenin yürütme gücün oluşturmuştur. Komite kendi departmanlarını ve komisyonlarını oluşturarak bu yapılara yönetici tayin etmiştir. Bu tayinler DKÖB Halk Sovyeti tarafından onaylanmalıydı. Bu süreçte Bakû`deki merkezi yönetimin onayını almak zorunluluğu bulunmuyordu.

DKÖB üzerine Kanununun 46. maddesine göre, bütün sanayi ve hizmet sektörü devletin mülkü olduğu için bu alandaki tayinler ve görevden almalar DKÖB`nin Halk Sovyeti`nin onayını gerektirmiştir. Fakat Komünist Parti bu konularda informal olarak daha çok güce sahip olmuştur.

Azerbaycan SSC KPMK`nin Azerbaycan bütün yerel ve merkezi yürütme komiteleri üzerinde denetleme ve kontrol gücüne sahip olmuştur. Azerbaycan SSC KPMK 23 Ekim 1981 tarihli kararıyla Azerbaycan`da tüm İcra Komiteleri yolsuzluk ve kamu mallarının yağma ile mücadele çabalarını artırmak zorunda kaldı.

DKÖB yürütme kolu Azerbaycan SSC Bakanlar Sovyetine katılmıyordu. Azerbaycan SSC Bakanlar Sovyeti DKÖB icra komitelerinin çalışmalarını kontrol edebilir gözlemleyebilir ve bazı durumlarda kararlarını askıya alabilir veya fesh edebilirdi.⁸⁵

Yargı yetkisi: 1978 Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası DKÖB`nin yargı sistemini yeniden onaylamıştır. DKÖB`nin il halk mahkemeleri ve Vilayet Mahkemesi yargının esas kısmını oluşturmuştur.⁸⁶ Yerel mahkemeler sadece Azerbaycan SSC Yargıtayı gözetiminde idi.

DKÖB Vilayet Mahkemesi Başkanı görevi icabı Azerbaycan SSC Yargıtay üyesi idi.⁸⁷ DKÖB Baş Savcısı SSCB Baş Savcısı tarafından tayin ediliyordu.⁸⁸

1977 Anayasası Özerk Bölgede yapılan yargılamalarda mahkeme dilinin bölgenin çoğunluğunu oluşturan halkın dilinde yürütülmesini garanti ediyordu⁸⁹ ve bu da Ermeni dilinin yargı dili olduğunun kanıtı idi.

85 A.e., madde 125 (7), 128.

86 Yüksek Sovyeti note 76, madde 163.

87 A.e., madde 165.

88 A.e., madde 177.

89 A.e., madde 159.

Fakat aynı zamanda Ermenice bilmeyenlerin kendi dillerini kullanmasını da garanti altına almıştır. Davalarda tercüman hizmetinden yararlanmak ve mahkeme süresinde kendi dilinde konuşma gibi haklar vermiştir.⁹⁰

Yerel yönetimler: SSCB'nin bütün arazisinde yerel yönetimler yerel Halk Sovyeti olmuştur. Yine de yeni anayasada yetkileri artırılmıştır. 1937 Anayasası'nın 88 maddesi 1978 Anayasası'nın 138. maddesine oranla yerel Sovyetlere daha dar bir hareket alanı tanımıştır.

Yeni düzenleme ile "... Kendi alanlarında bütün konularda yetkili olan Sovyetler, bu yetkilerini devletin genel çıkarları ve o alanda yaşayan halkın çıkarlarını dikkate alarak faaliyet göstermelidirler."

Yerel Halk Sovyetleri milletvekilleri kendi İcra Komiteleri'ni seçme yetkisine sahip olmuştur. Halk Sovyetleri'nin yetkisi dışında konular hariç bu komitelerin yetkileri yerel Halk Sovyeti ile çok benzeşiyordu.

Ekonomi: Bölgenin özerklik pozisyonunda en önemli gelişmelerden biri DKÖB'nin sosyo-ekonomik durumunun iyileştirilmesi için bölgenin kendine has özellikleri dikkate alınarak planlı ekonomisinin ve sosyal gelişmeye katkı sağlama sağlama yetkisinin verilmesidir.⁹¹ 1978 Anayasası'na göre, DKÖB kendi bütçesini oluşturabilirdi. Fakat DKÖB'nin bütçesi Azerbaycan SSC bütçesinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak kabul edilmiştir.⁹² Yine de DKÖB Kanunu bölgenin bütçesinin Azerbaycan SSC bütçesi içinde ayrı olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini göstermektedir. Bütçe devlet bütçesinden ve DKÖB'de bulunan sanayiden oluşmuştur.⁹³ Azerbaycan SSC 1978 Anyasası'nın 72 maddesinin 8. paragrafı DKÖB'nin bütçesinin harcamaları üzerinde Azerbaycan yüksek devlet kurumlarının kontrol yetkisi vermiştir.⁹⁴ Fakat yukarıda değindiğimiz gibi SSCB ekonomi sistemi merkezleştirilmiş sistemdi. DKÖB bütçesini Merkezi yönetim tarafından dayatılan şartları ve devletin gelişmişlik planını temel alarak hazırlamalıydı.

Taahhütler zinciri aslında Moskova'da başlamıştır. SSCB Komünist Partisi taahhütler reçetesini federe birimler için hazırlar, onlar ise daha küçük birimler için. Her beş yılda bir yeni devlet planı (GosPlan) hazırlar

90 A.e.

91 Yüksek Sovyeti note 76, madde 153; DKÖB Yasası madde 8.

92 A.e., madde 159-160.

93 Eski Anyasa'dan farklı olarak yerel vergiler ve harcamalardan bahsedilmemiştir.

94 Yüksek Sovyeti note 76, madde 72(8).

ve SSCB`nin bütün birimlerinin bu taahütler içinde (plana göre) tarım ürünleri dahil, farklı ürünler ve hizmetleri dahildi.⁹⁵ DKÖB İcra Kimtesi de Devlet Planı için taahütlerini hazırlamakla yükümlüdü.⁹⁶

Örneğin, 22 Şubat 1979`da SSCB KPMK, “Azerbaycan SSC`de üzüm ve şarap sanayisinin kalkınmasına dair düzenlemeler” başlıklı karar almıştır. 3 Temmuz 1982 yılında Azerbaycan SSC KPMK aldığı kararla 1982–1986 yılları arasında DKÖB İcra Komitesinin yükümlülüklerini yerine yetirmeyi talep etmiştir.⁹⁷ Diğer örnek DKÖB`de tarımın kalkınması için Azerbaycan SSC KPMK tarafından DKÖB Tarım A.Ş.`nin kurulmasına dair kararın alınmasıdır;⁹⁸ Aslında bu alınan karar 24 Mayıs 1982 tarihli SSCB Bakanlar Sovyeti`nin ve SSCB KPMK`nin kararının uygulanması idi. Azerbaycan SSC Bakanlar Sovyeti ile KPMK`nin ortak kararı ile ilgili diğer bir örnek 24 Haziran 1982 tarihinde DKÖB dâhil örnek çalışmalarına göre işçilerin maaşlarının artırılması için Kolhozlara yetki verilmesine dair karardır.⁹⁹

Mülkiyet hakkı: SSCB`de özel mülkiyet yoktu. Sosyalist mülkiyet anlayışına göre sadece kişisel mülkler yasal mülktü; kişisel mülkler kişisel ihtiyaçlar ve ev içinde kullanım amaçlı olmalı (evlerin aşırı değeri olmamalı ve parasal değer üretecek özelliğe sahip olmamalıdır). Berber veya ayakkabı tamiri gibi küçük işletmeler faaliyet gösterebilirdi. Mülk rejimi Azerbaycan SSC 1978 Anayasası`nın 11–13 maddeleri ile düzenlenmiştir. DKÖB`de yaşayan vatandaşların da SSCB`nin diğer bölgelerinde yaşayan vatandaşları gibi özel mülkiyet hakları vardı.

Güvenlik konuları: DKÖB`de polis güçleri DKÖB İcra Komitesi ve askeri güçler ise Merkezi Sovyet Yönetimi düzenlemesi ve kontrolüne tabi olmuştur. Azerbaycan`ın kendi askeri gücünü kurma yetkisi bulunmuyordu. Askeri konular Moskova`nın yetkisi altında idi.

Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan`ın DKÖB ile ilişkileri: politik ve ekonomik olarak DKÖB Azerbaycan`a bağlıydı ve ticaretini de Azerbaycan`la yürütüyordu. DKÖB`yi Ermenistan`la Lâçin üzerinden bir,

95 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opis 70, Delo 148, list 40. NKAO için 1983`de devlet planı 500 ton tarım ürünleri, 1985`de ise 1000 ton olmuştur.

96 16 Temmuz`da 1981 tarihinde AzSSR Bakanlar Kurulu`nun “1982 yılı için AzSSR Ekonomik ve Sosyal Kalkınma Devlet Planlama Taslağı” üzerine kararı. Nihai onay için Taslak AzSSC Komünist Partisi Merkezi Komitesi tarafından bir daha gözden geçirilmeli ve daha sonra SSCB Devlet Planlama Teşkilatına teslim edilmesi gerekiyordu.

97 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opis 70, Delo 100, list 41.

98 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opis 70, Delo 80, list 20-23.

99 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opis 70, Delo 80, list 38.

Azerbaycan`la ise altı karayolu bağlıyordu. Ermenistan`la hiç bir şekilde idari ilişki bulunmuyordu. Fakat Ermenistan DKÖB`de okullar ve üniversiteler için bazı kitaplar temin ediyordu. DKÖB`nin Ermeni nüfusu çoğunlukla Ermenistan`da eğitim alıyordu. DKÖB Ermenileri Rusça bildikleri için eğitim amaçlı Rusya`ya da seyahat ediyorlardı.

Genel olarak 1978 Anayasası DKÖB`ye daha geniş özerklik sağlamıştır. DKÖB`de yaşayan nüfus hem Azerbaycan yönetiminde, hem de DKÖB`nin kendisini ilgilendiren yasalar ve konular üzerinde söz sahibiydi. Fakat 1978 Anayasası birçok meselenin çözümünü yasal düzenlenmelere bırakmıştı. SSCB yasaları ve DKÖB`nin Halk Sovyeti`nin milletvekillerinin alacakları kararlara bırakılmıştı.

DKÖB`nin statüsündeki değişimler kurulduğu günden 1980`ne kadar devam etmiştir. Fakat bölgenin özerkliği yasal ve idari sistem üzerinden değil, parti sistemi üzerinden işlemiştir. Toplumsal düzeni kuvvetlendirmek ve bütün alanlarda meşruiyeti temin etmek için 28 Temmuz 1981 Azerbaycan SSC KPMK, yerel ve DKÖB İcra Komitelerine Kararları tartışma ve daha sonra uygulama yetkisi veren bir karar almıştır.¹⁰⁰ Aynı zamanda döneminde SSCB`deki özerk bölgelerin özerkliği Avrupa ile mükayesede oldukça düşük olmuştur. Bu durum SSCB idari sisteminin merkezleştirilmiş olmasından kaynaklanmıştır.

DKÖB`de Azınlık haklarının korunması

Özerklik statüsü Dağlık Karabağ`a nüfusunun çoğunluğu Ermeni olduğu için verilmiştir. Özerklik etnik farklılıklarını, dillerini ve kültürlerini korumak ve yaşatmaya hizmet etmeliydi. Özerkliğin amacı ekonomik bağımsızlık kazandırmak değil, onların etnik kültürel kimliğini korumaktı. Bu bölümde onlara verilen özerklik statüsünün bu amaca ulaşım ulaşımadığı tartışacaktır.

Sovyet rejimi SSCB`deki milli kimlikleri silmek veya ortadan kaldırmayı değil, insanların düşüncesinde işçilerin ve çiftçilerin kardeşliği duygusunu yaratmayı hedeflemiştir. İktidar ve zihniyette Komünist ideoloji gerekliydi. Yasal düzenlemelerin milli azınlıklara geniş haklar ve ayrıcalıklar sağlamasına rağmen sosyal ve kişisel hayata totaliter komünist müdahalecilik bu hakların bozulmasına neden olmuştur.

100 ADP UDPAR, Fond 1, Opis 86, Delo 106, list 96-106.

Bu yüzden bile DKÖB`de yaşayan Ermenilere sağlanan hakları Ulusal Azınlıkların Korunması için Avrupa Çerçeve sözleşmesine göre değerlendirdiğimiz zaman sözleşmenin 4. maddesinde öngörülen ayrımcılığın önlenmesi, kimlik hakkı, yani dil hakkı, gelenek ve kültürel mirasın korunması (madde 5) Azerbaycan SSC ve SSCB yasaları ile korunmuştur. Örneğin, DKÖB`de dil hakkını korunmasını kısaca inceleyelim.

Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi 1970, 1979 ve 1989 nüfus sayımına göre, DKÖB`de nüfusun %80.5, %75.9 - %76,9 etnik Ermenilerden, %18 - %23 - %21.5 etnik Azerbaycanlılardan ve % 1.3 - % 1.1 - % 1.5 diğer etnik halklardan oluşmuştur. Bölgede Ermeni dilini kendi ana dili olarak tanımlayanların sayısı 1970`ten 1989`a kadar değişmemiştir; % 96.33 (1979) ve % 98.44 (1989).¹⁰¹

Öte yandan Ruslaştırmanın bütün SSCB ülkelerine yayılması sonucu, Rusçayı kendi ana dili olarak kabul edenlerin sayısı çoğalmıştır. Rusca konuşmayan insanlar de fakto ikinci sınıf vatandaşlardı, çünkü SSCB`de kültürel ve dil durumu Rusçayı bilmeden devlet kurumlarında ve parti kurumlarında iş bulmak imkânsızdı. Bu eğilim DKÖB`deki alışkanlıklarında da gözlemlenmiştir.

1978–1988 yılları arasında Eğitim Bakanlığı`nın verilerine göre, DKÖB`de Ermeni okulları kalıcı olarak artmaktaydı: 1978–1979`da Ermeni okulları %62, 1988–1989`da ise %69`du. 1978–1979`de Ermeni okullarında öğrenci oranı %64 idi. 1988–1989`da ise %60`dı. Azerbaycan dilli okullarda ise bu oran 1978–1979`da %24.6, 1988–1989`da ise %24.3`dü. Rus okullarının öğrencileri artmaktaydı: 1978–1979`da %11, 1988–1989`da ise %15.5 idi.¹⁰²

Fakat Luchterhandt`ın belirttiği gibi, Özerk bölgedeki eğitim sistemi bile nispeten olumlu görüntü sunmağı başarmıştır. Ermenilerin toplu şekilde yaşadığı yerlerde (bölgede 215 yerleşim yerinden 200`ü buna işaret ediyordu) veya Azerbaycanlıları`n ayrı yerleşim yerlerinde yaşaması özerk bölgede Ermeni ve Azerbaycan okullarının ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu da DKÖB`de yaşayan etnik Ermenilerin % 96,3`nün Ermenice konuşmasına neden olmuştur.”¹⁰³

101 Itogi vsesojuznoj perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda, tom 4. Nacionalniy sostav naseleniya, Moskva, 1973; Chislennost i sostav naseleniya SSSR. Po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda. Moskva, 1985; Goskomitet SSSR po statistike. Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda. Moskva, 1989.

102 G.Pashayeva. From Soviet to European language policy standards: the Case of Azerbaijan. In: Azerbaijan Focus., Center for Strategic Studies, 2010, 2(2), s. 140.

103 O.Luchterhandt. Nagorny Karabakh's right to state independence according to international law. Boston, 1993, ss. 62-63.

Dil hakları ulusal azınlıklara tanınmış hakların sadece bir kısmını oluşturuyor. Aslında azınlık hakları insan haklarının bir kısmını veya belirli bir kombinasyonu, özel hayat, din, ifade ve toplanma özgürlüğü hakkı olarak görülmelidir.

Medya, okul ve yazışmalarda kendi dilini kullanma, kendi dininde ibadet, gelenek ve kültürel işleri gerçekleştirmek özgürlüğü etnik azınlıklar hakkı açısından en önemli konulardır. Komünist ideolojiyi benimsediği için SSCB din karşıtı bir rejim olmuştur. Müslümanlar, Hıristiyanlar ve Yahudilerin dini özgürlüğü kısıtlanmış ve devletin bütün düzeylerinde ateizm teşvik edilmiştir. Örneğin, 23 Ekim 1981'de Azerbaycan SSC KPMK "Ateistik Eğitimin kuvvetlendirilmesi" hakkında karar almış, il ve vilayetlerde dini geleneklere, mollalara ve vaizlere karşı mücadele etmek için komiteler oluşturulmuştur.¹⁰⁴

Sovyetler Birliği resmi kurumları insan hakları kavramının sosyalist hukuk kurumuna kesinlikle yabancı olduğuna ve burjuva hukuk kurumlarının kategorisine dâhil olduğuna dair propaganda yürütmüştür. Bu hakların doğası itibariyle kapitalizme ve emperyalizmin işçileri sömürmesine hizmet ettiğine vurgu yapılmıştır. Bu anlamda ilk jenerasyon hakları olan mülkiyet hakkı, dini özgürlük hakkı, ifade ve toplanma özgürlüğü gibi haklar komünist ideolojiye zıt olması nedeniyle kısıtlanmıştır. Buna rağmen temel hak ve özgürlükler SSCB'nin bütün anayasalarında ortaya konmuş, komünist ideoloji hakları insan hakları kavramı da dâhil diğerlerini dışlamıştır. İnsan hakları sosyalist topluma yabancı olan liberal toplumun temel taşı olarak öğretilmiştir.

Hak kavramı Sovyet mevzuatında belirlenmiş olmasına rağmen, sadece Anayasa'nın normlarına bakarak kişinin haklarını savunmak için herhangi bir adli veya diğer devlet kurumuna başvuru yapması mümkün olmamıştır. İnsan hakları Sovyet mevzuatında belirlenmiş olmasına rağmen, sadece Anayasa'nın normlarına gönderme yaparak birinin haklarını korumak için mahkemeye veya başka mercilere müracaat etmek imkânsız olmuştur. Böyle bir dava, şikâyet veya itirazın (hatta inceleme için) kabul olması için yasa ile sağlanan yüksek mahkeme emri olması gerekmiştir. Bu normlar yokluğunda, Anayasa'da belirtilen hak ve özgürlükler sık sık birer süs malzemesi olarak kullanılmıştır.¹⁰⁵ Uluslararası yasalar ve Sovyet mevzuatı arasında karşılaştırmalı analiz ikisi arasında çok büyük bir farklılık olduğunu göstermektedir.

104 ADP UPDAR, Fond 1, Opis 68, Delo 137, list 13-21.

105 Arkady I. Vaxberg. Civil Rights in the Soviet Union. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 506, Human Rights around the World (Nov., 1989), ss. 111-112.

Örneğin, propiska veya oturma izni (kendi içinde Stalin döneminin ürünü) gibi düzenlemeler Sovyetler Birliği tarafından imzalanan uluslararası anlaşmalarda belirtilen normlarla hiçbir ortak yanı yoktu ve hem uluslararası anlaşmalar, hem de Sovyet anayasasının garantisi altında olan hareket özgürlüğünü ihlal etmiştir. Ne yazık ki, bu sistemi frenlemek için tüm çabalar eski SSCB güvenlik kurumları tarafından oluşturulan engeller nedeniyle başarısız olmuştur. Uluslararası yasal araçlar halka kendi düşüncelerini ifade etmek ve her türlü bilgiye ulaşmayı garanti altına almış olsa da, o zaman Sovyet mevzuatı ya da uygulamasında ifade özgürlüğü için hiçbir garanti yoktu.

Sovyet mahkemelerinin uluslararası insan hakları anlaşmasından kaynaklanan yükümlülüklerini uygulama deneyimi çok azdı. Sovyet yargı sisteminde uluslararası hukuk ulusal hukukun bir parçası olarak kabul edilmemiştir. SSCB`nin 1977 Anayasası`nda şöyle denilmektedir, “SSCB`nin diğer devletler ile ilişkileri SSCB tarafından imzalanan anlaşmalar ve genel olarak uluslararası hukukun tanınan norm ve ilkelerinden kaynaklanan yükümlülüklerinin gerçekleştirilmesi üzerine kurulmuştur.”¹⁰⁶ Fakat Komünist mahkemelerin denetimi altında olan Sovyet mahkemelerine uluslararası hukukun asıl kaynağı olan uluslararası anlaşmalara gönderme yapma yetkisi verilmemiştir.

Bunun yerine 1977 Anyasası uluslararası hukuk uygulamalarını yürütme organı olan Bakanlar Sovyeti`ne vermiş¹⁰⁷ ve bu organ konuyla ilgili doğrudan yetkiye sahip organdı.¹⁰⁸ Ulusal mahkemelerde SSCB`nin uluslararası insan hakları anlaşmalarına başvurma isteksizliği bir kaç nedenden kaynaklanabilir. Nedenlerden biri, Sovyet sistemi hukukun üstünlüğünün devlet memurları faaliyetleri üzerinde kontrol mekanizması olduğu düşüncesine kapalıydı; hukuk sosyalist düzenin kurulması ve sürdürülmesi için bir araç olarak görülmüştür.¹⁰⁹ Sovyetler Birliği`nde anayasal denetim geleneği yoktu, elitlerin ve bürokrasini değiştirmek için uluslararası hukuktan yararlanma düşüncesi yabancı bir anlayıştı.

Diğer bir neden hükümeti sınırlamak için kuralları çalıştıracak bağımsız yargı kültürü bulunmuyordu. Tam tersine Sovyet mahkemeleri ve yargı

106 Yüksek Sovyeti, note 72, madde 29.

107 *A.e.*, madde 128, 131(6).

108 *bkz.*, Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and Denunciation of International Treaties of the USSR, art. 21, translated in W. Butler, Basic Documents on the Soviet Legal System (2d ed. 1988), s. 290.

109 Berman, *The Comparison of Soviet and American Law*, 34 IND. L.J. (1959), s. 559 ve s. 567.

sistemi partiye yardımcı organ olarak hizmet ediyordu. Uluslararası örf ve adet hukukuna doğrudan başvurulduğu sosyalist olmayan ülkelerden farklı olarak Sovyet mahkemeleri örf ve adet hukukuna hukuk kaynağı olarak başvurmamıştır.¹¹⁰

Yine de, Azerbaycan SSC ve SSCB'nin bir parçası olan DKÖB'de vatandaşlarını hakları SSCB'nin muvafık Anayasalarının vatandaşlara sağlamış olduğu koruma altında idi. DKÖB ile ilgili yasal düzenlemelerde kişilerin haklarının korunması için var olan düzenlemeleri DKBÖ'de insan haklarının korunmasını sağlayan normlar olarak görmek yalııştır. DKÖB'deki etnik haklarla ilgili düzenlemeler daha önceki üç Anayasa yorumlanarak incelenebilir.

SSCB'nin Anayasası insan haklarını bir kurum olarak tanımlamıştır. Daha önce belirtildiği gibi, Sovyetler Birliği'nin vatandaşlarına sağladığı hakların özünde "vatandaş"ın "bireysel" hakkı olarak değil, uluslararası insan hakları hukuku doktrini yatıyor.

1927 Anayasası Azerbaycan'daki azınlıkların hakları ile ilgili düzenleme içermiştir. Bu düzenleme Anayasanın 15. maddesinde "ırkı ve etnik kimliği ne olursa olsun... ulusal azınlıklara doğrudan veya dolaylı ayrıcalıklar tanımak veya eşitlik haklarını bozmak Cumhuriyetin yasalarına tamamen aykırıdır" şeklinde ifade olunmuştur.¹¹¹ Dünyadaki diğer devletler ile mükayesede Azerbaycan SSC'deki bu madde oldukça ilerici olmuştur. Ayrıca 15. madde azınlıklara kongrelerde, mahkemelerde, kamusal alanda ve gerçek hayatta kendi dillerini kullanma ve okullarda kendi dillerinde eğitim alma hakkı vermiştir.¹¹²

1937 Azerbaycan SSC Anayasası'nda yeni gelişmeler yaşanmıştır. Söz konusu Anayasa'nın XI Bölümü'nde vatandaşların bütün hakları tekrarlanmıştır. İşçi haklarına öncelik tanınmıştır. Bahsettiği öncelikli hak çalışma hakkı olmuştur. Bu hakkın kullanılması ulusal azınlıklar da dâhil olmak üzere, tüm vatandaşlar için garantili ücretli iş hakkı olarak anlaşılmaktadır.¹¹³ Yapılan düzenleme çerçevesinde boş vakit ve dinlenme, 7 saatlik iş günü yıllık izin ve eğlence altyapısını kullanma hakkı verilmiştir.¹¹⁴ Daha sonra ayrımcılık yapılmadan bütün insanlar

110 Ametistov, *Problems of Relations Between International and National Law*, The Moscow Conference on Law and Economic Cooperation: Faculty Presentations (1990), s. 55, s. 57.

111 http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf.

112 *A.e.*

113 Yüksek Sovyet note 42, madde 125.

114 *A.e.*, madde 126.

için 8 yıllık eğitim hakkı, emeklilik maaşı ve diğer sosyal avantajlar gibi sosyal güvenlik hakları verilmiştir.¹¹⁵ 1937 Anayasası ayrımcılığa karşı katı normlar sağlamış, ulusal ve etnik ayrımcılık yasaları yasaklanmıştır. En basit etnik ayrımcılık bile yasal olarak cezalandırılır kabul edilmiştir.¹¹⁶ Bu nedenle DKÖB`de yaşayan Ermenilerin azınlık hakları Anayasal yolla koruma altına alınmıştır.

1937 Anayasası dini özgürlükleri ve devletin sekülerliyini yeniden kabul etti,¹¹⁷ aynı zamanda ifade ve konuşma özgürlüğü, basın özgürlüğü, örgütlenme ve toplanma özgürlüğü, sokaklarda gösteri yapma ve yürüme özgürlüğüne geniş haklar tanımıştır. Bu hak kaynaklara ulaşma özgürlüğü de tanımıştır.¹¹⁸ Ayrıca bu anayasa kişisel garantiyi de sağlamıştır. Anayasa, savcı veya mahkemenin yaptırımını dışında herhangi keyfi tutuklamayı yasaklamıştır. Aynı garanti kişilerin konut dokunulmazlığı ve yazışmaları için de verilmiştir.¹¹⁹

AzSSR 1978 Anayasası insan hakları konusunda önemli ilerlemeler kaydetmiştir. SSCB`nin insan haklarına önemli bir bölüm ayıran 1975 Helsinki Aktı`na taraf olduğunu belirtmek gerekiyor, SSCB Anayasası`nda değişiklik yapmak oldukça önemliydi.

Bu özel anayasa ayrımcılık konusunu ırk ve milliyet ayrımcılığından cinsiyet, eğitim, dil, din, etkinlikler ve hatta ikamet ayrımcılığına kadar genişletmiştir.¹²⁰ Anayasa ayrımcılık konusuna dilsel ve dinsel azınlıkları da dâhil etmiştir. Anayasa kadın ve erkeklere eşit haklar tanımış¹²¹ ve SSCB içinde yaşayan özellikle etnik azınlıklar dâhil bütün ulusları koruma kapsamına dâhil etmiştir.¹²² Anayasa ayrıca bütün insanların özellikle yabancıların mahkeme karşısında savunma hakkını anayasal hak olarak tanımıştır.¹²³

Diğer iki Anayasa`ya göre, 1978 Anayasası insan haklarına daha geniş garanti sağlamıştır. Politik hakların birçoğunun tanınmasından kaçınılmış fakat sosyal, ekonomik, sivil ve kültürel haklara geniş yer verilmiştir. 1978 Anayasası öncelikler gibi etnik ve dini azınlıklara karşı

115 *A.e.*, madde 127, 128.

116 *A.e.*, madde 130.

117 *A.e.*, madde 131.

118 *A.e.*, madde 132, 133.

119 *A.e.*, madde 134, 135.

120 Yüksek Sovyeti notu 76, madde 32.

121 *A.e.*, madde 33.

122 *A.e.*, madde 34.

123 *A.e.*, madde 35.

ayrımcılığı yasaklamıştır; temel normlar siyasi ve sosyal hayatta vatandaşlara karşı ayrımcılığı, milliyeti ve ırkı gerekçe ile ihmal etmeyi yasakladı. Bu kanunlar DKÖB için de uygulanmış ve Ermeni azınlık koruma altına alınmıştır.

Sonuç

Günümüzün şartları çerçevesinde DKÖB`de Sovyet özerkliği anlatımı gerçeklerin çarpıtılmasıdır. İlan olunan hakların kesinlikle uygulanmadığı söylenebilir. Parti kontrolü nedeniyle kuvvetler ayrımı ilkesi işlememiştir. Fakat Sovyet yönetimi altında bütün Sovyetler Birliği`ne has olan iç problemler olmadan yıllarca Ermeni ve Azerbaycanlıların bir arada yaşadığı söylenebilir.

Özerkliğin geliştirildiği her üç dönemde devlet organlarının isimlerini değiştirildiği fakat özünde bir değişiklik yapılmadan aynı sistemle yönetildiği söylenebilir. Konseyler Kongresi`nden DKÖB Halk Sovyeti`ne kadar yasamanın gücü hayali olmuş ve bütün SSCB`de olduğu gibi yasalar ve kararlar parti düzenlemelerine göre kabul edilmiştir.

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Aynı zamanda yürütme organları devlet gücünün gerçek taşıyıcıları olmuştur. 1936 yılına kadar departmanlar ve komiserleri idari konularda çalışmış ve daha sonra 1988 yılına kadar aynı görev Bakanlar Konseyi ve Yürütme Komiteleri tarafından yürütülmüştür. Yargı alanında, DKÖB`nin kendi sistemi olan bölge mahkemeleri ve (1925 yılından itibaren) nispeten hızlı temyiz mahkemesi vardı.

Ancak, bu özerkliğin var olduğu bütün dönemler boyunca, yargının yüksek organı Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Mahkemesi olmuş ve son temyiz başvurusu sadece orda yapılabilirdi. Aynı zamanda yerel Vilayet Mahkemesi Başkanı Azerbaycan SSC Yüksek Mahkemesi üyesi idi ve bölgede yargılamalar genellikle Ermenice yürütülmüştür.

Özerkliğin geliştirilmesi aşamalarında DKÖB ekonomi konularında kısmen sorumlu olmuştur. 1923–1936 arasında Ekonomi Departmanı kalkınma programlarının uygulanması ve Azerbaycan SSC`nin bütçesi ile birleşik olan bütçesinden harcamalar yapmakla yükümlü olmuştur. 1936 yılında DKÖB`nin bütçesi Azerbaycan SSC bütçesinden ayrıldı ve harcamalar hala Bakü ve Moskova`nın sıkı kontrolü altında idi.

1978`ten itibaren DKÖB sosyal ve ekonomik planlarını ekonomik olarak merkezi hükümetten bağımsız şekilde yapma imkânı kazanmıştır. Daha

sonraki aşamalarda DKÖB ekonomik olarak Azerbaycan SSC diğer bölgelerinden ve hatta SSCB`nin bazı bölgelerinden ekonomik olarak daha iyi gelişmiştir.

DKÖB`nin karar verme sürecinden de izole edilmemiştir. Kurulduğu günden itibaren Milletler Konseyi`ne bir temsilci ve 1936`tan sonra ise beş temsilci gönderme imkânı kazanmıştır. Son aşamada Bölgeyi ilgilendiren konularda karar verme yetkisine sahip Azerbaycan Yüksek Sovyeti Prezidyumu Başkanının üç yardımcısından biri DKÖB`den atanmaktaydı.

Diğer taraftan idari bölünme ve bölgenin sınırlarının değişmesi merkezi hükümetin yetkisi alanında kalmıştı. Temel olarak merkezi hükümetin yasama, yürütme ve yargı makamları tüm organları DKÖB organlarının aldığı kararları iptal etme yetkisine sahipti. Daha da ötesi karar verme ve uygulama süreci Komünist Parti`nin gözetimi ve kontrolü altında idi.

Yasama ve yürütme organları kararlarının perde arkası karar verme sürecinin yasal çıktısı idi. Daha sonra fiili kararlara dönüşen bu kararlar Parti düzeyinde yerel ve merkezi yetkililerin yazışmalarından oluşmuştur. Fakat bilgisizlik nedeniyle azınlıkların kendini yönetim konusu doğası itibarıyla gelişigüzel olmuştur. Partinin aynı düzeydeki denetimi bütün SSCB`ye ve küçük birimlere de uygulanmıştır. Etkili bir kendini yönetimin inkâr edilmesi SSCB`nin genel politikasının bir parçasıydı.

Altyapısal anlamda DKÖB Ermenistan`a yakından bağımlı değildi, Birlik olduğu için SSCB tek bir devlet olarak kabul görmüş ve bu nedenle kültürel olarak Ermenistan SSC ile DKÖB arasında etkileşim problemi bulunmuyordu. Ermenistan DKÖB okulları ve üniversitelerine yazılı edebiyat eserleri sağlıyor, DKÖB Ermenileri Ermenistan`da eğitim alıyordu.

DKÖB`nin özerkliğinin son aşamasında ekonomik olarak bölge Azerbaycan SSC ile mükayesede daha avantajlıydı. Demografik olarak durum istikrarlıydı ve nüfusun çoğunluğu Ermenilerden oluşmuştur. Demografik yapının değiştirilmesi için izlenen politikayla ilgili bir kanıt bulunmuyordu.

Özerkliğin başarısızlık nedenleri azınlık haklarının yetersizliğinden veya Azerbaycan merkezi yönetiminin uyguladığı ayrımcı politikadan değil, SSCB`nin yönetim sisteminden ve Ermenilerin ayrımcı amaçlarından kaynaklanmıştır.

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COLONIALISM, GERMAN EXPERIENCE AND THE REFLECTIONS ON HISTORY

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Abstract: *The German colonialist experience is relatively a less studied area. First of all, it occupies relatively a short span of time. Second, the general emphasis on the Third Reich eclipses other periods. In the aftermath of the abrupt ending of German colonial rule, the British even argued that the German Empire was inexperienced when it came to ruling indigenous populations and foreign lands.¹ However, as Steinmetz shows German Empire was experienced in “colonial statecraft.”²*

Thus, this paper focuses on German colonialism, its roots, course of action and pertinent repercussions. In order to do so, it initially investigates the nature of colonialism in general and then raises questions on the origins and the development of the German colonial legacy in particular. In an interdisciplinary fashion that encompasses colonialism, German history, the Holocaust, and genocidal studies and through a hybrid form of methodology that introduces modifications to the Meinig’s chronological framework³, I posit that genocidal tools had been available to the German Imperial Army long before the Holocaust. Consequently, when national prestige and global hegemony were perceived to be threatened, certain segments of the German society approved extreme brutality, and perhaps genocide.

After presenting various theoretical interpretations, the study adopts a case-study approach through German South West Africa. Consequently,

* The views expressed in this study solely represent the author’s own opinions and assessments.

1 George Steinmetz, *The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. xvii.

2 Ibid.

3 D.W. Meinig, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800 Vol. I of The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

the essay will be unfolding a problem presented by recent scholarly works: debate on German colonialism and its link to Holocaust.

Keywords: Colonialism, Genocide, Holocaust, The German Empire (II. Reich), Namibia, Kingdom of Italy

SÖMÜRGEÇİLİK, ALMANYA'NIN DENEYİMLERİ VE TARİHE YANSIMALARI

Öz: *Almanların sömürgeci deneyimi diğerlerine kıyasla az çalışılmış bir alandır. (Bunun nedeni) Her şeyden önce bu konu kısa bir zaman zarfını kapsar. İkincisi, Nazi Almanya'sına verilen genel önemin diğer dönemlerin önüne geçmiş olmasıdır. Alman sömürgeci yönetiminin ani bitişinin sebebi İngilizlerce, Alman İmparatorluğu'nun yerel halkı ve yabancı toprakları yönetmedeki tecrübesizliği olarak öne sürülmüştür. Ancak, Steinmetz bize Alman İmparatorluğu'nun 'sömürgeci devlet yönetimi' konusunda tecrübeli olduklarını gösterir.*

Nitekim bu yazı Alman sömürgeciliğine, onun kökenlerine, hareket şekline ve doğurduğu etkilere odaklanmaktadır. Bunu yapabilmek için, önce genel olarak sömürgeciliğin doğası araştırılmakta, sonrasında Alman sömürgeci mirasının kökeni ve gelişimi hakkında sorular sorulmaktadır. Sömürgeciliği, Alman tarihini, Holokost ve soykırım çalışmalarını kapsayan, Meinig'in kronolojik çerçevesine eklemeler yapan karma bir yöntem kullanan disiplinlerarası bir üslupla, Holokost'tan çok daha önce soykırım araçlarının Alman İmparatorluk Ordusu'nun kullanımına açık olduğunu önermekteyim. Buna bağlı olarak, ulusal itibar ve küresel hâkimiyetin tehdit altında olduğu algılandığında, Alman toplumunun belirli kesimleri, olağanüstü vahşeti ve belki de soykırımı onaylamıştır.

Çeşitli teorik tefsirleri sunduktan sonra çalışma, Alman Güneybatı Afrika'sı üzerinden, vaka incelemesi yaklaşımını benimser. Bunun sonucunda, makale günümüzde akademik çalışmalara konu olan Alman sömürgeciliği ve bunun Holokost ile bağlantısı tartışmasına katkıda bulunacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sömürgecilik, Soykırım, Holokost, Alman İmparatorluğu (II. Reich), Namibya, İtalya Krallığı

1. Introduction:

It is not clear whether British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey was persuaded by Emperor Wilhelm II's remarks that "Germany desired no further territory. Her own Colonies were ample for her needs. And besides, that there were large German places of business flourishing in British colonies."⁴ However, the transcribed dialogue, as a micro-historical case, presents the contemporary historian a vivid example of the German colonialist legacy and its rhetoric. The Emperor's remarks acknowledge, first of all, that by 1907, Germany had emerged as a colonialist empire in the age of British and French colonial empires. Osterhammel even points that "before 1914, the Germans also built up an 'informal empire' in China, Latin America, and the Ottoman Empire."⁵ Furthermore, the future of German political interests in the Middle East would have been perceived consequential for the British Empire. Second of all, by acknowledging disinterest in acquiring new territories, Wilhelm II could have been sustaining the delicate diplomacy Chancellor Bismarck had embarked.⁶ Finally, while Wilhelm's words aimed at placating the British, Germany might indeed have been refraining from the complexities of the colonial war which took its toll over the four-year long armed conflict (1904-1908) in South West-Africa. Despite these assertions, German colonialist history still deserves further inquiry. Such an undertaking would not only provide a better understanding of colonialism but also of German history.

The German colonialist experience is relatively a less studied area. First of all, it occupies relatively a short span of time. Second, the general emphasis on the Third Reich eclipses other periods. In the aftermath of the abrupt ending of German colonial rule, the British even argued that the German Empire was inexperienced when it came to ruling indigenous populations and foreign lands.⁷ However, as Steinmetz shows German Empire was experienced in "colonial statecraft."⁸

4 In an attempt to convince the British Foreign Secretary of the German intentions in the Middle East, Emperor Wilhelm II made it explicit on November 12th, 1907, that "Germany desired further no further territory. Her own Colonies were ample for her needs. And besides, that there were large German places of business flourishing in British colonies." Document 25, November 13, 2007, Foreign Office reprinted in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, General Editors Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt Part I From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series B The Near and Middle East 1856-1914 ed. David Gillard Volume 18: *Arabia, the Gulf and Bagdad Railway, 1907-1914*, (University Publications of America, Inc. 1985), pp. 18-20.

5 Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism* (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997), p. 19.

6 Russell A. Berman, "Book Review: Colonial Fantasies," *Modern Philology*, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Aug 2000), pp. 110-114.

7 George Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. xvii.

8 Ibid.

Thus, this paper focuses on German colonialism, its roots, course of action and pertinent repercussions. In order to do so, it initially investigates the nature of colonialism in general and then raises questions on the origins and the development of the German colonial legacy in particular. In an interdisciplinary fashion that encompasses colonialism, German history, the Holocaust, and genocidal studies and through a hybrid form of methodology that introduces modifications to the Meinig's chronological framework⁹, I posit that genocidal tools had been available to the German Imperial Army long before the Holocaust. Consequently, when national prestige and global hegemony were perceived to be threatened, certain segments of the German society approved extreme brutality, and perhaps genocide.

After presenting various theoretical interpretations, the study adopts a case-study approach through German South West Africa. This specific case-study is particularly relevant since it had become one of most notorious examples of colonization and armed conflict. Consequently, the essay will be unfolding a problem presented by recent scholarly works: debate on German colonialism and its link to Holocaust. While doing so, a comparative approach is also utilized. Finally, in an epilogue, current relations between Germany and former South West Africa, Namibia, will be clarified. In terms of tribal names and German words, I adhere to the original punctuation of the quotations. Otherwise, generally accepted wording has been used.

2. Conceptualization of Colonialism:

The Economist, in an anachronistic fashion, lately interpreted Chinese overseas overtures as colonialist intentions.¹⁰ According to the report, the contemporary Chinese, fueled by their "thirst for resources"¹¹ had become "the new colonialists."¹² If however, *The Economist* misinterpreted this notion and had categorical flaws, what then would be the definition of colonialism?

Osterhammel offers a comprehensive definition of colonialism. According to him,

9 D.W. Meinig, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800 Vol. I of The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

10 "A Ravenous Dragon: A special report on China's quest for resources, March 15th, 2008," *The Economist* March 15th-21st 2008.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

*Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.*¹³

There are certainly other interpretations of colonialism as well as of imperialism and empire. In early interpretations of the term, Heinrich Friedjung had asserted that “imperialism signified both a nationalist ideology devoted to extending the domination of a particular nation state, and also a policy determined by ceaseless rivalry among the powers composing the international system of states.”¹⁴ According to Said, on the other hand, “imperialism means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory; ‘colonialism’ which is almost a consequence of imperialism is the implanting of settlements on distant territory.”¹⁵ Zantop further asserts that “imperialism thus encompasses both thought and action, [whereas] colonialism only the latter the actual taking possession and settling of the land.”¹⁶ Osterhammel, on the other hand, juxtaposes that “imperialism is the concept that comprises all forcings and activities contributing to the construction and the maintenance of transcolonial empires...Imperialism thus implies not only colonial politics, but international politics for which colonies are not just ends themselves, but also pawns in global power games.”¹⁷ Whereas the colonial politics is left to the hands of localized officials, imperialism is the domain of the metropolis.¹⁸ Moreover, Zantop concludes that, “as the experience of Germany shows, colonialist desires could be instrumentalized for imperialist purposes, since they had taken hold of the imagination long before any state-sponsored expansion was even considered.”¹⁹

13 Osterhammel, p. 15.

14 Heinrich Friedjung, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1884-1914*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1919-1922), pp. 4-5, quoted in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* trans. P.S. Falla, New York: Random House, 1980.

15 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 9, quoted in Suzanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family and Nation in Pre-colonial Germany, 1770-1870*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 8.

16 Suzanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family and Nation in Pre-colonial Germany, 1770-1870*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 8-9.

17 Osterhammel, p. 21.

18 Osterhammel, p. 22.

19 Zantop, p. 9.

3. Repositioning of German Colonialism in Comparative Framework:

Whereas the British, French and Spanish Empires have a long-legacy of colonialism dating back to the early modern ages, the German Empire is a late comer in such an imperial enterprise. In order to encapsulate peculiarities and commonalities of their enterprise in Africa, this paper not only points to the colonial imagination in the German psyche, which will be discussed in Section 4 but also briefly compares the German colonial legacy to similar Italian experiences in Section 6.

4. Conceptualization of Colonialism in Imperial Germany:

While an imperial cable, stating protection over a German overseas enterprise in South West Africa, on April 24, 1884 marks the beginning of German colonialist history,²⁰ its colonialist ventures date back to earlier centuries. The first episode is the failed colonization attempt in Venezuela during 1528-1555.²¹ The second episode emerges out of the 18th and 19th century German scholarship²² that in a form of intellectual imagination transformed even the failed Venezuela experience into an “ultimately triumphalist fantasy,”²³ which facilitated the emergence of German /Prussian State as a colonialist empire.²⁴

Pre-1884 colonialist thinking, according to Zantop, laid the foundation for German colonialism. Zantop’s theory demonstrates the following:

*As the experience of Germany shows, colonialist desires could be instrumentalized for imperialist purposes, since they had taken hold of the imagination long before any state-sponsored expansion was even considered. Imaginary colonialism anticipated actual imperialism, words, and actions. In the end, reality just caught up with the imagination.*²⁵

In addition to creating new colonies, what the afore-mentioned intellectual ‘fantasy’ assisted was the formation of a German identity.²⁶

20 German colonialist activity encompassed South-West Africa, Togo, Cameroon, East Africa and the Pacific. See Zantop, p. 1.

21 Zantop, p. 19.

22 For its racist contents, see Zantop, pp. 66-80 and 81-97.

23 Zantop, p. 29.

24 Ibid., pp. 1-16.

25 Ibid., p. 9.

26 Ibid., p. 7.

According to Zantop, in their struggle against other European nations, Germans created mental maps on various social categories that assisted “constructing a national identity in opposition to the perceived racial, sexual, ethnic or national characteristics of others, Europeans and non-Europeans alike.”²⁷ She further posits that “as Germans imagined their others, Europeans and non-Europeans both outside and inside Germany, they created themselves.”²⁸ Consequently, the colonies became the stage “for the creation of an imaginary national self freed from history and convention”²⁹ Zimmerer and Zellner point out Dr. Fabri and Hübbe-Scheiden’s promotion of colonial aspirations and how the latter (Hübbe-Scheiden) linked “the development of national consciousness, an independent overseas policy and national power.”³⁰

Steinmetz, on the other hand, posits a theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of ethnographic discourses, symbolic struggles among the colonizers and the psychic identifications on the making of German colonialism.³¹ According to this theory, the pre-colonial images of the indigenous population had a bearing on the later colonialist administration’s policy.³² However, not only the power struggle between German classes but also colonialist administrators’ personal choice affected the outcome of the native policy, which is the “official intervention directed toward stabilizing a colonized group around a particular definition of its culture, character and behavior.”³³

The economic dimension of the German colonial project is relevant to the discussion at hand and also an unresolved question. For Friedrichsmeyer et. al., “German conduct within the colonies depended very much on the nature of the land and specific German interests. ... Germany’s policy aims in the colonies were almost exclusively economic.”³⁴ For Zimmerer and Zeller, “from the 1830s, the German presence in West Africa grew until in some places, German firms occupied first place in the European colonial trade”³⁵ and the State

27 Ibid., p. 7.

28 Ibid., p. 7.

29 Ibid., p. 7.

30 Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller, trans. Neather, Edward, *Genocide in German South-West Africa: the Colonial War (1904-1908) in Namibia and its aftermath*, Monmouth, Wales: Merlin Press, 2008, p. xxi and also Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism*, trans. P.S. Falla, (New York: Random House, 1980).

31 Steinmetz, p. 22.

32 Ibid. p. 2.

33 Ibid. p. 43.

34 Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Suzanne Zantop, ed. *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy*. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 1998), p. 11.

35 Zimmerer, *Zimmerer and Zeller*, p. xix.

refrained from the cost that would be associated with an imperial administration.³⁶ However, it is difficult to view German colonial project as a profitable enterprise in all cases as a uniform model. Within this context, Smith argues that the German colonial empire is a reflection of “nineteenth-century European imperial expansion”³⁷ established “as a product of the complex interplay of domestic political forces resulting from rapid socio-economic change, the empire itself was never a practical success.”³⁸ Consequently, the colonial project meant “a significant factor in making Germany not just a great power on the continent of Europe, but truly a world power.”³⁹

5. Case Study: German South West Africa

While Osterhammel mentions an ‘African’ model of colonization where colonizers relied on an indigenous workforce,⁴⁰ Meinig introduces a phase approach for the colonization process in which he identifies eight stages.⁴¹ The settlers’ demand for the livestock in the South West African case assisted annihilation of the labor force. This event undermines a narration based on indigenous labor force, thus adoption of African model. A chronological approach seems fit for the purposes of this paper. Thus, over the course of this section, the phases of German colonialism in South West Africa will be provided and if necessary, modifications to the Meinig’s framework will be introduced:⁴²

a) Reconnaissance of the unknown terrain

The initial stage of Meinig’s framework simply needs to be modified to encompass civilian and missionary reconnaissance and establishment. According to the original scheme, civilian settlement would have been stage seven. Nevertheless, the German presence in South West Africa started with the missionary activities of the Rhenish Missionary Society

36 Helmuth Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, (translation by C. Hurst & Co. London, 1986), p. 14, quoted in Zimmerer and Zeller, p. xix

37 Woodruff D. Smith, *The German Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), p. 233.

38 Ibid.

39 Zimmerer and Zeller, p. xxiv.

40 Osterhammel, p. 7.

41 D.W. Meinig, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800 Vol. I of The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 65 quoted in Osterhammel, p. 41.

42 Osterhammel suggest modifications to the Meinig’s theory, except the Brazilian, North American and Caribbean, and some South Sea cases. (See Osterhammel, p. 41).

(RMG) as early as 1842.⁴³ Although RMG raised the Prussian flag over its missionaries, and received King's assurances for their activities, it had not only a relative autonomy but also a pragmatic orientation of encouraging and collaborating with the British colonial rule in South Africa. This was intended to solidify the mission's interest.⁴⁴ However, the British later failed to meet the mission's requests; this, in return, led to RMG's even stronger appeal for the German imperial protection.⁴⁵ As Drechsler acknowledges, "from 1880 onwards the Rhenish Missionary Society openly called for German intervention in South West Africa."⁴⁶ However, German Imperial documents present that Chancellor Bismarck did not approve the RMG's visions for the region.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, as the British rule became problematic in the face of indigenous uprisings, change of British domestic politics, and RMG's manipulation of events promoted its demands for the German protection with even more vigor.⁴⁸

b) Gathering of coastal resources

In 1881, a German expeditionary campaign for mining began.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, RMG had founded the West German Association for Colonization and Export.⁵⁰ In the next two years, however, the main coastal activity began underway as a German merchant acquired the minor coastal section of Angra Pequena.⁵¹ Having realized the diminishing British power in the region and the feasibility of a colonial rule as evidenced by the German coastal presence in Angra Pequena, finally German protection was granted to the region on 24th April, 1884.⁵² How did this policy change come about? According to Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox and Zantop, "why Bismarck changed his mind about German colonies is still a matter of conjecture."⁵³ Possible

43 Horst Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966. trans. *Let us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism*. trans. Bernd Zöllner, (London: Zed Press, 1980).

44 Drechsler, p.19.

45 Drechsler, p. 20.

46 Drechsler. p. 20.

47 Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2098, p. 10, Memorandum for Herr von Kusserow, 13 May 1880 quoted in Drechsler, p. 20.

48 Drechsler, p. 20-21.

49 Drechsler, p. 21.

50 Drechsler, p. 21.

51 Drechsler, p. 21.

52 Drechsler, p. 22.

53 Friedrichsmeyer, p. 10.

explanations encompass a variety of theories ranging from geopolitical, to economic and even sociological approaches. While Smith acknowledges various pertinent theories, perhaps it is best to agree with his conclusion that “in Germany, the real meaning of colonialism must be found in its domestic political function”⁵⁴ and that policy change was due to domestic political rivalry.⁵⁵

c) Barter with the local population

Stage three also requires modification. Instead of bartering with the local population, what German settlers did was apparently to compete over economic sources of revenue. For the majority of German settlers, cattle-stock-raising seemed a viable option; however, the indigenous people, especially the Hereros, were not fond of selling neither their land nor their cattle. The rest of the settlers sought to extract metals and precious stones. At the outset, manipulation was the key to acquire land for the entrepreneurs. Some indigenous groups had agreed to sell their lands by the mile, whereas the German settlers, such as Adolf Lüderitz “...cheated the Africans...”⁵⁶ by utilizing geographical miles. Moreover, various territories bought by the German settlers were claimed by the Hereros as their land.⁵⁷ The frictions between the settlers, and the indigenous groups as well as rivalry among them persisted and led to armed uprisings. This development, however, led to the administration’s forcefully taking away the Herero lands. “By 1903, more than half the Herero cattle had passed into the hands of the settlers, whose farms were encroaching alarmingly on Herero pasture land.”⁵⁸ Thus a vicious cycle emerged. Land-loss induced the Hereros to rebel. The land confiscations became the means of punitive German action which led to further native rebellion.

d) Plunder and initial military actions in the interior

Plunder, in contrast to Meinig’s framework came in the form of economic conquest and private acquisition of land. However, private entrepreneurship eventually ran into fiscal difficulties, which in turn,

54 Smith, p. 233.

55 Smith, pp. 238-239.

56 Drechsler, p. 23.

57 Drechsler, p. 25.

58 *SWAPO 13* Report quoted in Friedrichsmeyer, p. 13.

compelled Adolf Lüderitz to turn his properties over to German South West Africa Company.⁵⁹ This company thusly received the blessing of the German state since its acquisition nullified the British bid for the Lüderitz property.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the rhetoric in its petition for tax-exemption and the Parliament's exemption testify to the close relationship between the two entities.⁶¹

e) Securing of outposts

The securing of outposts also differed from the Meinig's framework. Whereas the German presence occurred earlier, the securing of the "northern coastal strip between 22° and Cape Frion"⁶² did not finalize not "until June or July 1885."⁶³

f) Imperial imposition

Long-before the imperial imposition, the civilian settlement began in South West Africa. Consequently, the civilians (missionaries, merchants, colonial society in general) launched a public relations campaign to induce the German state for a colonialist project. When the German state finally declared its rule over this territory, it assigned only a handful of ranking German officials to the Southwest Africa.

As the German officials entered the natives into treaties and guarantees, they started to feel disappointed by the invalidity of the agreements.⁶⁴ By 1888, resentment led to the Herero's uprising and the fleeing of the German officials from the Hereroland.⁶⁵ In the aftermath of such a breakdown of the German colonialist rule, RMG, whose activities were suppressed by the indigenous groups, once again appealed to Berlin and asked for "a standing militia composed at least 400 men plus two batteries so that any manifestation of arrogance and violation of interests can be punished."⁶⁶ Governor Goering also advocated for military

59 Drechsler, p. 30.

60 Drechsler, p. 30.

61 Drechsler, p. 31.

62 Drechsler, pp. 24-25.

63 Ibid.

64 Drechsler, p. 38.

65 Drechsler, p. 39.

66 Imperial Colonial Office File No. 2105, pp. 32-4 quoted in Drechsler, p. 40.

presence, RMG Inspector Büttner even suggested playing the natives against each other.⁶⁷

Finally, in late June, 1889 a small German force, traveling on a British commercial ship under the disguise of explorers arrived in South West Africa.⁶⁸ Despite their initial orders favoring collaborating with the natives against the British, the German commander, Captain Curt von François, soon enough alienated the Hereros, and consequently asked for an increase in military presence. According to him:

in order to straighten matters, out here, it is necessary to crush the Herero and to drive their friends, the English out of the country. To achieve this would require no more than 140 infantrymen and 10 gunners in full combat gear plus two pieces of light artillery...The larger the force the greater the benefits resulting from the capture of the sizeable cattle herds of the Herero (approx. 200, 000 head.)⁶⁹

The German settlers' response -as they shared with François- was positive towards the military option:

Your energetic and vigorous action over the English issue has completely upset the Herero. It is a pity they haven't hanged a couple of them right away, as rumour here first had it. I feel that exemplary action like that would have had a salutary effect because the Herero need to be ruled with an iron hand lest they think we're afraid of them or don't mean business.⁷⁰

Despite Berlin's initial resistance, the decision to make a major increase (214 men and two officers) in military personnel came about in 1893.⁷¹ However, François's adamant militaristic engagement and provocation targeted at the natives counter-produced results that led to the attacks on the German settlers. German military was not able to prevent or suppress the assault which in return brought the official removal of François.⁷²

67 Drechsler, pp. 41-42.

68 Drechsler, pp. 42.

69 *Imp. Col. Off. File No. 2107*, pp.68-70, François to Bismarck, 20 August,1889 and File 2108, François to Krauel, 29th October, 1889 quoted in Drechsler, pp. 44.

70 Curt von François, *Deutsch-Südwestafrika, Drei Jahre im Lande Hendrik Witboois*, (Berlin , 1896), p. 56 quoted in Drechsler, p. 44.

71 Drechsler, p. 69.

72 Drechsler, pp. 69-75.

The next German colonial ruler was Theodor Leutwein, who, according to Drechsler, was able to amalgamate the diplomatic dealings and military policy to suppress the natives⁷³ and enhanced the German authority in South West Africa. However, his policies were equally too brutal and eventually collapsed in the face of a Herero uprising in 1904.

g) Implantation of a first group of non-military immigrants and initiation of a self-sustaining colony

It is doubtful whether West Africa ever became a self-sustaining colony. At the outset, it was an economic failure. Bismarck, especially in the case of West Africa refrained from the colonial project in the face of bleak economic prospects.⁷⁴ He even had to overlook the private entrepreneurship and missionary activity. As Smith emphasized, “effective occupation meant a much heavier colonial involvement than Bismarck had ever intended for Germany, with attendant expenses that threatened his entire colonial scheme.”⁷⁵

Eventually, the discovery of precious metals and minerals propelled a turn-around for a few enterprises. The major transformation, however, was complemented by the “the gradual transfer of land and cattle of the Herero and Nama into the hands of Germans settlers, a development that was completed with the crushing of the great uprisings between 1904 and 1907.”⁷⁶

h) Development of a complete colonial ruling apparatus.

As mentioned above, a more structured and extensive colonial rule emerged under the administration of Governor General Leutwein. He successfully maintained a divide and rule policy upon various native tribes, and when diplomacy and collaboration did not provide the results sought, he did not hesitate in resorting to military campaigns against the natives such as the Witbooi tribe.⁷⁷

Leutwein’s policies, however, could not alleviate the resentment

73 Drechsler, p. 75.

74 Drechsler, p. 40.

75 Smith, p. 39.

76 Drechsler, 111.

77 There are various indigenous groups in South West Africa, ranging from the Hereros, which Steinmetz refers as Ovaherero, to the Witbooi, the Nama, the Basters, the Orlam, etc.

indigenous tribes had towards the German rule. According to Friedrichsmeyer, in the face of socio-economic problems imposed by the German settlers and the administration, Herero and subsequently Nama "...declare[d] war on the Germans in January 1904..."⁷⁸ Drechsler further informs that "under the leadership of their supreme Chief Samuel Maharero," Hereros, ...who preferred to die in arms in hand rather than wait in resignation until their last possessions [land and cattle] had been taken away from them..."⁷⁹ rebelled on January 12, 1904, believing that Germans were not abiding by the guarantee treaties.⁸⁰ Moreover, Leutwein's persuasion in obtaining a strip of Hereroland for a new railway free of charge and the anticipation of a flow of German settlers had further strained mutual relations. There were also numerous accounts of maltreatment (rape, murder, and other forms of humiliation) of the natives by the German settlers.⁸¹ Finally, Zimmerer points to the "provocation by the district officer of Okahandja, Leutnant Zürn [that] led to an escalation of tension."⁸²

Leutwein's initial tactics did not result in checking this calamity. In a short span of time "...the Herero had occupied the whole of central Namibia, with the exception of the military posts, and had plundered settlements and farm;"⁸³ killing 123 Germans.⁸⁴ According to the New York Times, "...Colonel Leutwein, in the tropical heat, incumbered by his sick men, harassed by the rebels, and possibly deserted by his carriers, may have been unable to force his way through the hostile tribesmen, and that he has been obliged to intrench himself and wait for the arrival of a rescuing expedition."⁸⁵ In the next couple of weeks, Leutwein's safety was assured and the rebels attacking a police post were repelled and sixty natives perished in this assault.⁸⁶ In April, rebellion picked up pace, Hereros engaged a German column on the way to Oniatu, killing thirty-three German military personnel and losing, according to an unofficial German account, ninety-two of their men.⁸⁷ On April 11th, an 8 hour engagement took place, forcing Hereros to leave their stronghold. On this account, an article presents Leutwein's cable:

78 Friedrichsmeyer, et. al., p. 13.

79 Drechsler, p. 132.

80 Drechsler, p. 132.

81 Drechsler, pp. 133-135.

82 Zimmerer, p. 43.

83 Ibid., p. 44.

84 Ibid.

85 *The New York Times*, February 2, 1904, p.2.

86 *The New York Times*, February 24, 1904, p.2.

87 *The New York Times*, April 10, 1904, p.4.

With the united Principal Division (Duerr) and Western Division, (Estorff,) I attacked the enemy's chief force, about 3,000 strong, at Onganjira, a short distance to the eastward of Okahanja.

The Hereros were in a strong, semi-circular position on a hill fronting the northwest. We first flanked and forced back the enemy's left wing, and then attacked the centre and right. Two energetic counter-attacks of the enemy against our left were repulsed.

The enemy's position was broken through at nightfall, after eight hours' fighting, and the enemy was driven back on all sides. The chief forces apparently retired in a northeasterly and easterly direction.⁸⁸

However, the remaining German forces were not as lucky as the above-mentioned. Two weeks later, it was reported that Major von Glasenapp's column (Eastern Division) was "down with typhoid, the number of cases having more than doubled in three days."⁸⁹ The following excerpt further described the clear and present danger for the German colonial project:

GERMAN "Little War"

Proving Disastrous

Disease Prevents Advance of Column in Africa.

Emperor William is Angry

Considers that the Expedition Has Been Mismanaged-Heavy Reinforcements Thought Necessary

London Times-The New York Times

Special Cablegram

...

The present apparent deadlock, together with the severe losses sustained through disease and in the field confirms the impression

⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, April 12, 1904, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, April 29, 1904, p. 5.

that the strength of the expeditionary force is inadequate to secure the radical suppression of the insurrection.

A composite force will therefore in all probability have to be equipped and dispatched.⁹⁰

Meanwhile Leutwein's actions and the bleak reports created resentment in Berlin. Colonialist voices in Berlin, especially the German Colonial League, had already blamed the Governor:

The results of Governor Leutwein's policy of window-dressing, procrastination and appeasement are now patent to everyone. Throughout the country, the natives who, unlike European private citizens, have for years pampered and made immoderate in their demands through the Governor's blandishments are now in a state of ferment which threatens to assume dangerous proportions. Anyone familiar with the life of African and other less civilized non-white peoples knows that Europeans can assert themselves only by maintaining the supremacy of their race at all costs. Moreover, anyone familiar with the situation knows the swifter and harsher the reprisals taken against rebels, the better the chances of restoring authority. The authorities in German South West Africa have grossly infringed these two fundamental tenets of colonial policy towards the native problem... that the current system of colonial administration be abandoned following the successful completion of military operations and that the policy pursued so far towards the natives be changed in favour of our own race.⁹¹

In return, Berlin sent its 'big gun' to the country: General von Trotha. It was reported that German Emperor "overrides Ministers"⁹² and appoints the General to "succeed Gov Leutwein".⁹³ This decorated general assumed military-high command of German troops. According to British sources:

in June of that year [1904] General von Trotha arrived upon the scene and took command of nearly 8,000 troops. His mission was to stamp out rebellion by force. Whenever he captured natives

90 *The New York Times*, April 29, 1904, p. 5.

91 *Flugblätter des Deutschen Kolonial-Bundes, IX: Zu den Unruhen in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* in *Imp. Col. Off. File No. 2111*, p. 26 quoted in Drechsler, pp.141-142.

92 *The New York Times*, May 8, 1904, p. 4.

93 *Ibid.*

these commands were carried out to the latter (large sums of money were offered for the capture of the Herero chiefs, and General von Trotha assured that tribe that he would spare neither women nor children.) A few trivial successes were obtained but by war and by sickness the Germans suffered great losses, and last October their troubles were increased by the rising of the hitherto friendly Witboois.⁹⁴

The New York Times also informed about the new orders General issued:

I, the great General of the German soldiers, send this letter to the Herero Nation. The Hereros are no longer German subjects. They have murdered and robbed, they have cut off ears and noses and other members of wounded soldiers, and now they are too cowardly to fight. I say to the people: Whosoever brings one of the Captains a prisoner to one of my stations shall receive 1,000 marks, (\$250) and for Samuel Maherero I will pay 5,000 marks. The Herero Nation must now leave the country. If the people do it not I will compel them with the big tube, (presumably guns are meant.)

Within the German frontier every Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without a cattle, will be shot. I will not take over any more women and children. But I will either drive them back to your people or have them fired on. These are my words to the nation of the Hereros.

The Great General of the might Emperor, von Trotha.⁹⁵

Trotha's policies had meant a new turn in terms of native policy. Trotha's vision, perhaps in line with François's tendencies, sought total submission of the Hereros. For that end, "an expeditionary force of 14,000 under the command of General Lothar von Trotha undertook to exterminate the Herero, and to "settle" the native question once and for all."⁹⁶ British newspapers even acknowledge the presence of almost 20,000 German troops.⁹⁷ In the aftermath of German military built-up,

94 News of the Week, *The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times* (London: England), Saturday, October 21, 1905; p. 245; Issue 2317.

95 *The New York Times*, August 27, 1904, p. 4.

96 Friedrichsmeyer. p. 13.

97 News of the Week, *The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times* (London: England), Saturday, October 21, 1905; p. 245; Issue 2317.

change of native police and Governor General, it is now evident that “so badly has the temper and confidence of the natives shaken that success seems unlikely [for them].”⁹⁸

While there seems to be a major difference between Governor General Leutwein’s policies and General von Trotha’s, Steinmetz posits that both administrators’ policies towards indigenous groups had genocidal outcomes. The only difference perhaps, according to Steinmetz, was that Leutwein spared children and women in his action against the Witbooi uprising.⁹⁹

Perhaps, it is more plausible to distinguish Leutwein and von Trotha in terms of method and economic rationality. Within this concept, it is important to acknowledge not only Leutwein’s preference towards negotiation with the natives but also his firm belief in the preservation of the natives as the main labor source in the colony.¹⁰⁰ General von Trotha, on the other hand, regarded the indigenous population as the enemy which had to be suppressed with every means possible. In an interview given by Leutwein, upon his return to Hamburg, he informs the readers of the following: “I am accused of too much leniency, and I cannot find this wrong. I was firmly convinced that I could win the natives by mild methods. At the same time, had I had 10.000 men instead of 400, it would have been better.”¹⁰¹ This statement clearly distinguishes Leutwein from Trotha in many ways. Not only did he prefer more peaceful methods, but also he lacked necessary means for the massive brutality to be inflicted upon the natives under Trotha.

Steinmetz also surmises that “if Leutwein had been backed by the German Government against von Trotha rather than being out of power, he might have acted to halt the genocide by switching from an ethnographic to an economic logic.”¹⁰² However, the notorious ethnographic branding of the Hereros prevented Leutwein’s arguments to be heard in Berlin. As Steinmetz underlines “novel ethnographic representations can not be created on command, from scratch.”¹⁰³

General von Trotha’s policy was not limited to armed action; it also included driving Hereros to the Omaheke desert where they would

98 Ibid.

99 Steinmetz, p. 189.

100 Drechsler, p. 148.

101 *The New York Times*, December 31, 1904, p.2.

102 Steinmetz, p. 201.

103 Ibid.

perish of draught and hunger. It was reported that “the records of the [German] General Staff tell a harrowing tale of the spectacles presented by the trackless waste of the Omaheke desert, where hundreds of bleaching skeletons testify to the relentless manner in which the Commander in Chief carried out his determination to make no prisoners.”¹⁰⁴ In conclusion, the native policy under this administration became ironic since it eradicated the natives.¹⁰⁵ The following excerpt acknowledges the exterminationist aims of the German army more explicitly:

*This bold operation shows in a brilliant light the reckless energy of the German leadership in pursuing the beaten enemy. No trouble, no deprivation was spared to rob the enemy of the last remnants of his capacity to resist. He was driven from water-hole to water-hole like a beast hounded half to death, until, having lost all will, he fell victim to natural forces in his own country. The waterless Omaheke would complete the task begun by German force, the annihilation of the Herero people.*¹⁰⁶

As this section investigates the factual and chronological accounts, it aims to present a general narrative that sheds light on the complexities of identity formation, colonialist thinking and the peculiarities of German history. Thus, another category that needs to be added alongside Meinig’s framework. This category should certainly be the pre-colonial ethnographic discourse. On that, Steinmetz acknowledges that “representations of the Ovaherero were overwhelmingly hateful, even exterminationist.”¹⁰⁷ In the face of Herero’s resistance to being Christianized, the Rhenish Mission Society’s¹⁰⁸ turned sour: “... a human emotion is still unknown to them... God is exterminating the Herero because of their doglike nature, their sharing of wives, their sodomy, their incest and sins with animals... The Hottentots are the stick with which God is striking them.”¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Hereros, due to their holding to their ancestral cattle herding practices and refusing to

104 *The New York Times*, August 27, 1904, p. 4.

105 Steinmetz, p. 239.

106 *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, Edited on the basis of official documents by the Department for the History of War on the General Staff, 2 vols, Berlin, 1906/7, vol 1, p. 211, quoted in Jürgen Zimmerer, “War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa”, Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War (1904-1908) in Namibia and Its Aftermath*, translated from the German by Edward Neather, (Berlin: Merlin Press, 2003), p. 41.

107 Steinmetz, p. 125.

108 Their missionary activities date back to late 18th century and continue through out the later centuries.

109 “Otjikango,” *Berichte der RMG* 10 (16, 1853), p. 241; “Neun Jahre im Hererolande,” *Berichte der RMG* II (15, 1854), p. 228, quoted in Steinmetz, p. 131.

sell them to German settlers, were also branded as being ‘stingy’.¹¹⁰ In 1876, another missionary report further established that “nothing at all can be done with these people, petrified and ossified as they are in earthly things, before God’s hand has again struck them down and smashed them to pieces.”¹¹¹ What is more striking is that the author of the afore-said report would be escorting the first colonial ruler of German West Africa, Heinrich Goering, (surprisingly the father of Hermann Goering, the infamous field marshal of the Third Reich).¹¹² Accordingly, as Steinmetz acknowledges, the uniformity of this discursive formulation had grave implications for the course of German native policy directed at the Ovaherero.”¹¹³

In conclusion, the escalation of the situation in South West Africa assisted the imperial imposition and as Drechsler put it, “the insurrection afforded the German imperialists a long-sought pretext- for conquering the territory military and transforming the “Protectorate” into a colony.”¹¹⁴

6. Discussions on Holocaust and West Africa:

Osterhammel, points to the presence “of a purposeful destruction of an entire populace”¹¹⁵ within the German colonial history. Drechsler also underlines that, “Von Trotha had but one aim: to destroy the Herero nation. He believed that the easiest way of achieving it was to drive the Herero into the Omaheke desert. But such a crime can only be described as genocide.”¹¹⁶ The following excerpt from a leading German officer’s diary clearly informs of the General von Trotha’s intentions:

...The Herero were now fleeing further still out into the desert sands. The frightful spectacle was repeated again and again. The men had worked to open up the water sources with feverish haste,

110 Steinmetz, p. 131.

111 Eine Untersuchungsreise im Hereróland,” *Berichte der RMG* 32 (5, 1876), p. 130 quoted in Steinmetz, p. 133.

112 Steinmetz, p. 133.

113 Steinmetz, p. 125.

114 Drechsler, p. 138.

115 Osterhammel, p. 44.

116 Drechsler, p. 155, and According to the Article 2 of “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” of 1948, “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

*but there was less and less water and there were fewer and fewer water-holes. They fled from one to the other and lost almost all their cattle and very many of their people. The groups dwindled to occasional stragglers over whom we gradually took control. Some managed to escape through the desert and reach English territory. The policy of smashing the people in this way was as stupid as it was heartless. We could have saved a great number of them and their herds if we had spared them and helped them to recover. They had been sufficiently punished. I made this suggestion to General von Trotha, but he wanted their total extermination.*¹¹⁷

Bley further theorized that the lateness of the German national development induced a quasi fascist regime in the colonies, thus resembling the outcomes of Nazi policies.¹¹⁸ Moreover, as Friedrichsmeyer et. al. argue "... the Nazis were convinced that Germany would eventually need an extensive overseas empire to guarantee its access to raw materials, markets, and investment areas, and they renewed the call for Mittelafrika¹¹⁹ that would transcend the bounds of the prewar colonies."¹²⁰ Furthermore, in terms of investigating the German social and intellectual history, Zantop realizes the necessity to "analyze and explain why it was not the enlightened models of tolerance and assimilation that prevailed, but racism, xenophobia, sexism and aggressive expansionism."¹²¹

Detlev Peukert, on the other hand, developed the analysis which presented traits of racism in pre-Nazi era.¹²² According to Peukert, fascism emerges out of contradictions in modern society. Modernity has its own utopian image, which tends to overlook the existence of winners and losers in the society which, in turn, induces agitation within the society.¹²³ In this context, Baumann also states that a particular modernist approach which sought to redefine and reshape the society,

117 Ludwig von Estoff: *Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika 1894-1910*, Christoph-Friedrich Kutscher ed., 1979, p. 117, quoted in Zimmerer in Zimmerer and Zeller, p. 43.

118 Helmut Bley. *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1914. English South-West Africa under German rule, 1894-1914*, translated, edited, and prepared by Hugh Ridley. Evanston, Northwestern University Press Date: 1971, p. xvii, pp. 223-25, p. 282, quoted in Steinmetz, p. 141.

119 Historical German geo-political vision of domination in Africa.

120 Friedrichsmeyer, *Ibid.* p. 17.

121 Zantop, p. 16.

122 Sweeney, Dennis, "Reconsidering the modernity paradigm: reform movements, the social and state in Wilhelmine Germany," *Social History* 31, No.4 (2006), p. 406.

123 Detlev Peukert, *The Weimar Republic : The Crisis of Classical Modernity* trans. Richard Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993) .

even reached a state where perceived alien elements of the society were to be suppressed.¹²⁴

Sweeney, on the other hand, emphasizes the existence of various competing modernist projects (“ranging from social-democratic, confessional, liberal, feminist to radical nationalist strategies of social reform”¹²⁵) in the Wilhelmine era¹²⁶ and that the Nazi state “evolved from a process of political struggle that eliminated certain social projects and concentrated other previously independent and self-mobilized reform energies and domains of disciplinary and biopower¹²⁷ into its own expanding and violent carceral apparatuses.”¹²⁸

In essence, while the works of the German Anthropologic Society contributed to the embryonic racist awareness in elementary schools by the late 19th century Germany,¹²⁹ Sweeney points to even other cases:

The German case itself offers the most compelling critique of this kind of argument [Argument for modernity being a ‘generative principle or impulse’] for mid-twentieth century Nazi policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide were linked genealogically to the biopolitical racism of the late Wilhelmine radical right, especially the Pan-German Leagues, which mooted plans for ethnic cleansing (völkische Furbereinigung) as early as 1912 and more comprehensively in 1914 in vehement opposition to other “modern reform visions.”¹³⁰

Therefore, it is plausible that the Wilhelmine period contained precursors of Nazism, and subsequently Nazis built upon these foundations and advanced their agenda by choosing a particular project among the many other competing ones. Zimmerer, within this context, “in an attempt to sketch archaeology of genocide” investigates a possible link between colonial policies of violence and “the extremely bureaucratized violence of Nazism”.¹³¹

124 Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Post-Modernity*, (London: Routledge, 1992) quoted in Sweeney, p. 431.

125 Foucault and Governmentality quoted in Sweeney, p. 430.

126 Sweeney, p. 430.

127 See M. Foucault

128 Sweeney, p. 430.

129 Andrew Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 135-146.

130 Sweeney, p. 433.

131 J. Zimmerer, ‘Colonial Genocide and the Holocaust, Towards an Archeology of Genocide’, in Genocide and Settler Society, ed. Moses. pp. 49-76, in Jürgen Zimmerer, “Colonial Genocide: The Herero and Nama War (1904-8)”, ed. Stone, Dan, *The Historiography of Genocide*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 336.

While Zimmerer points to the positive correlations between the Holocaust and the Herero case, Steinmetz posits such a link as a historiographical stretch.¹³² For Zimmerer, “a theoretically informed framework for the question of continuity”¹³³ had been present. Within this context, he further acknowledges the “the blatant sense of racist superiority” inherent in the German settlers’ radicalism¹³⁴ and in some of the missionaries¹³⁵ as well as the racial war perception of the German military.¹³⁶ Army Chief of Staff General von Schlieffen, as Zimmerer argues, approved von Trotha’s intentions.¹³⁷ Thus, the inexhaustible nature of discussion on the subject induces this paper to touch upon this controversial area as well.

Regardless of underlying the extent of the German colonial rule’s contribution to the Holocaust, it is perhaps more purposeful to conclude that the genocidal tools became available to the German imperial army before the Holocaust. While the decision to resorting to such tools was isolated events, could these practices have indeed had a bearing on the later Third Reich policies? Within this context, one spots the resemblance between dumping of the Jewry into the French territories in 1941 and forcing the Hereros to the Omaheke desert.¹³⁸ According to Marrus and Paxton, “well into 1941, German authorities considered unoccupied France a place to dump their unwanted Jews.”¹³⁹ Moreover, the use of dog-tags and the establishment of concentration camps in South West Africa seem to herald the events that will occur in the Holocaust.¹⁴⁰ Zimmerer, in this regard, also “interpreted that war of annihilation (1941-4) in eastern Europe and the related occupation policies as a colonial war and part of the German imperial project, identifying personal experience, institutional memory, and public perception as major trajectories of German colonial fantasies, knowledge and experiences.”¹⁴¹

Zimmerman points to the pace and to the commonalities between the

132 Steinmetz, p. 7.

133 Jürgen Zimmerer, “Colonial Genocide: The Herero and Nama War (1904-8)”, ed. Stone, Dan, *The Historiography of Genocide*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 336.

134 Zimmerer in Zimmerer and Zeller, p. 42 and p. 46.

135 Ibid. p. 44.

136 Ibid. p. 46 and p. 51.

137 Ibid.

138 Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 10.

139 Ibid.

140 Drechsler, p. 166 and Steinmetz, p. 171.

141 Zimmerer, “Colonial Genocide: Herero and Nama War”, p. 336.

pre-Holocaust and the Holocaust era German anthropological endeavors. According to him “such scientific exploitation of the victims of genocide had a strong precedent in the German war of extermination against the Herero of Southwest Africa.¹⁴² He further surmises that “the Holocaust brought to Europe practices developed in colonial Africa, as the genocidal war against the Herero and the role of anthropologists in that war make all too clear.”¹⁴³

Another resemblance, perhaps more importantly, recurs in the German colonial discourse attributing commonalities between the Jewry and the African indigenous groups.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, as Stocker posits “a close link between the laws on mixed marriages in the colonies and under the Nazis; ‘in the German colonial empire, precursors of the Nuremberg Laws already existed before the First World War.’¹⁴⁵ Moreover, Zimmerer informs of German administrative norms towards racially differentiated and serfdom creating societal order in the colonial experience.¹⁴⁶ In light of this information, I feel that the sustained ethnographic discourses deserve special attention in terms of identifying the roots of the Holocaust and even the contemporary xenophobia in Europe. In terms of identifying such roots and links to the Holocaust, Zimmerer even takes a bolder step as he stresses that

Binary encoding and the vision of one’s own superiority, combined with viewing the original population as superfluous, inferior and vanishing, which prevailed in the colonial context, were also prone to von Trotha’s concept of race war and the Nazi’s Social-Darwinian Lebensraum ideology.¹⁴⁷

In addition to Steinmetz’s and Zimmerer’s point of views, perhaps a third alternative in terms of investigating the link between the Holocaust and colonialist project could be available. I propose the usage of a comparative perspective in this regard. Since Italy was also a latecomer in the 19th century colonialism and imperialism, perhaps it is better suited to compare the Italian and German experiences. Similar to Zantop’s

142 Andrew Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Anti-humanism in Imperial Germany* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 244.

143 Ibid.

144 Steinmetz, pp. 118-120 and p. 183.

145 Helmuth Stoecker, *Drang Nach Afrika, Die Deutsche koloniale Expansionspolitik und Herrschaft in Afrika von den Anfängen bis zum Verlust der Kolonien*, (Berlin, 1991), p. 184, quoted in Zimmerer and Zeller, p. xxvii.

146 Zimmerer, Zimmerer and Zeller, p. 58.

147 Zimmerer, “Colonial Genocide: Herero and Nama War”, p. 336.

argument, a colonialist imagination had been present in the Italian psyche.¹⁴⁸ In the case of North Africa, for instance “by 1911, Libya had become in popular imagination a veritable Eldorado, and a book about it with the title of *Our Promised Land* appeared that same year. History and geography were invoked to establish a proprietary right over this former dependency of ancient Rome.”¹⁴⁹ Missionaries too, had been advocates of the colonial project. They “supported the chamber of commerce at Genoa in encouraging the government set up trading and refueling stations in the Red Sea.”¹⁵⁰ Moreover, the first colony was founded in 1882 “on the coast of the Red Sea where there was less chance of clashing with other European interests.”¹⁵¹

Fantasy and imagination had also been present in the Italian colonial experience. The Red Sea colony initiative, for instance, had been branded as a way of circumventing “imprisonment in the Mediterranean,” and receiving “a key to the Mediterranean” through the Red Sea.¹⁵² Thereby, as Smith emphasizes, “the realities of geography were thus obscured by rhetoric.”¹⁵³ Also, Pasquale Turiello had asserted that “nations had to pervade other areas with their language and culture or else would disappear in the struggle for life.”¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, colonialist project also took root in Eritrea, starting from 1890.

There had been opportunities for Italy to colonize Tunis and Egypt with Great Britain; however, such offers could not have been realized.¹⁵⁵ The weakening of the Ottoman Empire and global political conjuncture did nonetheless created room for another colonialist aspiration in Libya. Early attempts circa 1907 started with “a process of so-called ‘peaceful penetration’ of the economic and social life of the territory.”¹⁵⁶ While Banco di Roma had been the main facilitator of this initiative,¹⁵⁷ the Ottoman administration took a keen interest in quelling such an intervention by favoring mostly German enterprises in the region.¹⁵⁸ The

148 Denis Mack Smith, *Modern Italy: A Political History*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 243.

149 Smith, p. 243.

150 Smith, p. 117.

151 Smith, p. 164.

152 Smith, p. 164.

153 Smith, p. 164.

154 Smith, p. 133.

155 Smith, p. 120.

156 John L. Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 26.

157 Wright, p. 26.

158 Smith, p. 243.

war between the native Arabs¹⁵⁹ and Italian forces started in 1911, and it took more than two decades for Italy to finally suppress all indigenous groups and control Libya. Meanwhile, the brutality of the military tactics “dismayed” Europe.¹⁶⁰

In terms of domestic affairs of Italy, Smith informs that “...morale was greatly uplifted by this colonial success.”¹⁶¹ However, this colonial project ran into major problems. As Smith puts it “colonies without colonizers proved an expensive concession to sentiment. Tripoli needed capital, but Italy had not enough even for herself and few notable public works could be set on foot...”¹⁶²

In conclusion, Italy undertook a 19th century type of imperialist colonial project that transcends to the fascist period. While its legacy at times had been nationalist,¹⁶³ brutal,¹⁶⁴ assimilative visions such as those of Marshal Balbo who voiced the unity of “Catholic Italians and Muslim Italians” in Libya also emerged.¹⁶⁵ Despite the magnitude and the applicability of the Italian brutality, and the nationalist manipulation,¹⁶⁶ the overarching economic strains/rationale prevented an extreme mode of annihilation similar to the German project in South West Africa. Moreover, oil had been discovered in Libya as early as 1915.¹⁶⁷ Despite the nationalistic/imperialistic/fascist dichotomies of the Italian model, it is nothing comparable to the geo-politically motivated, global domination seeking German imperial and later fascist regimes. Thus, it is not necessarily the colonialism that leads to genocide, in spite of its severe brutalities. The economic rationality behind colonialism prevents from annihilating the indigenous sources of labor. But it is the “the racial segregationist state”¹⁶⁸ and the quest for global domination that obscures the economic rationale.

Moreover, the hunt for the scapegoats and xenophobia based on ethnographic discourse creates the formula for the genocide. This is present in the German model. Thus, there is a positive correlation

159 They had been briefly supported by the Ottoman Government in 1911 prior to the start of Balkan Wars in 1912.

160 Smith, p. 246.

161 Smith, p. 247.

162 Smith, p. 248.

163 Smith, p. 247.

164 Wright, pp. 25-41.

165 Wright, p. 41.

166 Smith, p. 248.

167 Wright, p. 220.

168 Zimmerer, p. 336.

between the German experience during the colonialist period and the Holocaust.

However, nothing can be comparable to the inhumanity and the dehumanization imposed on the Jewry during the Holocaust.

7. Epilogue:

The reconciliation efforts between Namibia and Germany culminated in the official visit of German Minister for Development and Economic Cooperation Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul to Namibia on August 14, 2004.



(Figure 1. German Minister Wieczorek-Zeul meeting with Herero Chief Christian Zeraua in Okakarara.¹⁶⁹)

169 Rainer Chr. Hennig, "Germany apologises for "1904 Namibia genocide," *Afrol News*, 16 August 16, 2004 http://www.afrol.com/printable_article/13714.

During this visit, Minister Wieczorek-Zeul, “with tears in her eyes”¹⁷⁰ acknowledged that if the term had existed, the atrocities carried out during German presence in South West Africa, would have been labeled as genocide.¹⁷¹ She also visited the battle fields and Samuel Maharero’s grave.¹⁷² The Namibian news sources reported that “a senior government official offered Germany’s first apology Saturday for a colonial-era crackdown that killed 65,000 ethnic Hereros- a slaughter she acknowledged amounted to genocide.”¹⁷³ Moreover, Minister Wieczorek-Zeul acknowledged that:

*We Germans confess to our historical-political and moral-ethical responsibility and guilt that German at that time took upon them... I plead you as part of our Lord’s Prayer to forgive us our sins... colonial madness led to racism, violence and discrimination....All what I have said has been an apology by the German government.*¹⁷⁴

The German acknowledgment of genocide induced claims for compensation for the descendants of the victims. However, the Government of Namibia differs from the Hereros, who merely constitute 7 % of the population, on this subject.¹⁷⁵ The Government prefers a sustained aid from Germany and rejects direct payment for any ethnic special group, meaning the descendants of the individual victims of various tribes.¹⁷⁶ Despite indigenous group’s objections, it seems Germany and Namibia agreed on this modality. It is significant that Minister Wieczorek-Zeul stated “our cooperation signifies that we feel dedicated to all Namibian citizens and that there, of course, will not be any payments to special groups.”¹⁷⁷ It is most probable that while the German government argues for exemption from any reparation due to of the ongoing and planned aid programs for Namibia,¹⁷⁸ the Namibian Government objects funneling of the funds to other entities other than its own.¹⁷⁹

170 Ibid.

171 <<http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/reden/ministerin/2004/august/rede20040814.html>>and Zimmerer, p. 323.

172 *NewsEra*, “German Minister to Pay Homage at Okahanja by Christin Inambao” www.newsera.com.na/article.php, 12 August 2004.

173 *MostlyAfrica*, “Namibia: Germany apology to the Herero”, August 14, 2004, <<http://mostlyafrica.blogspot.com/2004/08/Namibia-german-apology-to-Herero>>.

174 http://www.afrol.com/printable_article/13714.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.

178 Chrispin Inambao, “German Minister to Pay Homage at Okahandja,” *News Era*, 12 August, 2004. <www.newsera.com.na/article.php 12 August 2004>.

179 Ibid.

A year later after the official apology, the Namibian-German Initiative for Reconciliation and Development started its activities.¹⁸⁰ According to local press, this was “a coated offer of reparation, albeit the German authorities never admitted to this being reparation.”¹⁸¹ Through the Initiative for Reconciliation, Germany was prepared to support a programme “to address the injustices of German colonial rule in Namibia about 100 years ago” as one Namibian daily reported. Germany would over 10 years pay N\$160 million for the programme.”¹⁸² The article further informs how the Initiative “has been met with mixed feelings by the affected communities, from outright condemnation and rejection to cautious tacit approval.”¹⁸³ Moreover, the reaction to the Special Initiative reveals that ‘apology’ –despite its contribution to German-Namibian rapprochement- does not signal an end to the individual reparation demands. What’s more this assistance not only divides the target country but it also prevents overcoming negative perceptions. Thus, enhanced cross-cultural communication exercises are still needed. Moreover, a joint history writing that can encompass the memories of the ordinary Namibians and Germans may perhaps contribute to this end.

180 Zimmerer and Zeller, p. xxiv.

181 Kae Matundu-Tjiparuro, “When Will Reperation or Restorative Justice Be Discussed? *Newera*, 22 February 2007, <<http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?db=oldarchive&articleid=14925>>.

182 Ibid. and according to exchange rate in 2004 (CIA the World Fact book), 1 US dollar equals to 6. 4597 Namibian dollars. Thus, German aid amounts to 24. 7 million US dollars.

183 Ibid.

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RUSSIFICATION POLICIES IMPOSED ON THE BALTIC PEOPLE BY THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE SOVIET UNION

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* This article is based on my master's degree thesis titled "The Citizenship Policies of the Baltic States: Do They Conform to the European Framework?" submitted at Başkent University, Ankara/Turkey in January 25, 2012.

Abstract: *This article examines the russification policies imposed by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union on the people of the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Within the context of this examination, the specifics of the russification policies and the Baltic people's responses to them are explained. This article concludes that although russification policies were effective in maintaining control over the Baltic people, these policies had the unintended consequence of bolstering Baltic nationalism and calls for independence. These policies also left a profound impact on the minds of the Baltic people, and heavily influenced the way Baltic countries shaped their citizenship policies with regards to the Russian minority.*

Keywords: *russification, Baltic countries, Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian minority, statelessness, citizenship*

Rus İmparatorluğu ve Sovyetler Birliği Tarafından Baltık Uluslarına Uygulanan Ruslaştırma Politikaları

Öz: *Bu makale Rusya İmparatorluğu ve Sovyetler Birliği tarafından Baltık ülkeleri Estonya, Letonya ve Litvanya'nın insanlarına uygulanan ruslaştırma politikalarını incelemektedir. Bu inceleme çerçevesinde ruslaştırma politikalarının detayları ve Baltık insanların bu politikalarına olan tepkileri açıklanmaktadır. Makale ruslaştırma politikalarının Baltık insanlarını kontrol altında tutmakta etkili olmakla*

beraber kasıtsız bir şekilde Baltık milliyetçiliğini kuvvetlendirdiği ve bağımsızlık taleplerini ortaya çıkardığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Bu politikalar aynı zamanda Baltık insanların zihninde derin bir iz bırakmış; ve Baltık ülkelerinin Rus azınlığı ilgilendiren vatandaşlık politikalarının oluşturulmasını çok ciddi bir şekilde etkilemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ruslaştırma, Baltık ülkeleri, Baltık devletleri, Estonya, Letonya, Litvanya, Rus İmparatorluğu, Sovyetler Birliği, Rus azınlık, devletsizlik, vatandaşlık

1. INTRODUCTION

The Baltic people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania¹ have throughout their history struggled against foreign powers that attempted impose their rule on these peoples. While throughout their history Estonians and Latvians struggled against German influence and control, the Lithuanians struggled against Polish influence and control. Neither the Germans nor the Polish; however, left the kind of mark that the Russians have left on the Baltic people.

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The Baltic people came under Russian rule twice in their history; once during the 19th century under the Russian Empire, and a second time after the Second World War under the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the Baltic people, the defining element of Russian rule was “russification”; a process which broke down Baltic people’s resistance to Russian rule through decisively stamping out any move towards seeking independence and suppressing the expression of Baltic culture by imposing the primacy of Russian culture. While the first instance of Russian rule and the russification it entailed was strict in terms of political control and unsystematic in terms of cultural suppression; the second instance of Russian rule and the russification it entailed was much harsher, systemic and far-reaching in the way it was imposed. Not only was the expression of Baltic culture strongly suppressed in every respect, but forced population transfers conducted by the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the ethnic composition of the Baltic countries. It was because of the more severe nature of this second instance of Russian that it would have a much more defining impact on the mindset of the Baltic people, and greatly influence they way they behaved in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

¹ Due to reasons that shall be elaborated later, modern day Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are multi-ethnic countries. Historically speaking; however, the term “Baltic people” should be understood as referring to ethnic Estonians, ethnic Latvians, and ethnic Lithuanians. Other ethnic groups came to exist in large numbers in Baltic countries only after the annexation of these countries by the Soviet Union.

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Although the Soviet Union was a vast multi-ethnic formation, it was the Russians at the forefront of the Union and it was their interests that primarily shaped the functioning of the Union. It was for this reason that the Baltic people came to associate the nearly fifty years of Soviet rule as Russian domination in disguise. The large Russian-speaking minority² that became a part of the Baltic countries came to be viewed from this negative perception. The Russian minority was considered to be a foreign element forcefully introduced to the Baltic countries, and also as element that served as a reminder of the humiliating half a century of Russian domination. Due to this perception, the Baltic countries sought to curtail the influence of the Russian minority after achieving independence in the aftermath of the collapse of the Union.³ It was only through the Baltic countries interactions with various international organizations (especially the European Union) that these countries would loosen their stance on the Russian minority.

On a further note, both instances of Russification have had the unintended consequence of bolstering Baltic nationalism and calls for independence. The cultural subjugation attempted by the Russians only stiffened Baltic resolve to preserve their culture, which served to strengthen a sense of nationalism amongst the Baltic people. Russian policies also inadvertently provided a justification to break free from Russian control and establish Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as independent states.

As it can be seen from this narrative historical wrongdoings end up having unforeseeable repercussions in the future. The wrongdoings committed by the Soviet Union upon the Baltic countries would lead them to commit wrongdoings (although to a much lesser scale) against the Russian minority. Such wrongdoings would also serve as a rallying call for aspirations of Baltic independence.

2. THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RUSSIFICATION

The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had all fallen under Russian control by the 19th century. As a method of control, the Russian Empire began to employ a policy of russification towards Estonians,

2 In the context of the Baltic countries, the Russian-speaking minority – made up of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians – are usually simply referred as the “Russian minority”.

3 Lithuania constituted a separate case from Estonia and Latvia, since it was much more positive in its approach towards the Russian minority. The reason for this difference shall be elaborated upon in the paper.

Latvians and Lithuanians. As a state policy, this first instance of russification would serve as a precursor to the second instance of russification during the Soviet rule. As it has been mentioned earlier, however, the two instances of russification differed in their characteristics, scope and severity.

Russia during the imperial period was a vast and multi-ethnic empire. The ruling section of the empire was Russian, but they were aware of the impracticality of and the potential trouble that would come with trying to impose Russian culture on the vast number of non-Russians living in the empire.⁴ Anyone wishing to be part of the Russian state apparatus, however, was expected to be familiar with Russian culture and know how to speak Russian. As such, non-Russians who chose this path would in essence become russified.⁵ But beyond this, Russia had no intention of culturally eliminating the various groups living within its borders.⁶ It did, however, regard any opposition movement by non-Russians as a threat to the integrity of the empire. This law enacted by Russia in 1906 demonstrated the Russian mentality during the imperial period:

The Russian State is one and indivisible. ... The Russian language is the common language of the State and is compulsory ... in all State and public institutions. The use of local languages and dialects in State and public institutions is determined by special laws.⁷

During this time period Russia had no coherent and specific policy towards non-Russians. Russian policy towards non-Russians was at most reactionary and preventative in its scope.⁸ Russia enacted “special laws” according to the circumstances at hand. Poles and Jews, for example, were perceived by Russia to be potentially dangerous groups, and as such faced many cultural and political restrictions. Lithuanians on the other hand, were generally seen as being a harmless group destined to eventually become assimilated by Russian culture.⁹ It was for these reasons that only when the Lithuanians rebelled alongside the Poles did the Russians react harshly against the Lithuanians. As such, Russian action towards the Lithuanians during this period must not be judged as

4 Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), pp. 12-13.

5 Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia...*, pp. 12, 14.

6 Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia...*, p. 69.

7 Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia...*, pp. 44.

8 Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia...*, pp. 5, 11, 14.

9 Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia...*, pp. 46, 53.

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a sinister move, but as a natural consequence of Russia's drive to maintain a centralized and a unified empire.¹⁰

When Lithuanians rebelled against Russian rule, Russia predictably reacted by imposing restrictions on the expression of Lithuanian culture.¹¹ Russians shut down schools teaching Lithuanian, and made Russian compulsory in elementary schools. They shut down Catholic¹² monasteries and churches. They made Russian the official language in bureaucratic, administrative, and judicial affairs. They forbid the use of Latin letters when publishing books in Lithuanian, hoping that Lithuanians would start using the Cyrillic alphabet. Finally, they either imprisoned or executed anyone who was instigating opposition towards Russian rule.

Russian relationship with the Estonians and Latvians was of a different nature. Being much smaller, Estonians and Latvians posed no threat to the Russians, and thus Russians mostly left their loyal subjects the Germans in charge of ruling Estonians and Latvians.¹³ Things began to change by the end of the 19th century for two reasons:¹⁴ 1) Russia began to implement reforms and sought further centralization, and thus sought to bring Estonia and Latvia closer in line with Russian standards, 2) Russia began to feel uncomfortable with the cultural pull the Germans were having on Estonians and Latvians, especially after the German unification in 1871. Germany was now one of the most powerful states in Europe, Russians sought to prevent Estonians and Latvians drifting into rival Germany's orbit. Based on these two objectives the Russians enacted a number of changes.¹⁵ They brought the education and the justice system in Estonia and Latvia under direct Russian control. Like in Lithuania, they made Russian the official language in bureaucratic and administrative affairs. They also encouraged the growth of Orthodox Christianity and sought to undermine the influence of Protestant Christianity¹⁶, but were unsuccessful in this regard.

10 Kevin O'Connor, *The History of the Baltic States* (London: Greenwood Press, 2003), p. 53.

11 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 58. Also see; Steven Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition - The Baltic Republics* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), p. 109.

12 Lithuanians have historically been predominantly Catholic Christians.

13 As a legacy of previous German rule and despite the then current Russian rule, the German land owners were still highly influential within Estonia and Latvia.

14 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, pp. 53, 55.

15 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, pp. 54-56.

16 Estonians and Latvians have historically been predominantly Protestant Christians.

A sense of nationhood had already begun to form in Estonia and Latvia by early 19th century. This formation process began first when Russians abolished serfdom in Estonia and Latvia by 1819. This move was partly based on the genuine desire to improve the living conditions of Estonians and Latvians, and but also on the desire to collect taxes from these now emancipated people instead of having to rely on the Baltic Germans.¹⁷ Russia then proceeded to implement land reforms, which allowed Estonians and Latvians to buy land and financially secure themselves. Having secured themselves, Estonians and Latvians now found the time to express themselves, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the creation of Estonian and Latvian literature, art, and music.¹⁸ The first time Estonian and Latvian nationalism was made clearly apparent was when both Estonians and Latvians held national song festivals which openly celebrated Estonian and Latvian culture. Lithuanians, on the other hand, lagged behind Estonians and Latvians in this respect;¹⁹ they were poorer and faced more restrictions, and thus didn't have the opportunity to express themselves like Estonians and Latvians.

Though feeling increasingly nationalistic, the Baltic people aspirations were not always the same. When nationalism first began to form amongst the Baltic people, it was against German cultural domination (for Estonians and Latvians), and against Polish cultural domination (for Lithuanians). None of the three groups of people had any intention of breaking away from Russia; they considered being part of Russia to be something permanent.²⁰ This began to change in time, especially with the imposition of russification. While supporting Russian rule for having undermined Baltic Germans' power, Estonians and Latvians became increasingly uncomfortable with it the more they cultivated their sense of nationhood. Such sentiments eventually turned into political aspirations by the turn of the century as Estonians and Latvians first began to yearn for autonomy, which in turn turned into a call for independence.²¹

With regards to nationalism, Lithuanians caught up with the Estonians and Latvians partly due russification.²² As Polish cultural influence

17 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 41. Also see; Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, p. 11.

18 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, p. 11, 61-62.

19 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, pp. 46, 60.

20 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, pp. 47-48, 51, 59.

21 Charlotte Aston, *Antonius Piip, Zigfrids Meierovics and Augustinas Voldemaras: The Baltic States* (London: Haus Publishing Ltd, 2010), p. 15.

22 Aston, *Antonius Piip...*, pp. 20-22.

diminished due to Russian crackdown, Lithuanians began to culturally express themselves in late 19th century just like Estonians and Latvians had done earlier. Moreover, the banning of the Lithuanian alphabet severely backfired. Highly religious people, Lithuanians viewed this ban as an attempt to curb their expression of Catholic Christianity (practiced using the Lithuanian alphabet) and an attempt to push them towards Orthodox Christianity (practiced using the Cyrillic alphabet). Hostility towards the Poles began to be directed towards the Russians as well. What started as a religious reaction eventually turned into secular topics as well. In order to work around the alphabet ban, a large underground book printing and reading culture using the Lithuanian alphabet flourished. More and more Lithuanians began to read literature emphasizing Lithuanian culture. Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuanian cultural expression quickly turned into a call for independence due to Lithuania's past as an independent and influential state during the 15th and 16th centuries. Having once been independent, Lithuanians were more galvanized by their predicament than Estonians and Latvians.

The year 1905 was a turning point for the Baltic people. In 1905 protests broke out throughout Russia in reaction to the failings of Tsarist rule. Estonians and Latvians too joined this protest, but the protest movement was brutally repressed by Russia. Meanwhile in the same year Lithuanians called for self-government, but Russia refused to grant it. Being tiny in comparison to Russia, the Baltic people did not have the means to forcefully break away from Russian rule. Circumstances needed to change in order for the Baltic people to achieve independence. The necessary change occurred during the First World War. During the war, Russia became engulfed in the revolutionary events of 1917; which began when Russian people finally managed to overthrow Tsarist rule. Since internal power struggles in Russia were keeping Russian attention fixated on domestic affairs, Russia was not in a position to respond to events occurring elsewhere. The Baltic people took advantage of the situation, and by 1918, with Lithuanians taking the lead the Baltic people declared themselves as independent states.²³

3. THE SECOND INSTANCE OF RUSSIFICATION

As the Baltic countries' period of independence prior to the Second World War is not really relevant within the context of this paper, a brief summary will suffice. The period of independence for the Baltic countries from

23 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition*..., pp. 11-12, 61-62, 110.

1918 to the beginning of the war can be summarized by stating it was a period of democratic experimentation which eventually devolved (for all three countries) into political dictatorships. Although these dictatorships curtailed democratic ideals, they also brought much welcome political and economic stability after a long period of political turmoil and economic hardship for all three countries. This stability created a period of relative affluence, which would lead to a burst of cultural advancement for all three Baltic peoples. This was so because this was the first time in centuries that the Baltic people were free from foreign rule and free to determine their own countries' course for the future.

This period of independence was cut short by the events of the Second World War. The Baltic countries attempted to protect themselves from the looming war by maintaining a policy of neutrality, and forming a defensive Baltic alliance.²⁴ Their efforts were going to be vain, because they were located in the middle of a struggle that was to take place between two great powers: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union wanted control of Eastern Europe, and naturally the Baltic countries were a part of this struggle. During the course of the Second World War, the Baltic countries were eventually overrun by the Soviets. This meant that, by 1940, all three Baltic countries had ceased to exist as independent states. Furthermore, this Soviet occupation was to be a long lasting one, for it lasted from the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The events that took place during this Soviet occupation and control were to leave bitter memories for the Baltic people, especially Estonians and Latvians.

With the end of the Second World War, Nazi Germany had been pushed out of the Baltic countries by the Soviets. But at the same time, Soviets had seized control of all three Baltic countries. For the Soviet Union, the control of the Baltic countries was important for two reasons:²⁵ 1) The control of the Baltic countries increased Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, 2) The Baltic countries acted as a buffer zone to protect inner parts of the Soviet Union against possible military aggression coming from the west, which to the Soviets would mostly likely be one from Germany. As a relic of imperial Russian mentality, the Soviet Union viewed the Baltic countries as naturally belonging to the Union.²⁶ For this reason, unlike other Eastern European countries during

24 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 108.

25 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 109-111.

26 Henry R. Huttenbach, "Introduction: Towards a Unitary Soviet State: Managing a Multinational Society, 1917-1985," in *Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR*, ed., Henry R. Huttenbach (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1990), p. 4.

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the post-war era, the Baltic countries did not become satellite states with communist regimes; they were forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union.²⁷ Now having full control over the Baltic countries, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin's rule implemented a number of policies in these three countries that were to have a lasting impact.

The most important policy to mention was the russification of the Baltic countries. Russification is the most important policy to mention because it was the policy that subjugated the Baltic people, and changed the ethnic composition in the region. The change in the ethnic composition in turn would influence the way Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would behave after they declared their independence in 1990/91.

The russification policy of this time period shared similarities with the russification policy of the imperial period. In contrast to policy of the previous period, however, the more recent russification policy was much more ruthless and calculated in its character. It is interesting to note that the term "russification" was never used by the Soviet Union. The founding doctrines of the Soviet Union, as outlined by its first leader Vladimir Lenin specifically criticized and opposed aggressive Russian nationalism and any attempt to subjugate other nations.²⁸ The Soviet Union was initially meant to defend internationalism; the ideal of bringing together the working classes of various nationalities in an effort to build a well-functioning socialist system, which in turn would lead to communism.²⁹ In such a system, each separate nation was meant to grow and cultivate itself, and contribute its share to the common good. No individual nation was meant to dominate other nations. Furthermore, the concept of nation itself was not opposed, but instead seen as an indispensable step toward a successful socialist system.³⁰

Stalin assumed control of the Soviet Union after Lenin passed away, and changed the way the Soviet Union functioned. Aggressive Russian nationalism had been a growing phenomenon during the later stages of the imperial period, and it continued to have an effect on Russian minds even after the socialist take-over of power in Russia.³¹ Stalin shared the mentality of the Russian nationalists; the future of the Soviet Union

27 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition*..., pp. 14-15, 63-64, 111-112.

28 Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (New York: Monad Press, 1974), pp. 25, 42.

29 Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification*..., pp. 27, 33, 46, 49.

30 Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification*..., pp. 24, 44.

31 Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia*..., p., 68. Also see; Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification*..., pp. 62-64.

would revolve around the interests of Russians with other ethnic groups acting as subordinates. For this reason, during Stalin's rule the ideas of Russian nationalism came to be implemented through distortion of internationalism.³²

Internationalism became a tool to create one common Soviet people; united under common ideals, and with no national distinctions. Nationalism was officially seen as a subversive idea; contrary to the ideal of the Soviet people. But in truth this rhetoric meant the promotion of Russian culture and influence at the expense of other cultures.³³ With increased frequency Russian culture - its history, language, and character - came to be more and more praised, while other cultures became progressively more undermined. The ideal was to create the Soviet people, but it was to be achieved through the unifying power of Russian culture. As such, internationalism was turned into the new version of russification.

The Soviet Union, just like the Russian Empire, was a multi-ethnic formation. As was mentioned earlier the Russian Empire had no clear policy towards non-Russians. In contrast, Soviet Union's approach to non-Russians mainly revolved around the process of russification. Henry Huttenbach concisely explains Soviet Union's approach by stating;

Commitment to a unitary state with a homogeneous citizenry lies at the heart of all Soviet nationality policies since Lenin, the belief that the hodgepodge of Eurasian peoples could be fused by shrewd government management into a single, essentially Russian-oriented, people.³⁴

In terms of the Baltic region, the new form of russification was carried out in two ways: by suppressing Baltic culture, and by changing the ethnic composition of the Baltic region. The suppression of Baltic culture helped Russian culture to penetrate into the Baltic region. The ethnic alteration enforced this process by decreasing the number of those who would oppose this process, and increase the number of those who would support this process.³⁵ These changes would allow Russians to better dominate the Baltic region.

32 Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification...*, pp.40, 42-43, 46. Also see; Huttenbach, "Introduction: Towards a Unitary Soviet State....", pp. 3, 5.

33 Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification...*, pp. 45, 65-66, 92-93. Also see; Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1990* (London: Hurst & Company, 1993), p. 120.

34 Huttenbach, "Introduction: Towards a Unitary Soviet State....", p. 3.

35 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 127.

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Baltic culture was suppressed in the following manner: Russian was declared as the official language in the Baltic countries; as such the Baltic people had to do deal with Soviet authorities not in their own native language, but in Russian.³⁶ Furthermore all major institutions throughout the Soviet Union used Russian, and most of the noteworthy cultural, scholarly, and scientific work was produced in Russian.³⁷ Russian was not made compulsory in the Baltic education system, but the Baltic people were expected to become bilingual by taking optional Russian courses.³⁸ The Russians who immigrated to the Baltic region, however, were not expected to learn the local languages. Teachers were trained according to Soviet directives, which reflected Russian interests. It was evident that Russian enjoyed a dominant position not only in the Soviet Union in general, but also specifically in member states like the Baltic countries. This domination naturally weakened the position of other languages of Soviet Union such as the Baltic languages.

Besides language policies, official cultural events were held to praise Russian culture.³⁹ Furthermore, all Baltic cultural work - literature, theater etc. - were regulated by strict Soviet guidelines.⁴⁰ These guidelines restricted overt expressions of Baltic culture. In such works, not only were people expected to abstain from criticizing the Soviet system, but were also expected to abstain from making neutral comments. As such, Soviet guidelines expected people to praise the Soviet system. Failure to comply with Soviet guidelines resulted in a number possible outcomes: official warning, demotion, house arrest, actual arrest, interrogation under torture, or deportation.⁴¹ Faced with such potential consequences, most people chose to comply with Soviet guidelines. It was for this reason that, in comparison to the independence years, the amount of noteworthy Baltic cultural work plummeted during Soviet rule.⁴²

Faced with Soviet occupation and cultural suppression, some Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians chose to wage an armed struggle that began in 1944.⁴³ They collectively came to be called “the Forest Brothers”.

36 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition*..., pp. 15-16, 64-65, 112.

37 Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification*..., pp. 135-136, 156-157, 159, 161, 163.

38 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 135. Also see; Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*..., pp. 114-115, 130.

39 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*..., p. 115.

40 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*..., pp. 116-118.

41 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*..., p. 121.

42 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 132.

43 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*..., pp. 83, 86, 88-90, 92-93.

They would hide in the forested areas of the Baltic region, and only leave to collect supplies and employ hit-and-run tactics against Soviet personnel and infrastructure. The Soviet authorities responded with overwhelming brute force to wipe-out members of the Forest Brothers. They also carried out propaganda campaigns portraying the Forest Brothers as bandits preying on local populations. Faced with limited supplies, diminishing public support (based both on propaganda and increased complacency with Soviet rule), and overwhelming Soviet military power, the remaining Forest Brothers decided to disband after about eight years of operation.

Meanwhile the ethnic composition of the Baltic region was changed in the following manner: With the onset of the Soviet occupation many ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were imprisoned, exiled, or out-right executed. At the same time, Russians and other Russian-speaking people from around the Soviet Union were transferred to the Baltic countries.⁴⁴ This meant that as the number of ethnic Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian people went down, the number of Russian and other Russian-speaking people went drastically up. As a side note; thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanian's had fled their countries or perished when trying to flee because of the war and the Soviet occupation.

The russification of the Baltic countries had the impact of drastically changing the ethnic composition of Estonia and Latvia. Before 1940, Estonia's ethnic Estonian population comprised about ninety percent of the total population. In Latvia, the ethnic Latvians comprised about seventy-seven percent of the total population. As a result of Soviet Union's policy, by 1989 ethnic Estonian percentage had dropped to sixty-two percent, while ethnic Latvian percentage had dropped to fifty-two percent. At the same time, Russians came to comprise twenty-eight percent of Estonia's, and thirty percent of Latvia's total population.⁴⁵ The situation became especially drastic for Latvia; ethnic Latvians became minorities in their capital Riga, and the six other major cities of Latvia.⁴⁶

Lithuania was not affected by this policy as much as Estonia and Latvia

44 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, pp. 14-16, 64-65, 112.

45 The percentages have been compiled from; Anton Steen, "Ethnic Relations, Elites and Democracy in the Baltic," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 16, 4 (2000): pp. 71-72. Also see; Anton Steen, "Accessioning Liberal Compliance? Baltic Elites and Ethnic Politics under New International Conditions," *International Journal of on Minority and Group Rights*, 13, 2-3 (2006): p. 192.

46 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, p. 58.

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were. The proportion of ethnic Lithuanians with the regards to the total population of Lithuania remained stable at around eighty percent. Russians came to comprise about twelve percent of the total population.⁴⁷ The reason behind why Lithuania was not as affected by Estonia and Latvia was because Lithuania was not as industrialized as the other two Baltic countries. Russians wanted to work in factory jobs like they did back in Russia, and Lithuania did not offer the same opportunity as did Estonia and Latvia.⁴⁸ For this reason there was not much incentive for Russians to move to Lithuania. Lithuania's lack of industrialization thus made it less of target for Russian immigration than Estonia and Latvia.

There was not much the Baltic people could do in the proceeding decades after Soviet annexation.⁴⁹ The amount of repression imposed by the Soviet Union was eased after Stalin's death in 1953. For the next couple of years, the Baltic countries were given partial autonomy in economic affairs, which gave the Baltic countries the opportunity to improve their economic standards. This period, however, came to an end in 1965 when Leonid Brezhnev became the leader of the Soviet Union. From the time it began during Stalin's rule, cultural suppression continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. The Baltic people continued conform to Soviet rule, though they never lost their resolve to preserve their culture. Although they had managed to preserve their culture, the Baltic people entered the 1980s with little hope for the future because they saw no opportunity to break away from Soviet control.

Although both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union attempted to use russification policies as a method of control over the Baltic people, in the long run it proved to be ineffective in both instances. Just like they had done during Imperial Russia's rule, the Baltic people submitted to Russian rule only so long as the Soviet Union had to capacity to exert firm control on the Baltic countries. As soon as the Soviet Union began lose power, the Baltic people – fueled by a sense of nationalism – began to maneuver for independence.

Although maintaining a tight grip on those it ruled, the Soviet Union began to show signs of critical failure by the 1970s, mainly in its

47 Steen, "Ethnic Relations, Elites and Democracy in the Baltic, pp. 71-72. Also see; Steen, "Accessioning Liberal Compliance...., p. 192.

48 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition*...., p. 103.

49 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition*...., pp. 16, 65, 112-113. Also see; Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*...., p. 204.

competitiveness in the global economy.⁵⁰ Brought to power in 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev considered reform a necessity if the Soviet Union was to survive in a changing world. Although repeatedly warned that his reforms would lead to the downfall of the Union, Gorbachev went ahead and enacted the reforms and encouraged people of the Soviet Union to express their complaints with the system.⁵¹ Gorbachev believed that this reform process could be used in a controlled manner to identify the problems of the Union, and help it to become competitive again in the world economy. It did not work as Gorbachev had hoped; when people became aware that they could speak their minds, they could no longer be contained.⁵² The Soviet Union began to lose its ability to suppress its citizens' criticisms; and initial reluctant criticisms of the system eventually led to more and more open criticisms and protests. Those who resented the system, but who were too afraid to speak became emboldened when more and more people around them decided to speak. This trend first began in Russia, and eventually spread to other parts of the Soviet Union.⁵³

The Baltic countries were too small in comparison to the rest of the Soviet Union to attempt a forceful break-away. The reform process Gorbachev initiated, however, presented a golden opportunity for independence. The Baltic people's path to independence began in 1987, and went ahead in three phases:⁵⁴ 1) Protests regarding Soviet rule, 2) Call for autonomy, and 3) Push for independence. Protests first began over non-political issues; such as when the Latvians campaigned to stop the construction of a large hydro-power plant that would damage the environment.⁵⁵ In an atmosphere of Gorbachev-initiated reforms, Latvians pressed on until the local Soviet authorities decided to scrap the project. Such non-political protests spilled over to Estonia and Lithuania.

The authorities' unwillingness to crack down on protests further

50 Scott Shane, *Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended The Soviet Union* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994), pp. 59, 63-64, 67-68.

51 Shane, *Dismantling Utopia...*, pp. 5, 45, 66-67.

52 Shane, *Dismantling Utopia...*, pp. 17, 25, 40, 46.

53 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence...*, p. 303.

54 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence...*, pp. 303, 311, 322.

55 Protests regarding environmental concerns had historically been partially permitted in the Soviet Union. This provided a useful opportunity for the Baltic people to begin expressing their opposition to Soviet policies. Soviet reaction to such protests would help Baltic people determine whether to act more timidly or more aggressively when opposing Soviet rule. For reference, please see; Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 220.

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encouraged people.⁵⁶ Emboldened by success of ecological protests, people began to protest political issues as well; such as when in 1987 people protested the Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries, held national song festivals in 1988 openly celebrating Baltic culture, and formed a 692 km human chain in 1988 to express solidarity against Soviet rule.⁵⁷ In 1988 with Estonia taking the lead this time, protests eventually turned to popular fronts demanding Baltic autonomy for internal affairs. Such popular front eventually came to encompass a large majority of the Baltic population.⁵⁸ Gorbachev's stance regarding the events in the Baltic region was beneficial for the Baltic drive for autonomy. Gorbachev did not want to tarnish his positive image as a liberal reformer, and thus refused to employ violent means to suppress the opposition to Soviet Rule.⁵⁹ In this lenient atmosphere created by Gorbachev's rule, Soviet authorities in the Baltic region were unwilling to forcefully bring the Baltic people back in line with Soviet rule.

The path towards of independence entered its final phase by 1989; calls for autonomy turned into a push for independence. Lithuania was more confident than both Estonia and Latvia in pursuing independence because of its larger size and also because of its smaller Russian minority population. Estonia and Latvia meanwhile had to contend with a much larger Russian minority population which was for the most part vehemently opposed to the idea of Baltic independence.⁶⁰ Under such domestic circumstances, Estonia and Latvia were more timid than Lithuania, and thus were in favor of a more gradual approach to pursuing independence.⁶¹

Due to its confidence described above, and also emboldened by the previous successes and the rapid growth Baltic opposition towards Soviet rule, Lithuania decided to take the lead by declaring its independence in March 1990.⁶² Up until this stage Soviet authorities had mostly relied on arrests and staged rallies in support of the Soviet Union. But when the Baltic countries began to demand independence, the Soviet Union began to resort to open violence. By now, however, the

56 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence...*, pp. 304-307.

57 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, pp. 16-17, 114.

58 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence...*, pp.311-312, 316, 318. Also see; Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, pp.16-17, 65-66, 113-114.

59 O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 146, 156, 162.

60 The Russian minority's opposition to Baltic independence stemmed from their fear of becoming a vulnerable minority group within newly independent Baltic countries that might act hostile towards them based on historical grudges. For reference, please see; O'Connor, *History of the Baltic States*, p. 153.

61 Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution...*, p. 241.

62 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence...*, pp. 322, 329, 333.

international community had focused its attention on the Baltic countries. The Soviet Union was portraying itself as a reforming country, and its actions in the Baltic region were damaging its international image. Coupled with this was the fact that there was by that time too much momentum behind the Baltic independence movements; people refused to back down even when threatened with violence. Faced with this reality the Soviet Union decided to end its violent crackdown.⁶³

Convinced that Gorbachev's leadership was ruining the Union, Soviet hardliners attempted a coup in August 1991. The coup failed, but by now Gorbachev had lost his power, and the Union was nearing collapse. With the Soviet Union collapsing, Estonia and Latvia followed the example of Lithuania, and declared their independence in late August 1991. In September 1991, the Soviet Union acknowledged the independence of all three Baltic countries. As its final act, in December 1991 the Soviet Union decided to dissolve itself.⁶⁴ After about fifty years of foreign occupation, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had once again become independent states.

4. BALTIC CITIZENSHIP POLICIES SHAPED BY SOVIET RUSSIFICATION POLICIES

During the period Soviet rule, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were subject to Soviet interests. Soviet Union's russification policy had altered the ethnic composition of the Baltic region. The ethnic tension that existed between the native peoples of the Baltic region and the Russian-speaking people was masked by Soviet ideology; which maintained that there was harmony between different groups of people, and that all groups possessed the same political and cultural rights.⁶⁵

But as the Soviet Union ceased to exist; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became free to express themselves. The Baltic people consider the Soviet occupation to be like a bad dream from which they were finally able to wake up in 1991.⁶⁶ Despite Soviet propaganda, to Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians Soviet interests were nothing more than Russian interests in disguise. For this reason, the Baltic people

63 Misiunas, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence...*, pp. 329. Also see; Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, pp.16-18, 66, 116.

64 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, pp. 18, 66, 116.

65 Steen, "Ethnic Relations, Elites and Democracy in the Baltic," p.75.

66 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, pp. IX-X.

Russification Policies Imposed on the Baltic People by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union

developed a deep resentment towards Russia, and also towards the Russian minority and their descendants who came to their country during the Soviet occupation. To the Baltic people, the Russian minority who live amongst them are like the remnants of that Soviet occupation.⁶⁷

As the two Baltic countries that were most affected by the policies of the Soviet Union, Estonia and Latvia took measures against the Russian minority. Due to their historical resentment and fear, Estonia and Latvia sought to limit the ability of the Russian minority to challenge the rule of the ethnic Estonian and Latvian majority.⁶⁸ Renal'd Simonian explains this mentality by stating that these two countries' past experiences under Soviet rule created "a fixation on what happened in the past."⁶⁹ This fixation of Estonia and Latvia, in turn, led to "a stubborn desire to build a mono-ethnic state"⁷⁰ aimed at ensuring the supremacy of the titular majorities at the expense of the Russian minority. One such way was to establish a citizenship mechanism that would exclude the Russian minority. Since political participation depended on being a citizen of Estonia and Latvia, the Russian minority was automatically barred from wielding political power.

As a consequence of such policies, Estonia and Latvia would initially shape into ethnic democracies; democracies in which citizenship is granted based on lineage. The only valid lineage that would entitle someone to become a citizen was to be ethnic Estonian (for Estonia) and ethnic Latvian (for Latvia).⁷¹ Since they were of a lineage foreign to Estonia and Latvia the Russian minority and their descendants had no legal means to acquire citizenship. Such state policies created what authors such as Annelies Lottmann and Nida M. Gelazis refer to as a statelessness problem both for Estonia and Latvia, and for the Russian minority. Lacking the citizenship of any state, unwilling assimilate or leave, and not allowed to integrate (since that would put the Russian minority on equal footing with ethnic Estonians and Latvians); the Russian minority was stuck somewhere in the middle in a legal, political, and social limbo.⁷²

67 Renal'D Simonian, "The Russian Diaspora in the Baltic Countries," *Russian Politics and Law*, 42, 4 (2004): pp. 81-82. Also see; Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition*..., p. 159.

68 Steen, "Accessioning Liberal Compliance...", p. 187.

69 Simonian, "The Russian Diaspora...", pp. 67, 82, 88.

70 Simonian, "The Russian Diaspora...", p. 80.

71 David Galbreath, "The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 4, 1 (2003): pp. 35-36.

72 For reference please see the following three articles: Steen, "Accessioning Liberal Compliance...", p. 197. Annelies Lottmann, "No Direction Home: Nationalism and Statelessness in the Baltics," *Texas International Law Journal*, 43, 3 (2008): p. 516. Simonian, "The Russian Diaspora...", p. 80.

It was only through the combined pressure exerted by the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that Estonia and Latvia made reforms in their citizenship policies.⁷³ Through such reforms the Russian minority too became eligible to acquire citizenship, but only through passing a tough examination process that made sure that the applicant was thoroughly knowledgeable about Estonia and Latvia (their history, culture etc.) and loyal to Estonia and Latvia.⁷⁴ Through such reforms Estonia and Latvia would eventually evolve to become ethno-liberal democracies; democracies that discriminate against certain groups, but leave a strict mechanism through which such groups can attain citizenship.⁷⁵ It should be noted that through continued reforms both countries have become much more liberal over time with regards to their citizenship policies, and have noticeably decreased the number of Russian minority members who are without citizenship.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, as a consequence of the initial discriminatory citizenship policies and troubled relationship with the Russian minority, both countries have had strained relations with Russia in the post Cold War era.⁷⁷

156 Lithuania, on the other hand, was not in the same position as that of Estonia and Latvia. Its ethnic Lithuanian population remained at the same proportion with regards to the total population, and its Russian minority was a small one. Although viewing them with suspicion like Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania did not feel threatened by the Russian minority like the other two countries did. As a consequence of this, the citizenship mechanism it adopted after regaining its independence was an inclusive one. Upon attaining independence, Lithuania enacted a citizenship policy that basically granted citizenship to all residents of Lithuania, regardless of their lineage.⁷⁸ As a consequence of this, virtually all members of the Russian minority were granted citizenship just like ethnic Lithuanians. For this reason, Lithuania shaped to become a liberal democracy; a democracy that stresses civic identity over ethnic identity and one that creates policies that are as inclusive as possible,

73 Nida M. Gelazis, "The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic States," *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 6, 3 (2004): pp. 225, 232, 242.

74 Gelazis, "The European Union and the Statelessness Problem...", p. 232.

75 Galbreath, "The Politics of European Integration...", pp. 35-36.

76 "Citizenship," *Estonia.eu: Official Gateway to Estonia* website, 13.11.2013, [accessed on 11.12.2013] <http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html>. Also see; "Citizenship in Latvia," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia* website, 2013, [accessed on 11.12.2013] <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/4641/4642/4651/>.

77 Otfinoski, *Nations in Transition...*, p. 24.

78 Gelazis, "The European Union and the Statelessness Problem...", p. 227.

without discriminating against anyone based on their lineage.⁷⁹ It was for this reason that Lithuania and its Russian minority never experienced a statelessness problem like Estonia and Latvia did. As a consequence of this situation, unlike the other two Baltic countries Lithuania has had more positive relations with Russia.⁸⁰

5. CONCLUSIONS

The mindset of any group of people is heavily affected by their past experiences. For the Baltic people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania being politically dominated and culturally suppressed had been a reality throughout much of their history. Amongst all foreign elements that ruled over the Baltic people, however, it was the Russians that left the most noticeable impact.

The Baltic people experienced Russian rule in two instances; once by the Russian Empire and a second time by the Soviet Union. While Russian domination was evident during the rule of the Russian Empire, it was hidden behind Soviet ideology during the rule of the Soviet Union. Despite its nature, however, it was apparent for the Baltic people by whom they were being subjugated by.

Both instances of Russian rule entailed being subjected to russification policies. The first instance of russification that came during imperial Russian rule was strict in terms of political control and unsystematic in terms of cultural suppression. Despite Russian intentions, this policy ended up bolstering Baltic nationalism that had already begun to form amongst the Baltic people. Having a sense of nationhood, the Baltic people grabbed onto the opportunity to break away from the Russian Empire just when it was in no position to retaliate. The Baltic countries' period of independence was cut short when got annexed by the Soviet Union. Soviet rule brought with it the second of instance of russification; which was much harsher, systemic and far-reaching in the way it was imposed. In this second instance, Baltic culture was strongly suppressed in every respect. Even worse for the Baltic countries were the forced population transfers conducted by the Soviet Union, which had a noticeable impact on the ethnic composition of the Baltic countries (especially for Estonia and Latvia).

79 Galbreath, "The Politics of European Integration...", pp. 35-36.

80 *Otfinoski, Nations in Transition...*, p. 103.

Russian treatment of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians during Soviet rule had a deep impact on the mindset of these people. The Russian minority living amongst them was seen as a left over from Russian rule, and thus viewed with suspicion. It was from this experience that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shaped their citizenship policies once they achieved their independence from Soviet rule. Having been most affected by Soviet rule, Estonia and Latvia initially refused to give citizenship to the Russian minority which they viewed as a threat; thereby blocking the Russian minority's access to the political affairs of these two countries. It was only through the efforts of international organizations that these two countries changed their course for more liberal citizenship policies. Although viewing them with suspicion, Lithuania chose to give the Russian minority citizenship because it did not deem the small minority as a threat to itself.

As it can be seen from this narrative, repressive policies can have unintended consequences that are detrimental for the state that is applying it. Furthermore, repressive policies result in bitterness and hostility in repressed people, and lead onto past wrongdoings being reflected onto present times and into new circumstances that go onto create problems of their own.

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ŞEHİNŞA...

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Öz: Polonyalı gazeteci Ryszard Kapuscinski'nin "Şahların Şahı" başlıklı kitabı (1982), kitabın 1985'te Birleşik Devletler'de yayınlanmış baskısından Türkçeye çevrilmiştir (1989). Bu baskı, kitabın Lehçe aslında CIA'nin İran Devrimi'ndeki ve – özellikle de – 1953'te Başbakan Mussadık'ın devrilmesindeki rolünün anlatıldığı yaklaşık bir on beş sayfanın çıkarılmış olduğu özel – sansürlü bir baskıdır. Bu çalışma "Şahların Şahı"nın Türkçe baskısında eksik olan bu bölümleri özetlemektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Ryszard Kapuscinski, İran Devrimi, CIA, Mussadık darbesi, Leh Edebiyatı

SHAH OF SHA...

Abstract: Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski's "Shah of Shahs" (1982) has been translated into Turkish (1989) from its American edition that published in the United States in 1985. It was a special – censored edition, from which about fifteen pages were cut that appeared in the original Polish edition about the CIA's role in Iranian revolution and – especially – the overthrow of prime minister Mosaddegh in 1953. This paper summarizes these missing passages from the Turkish edition of "Shah of Shahs."

Keywords: Ryszard Kapuscinski, Iranian Revolution, CIA, military coup againts Mosaddegh, Polish Literature

Ryszard Kapuscinski

Polonyalı gazeteci ve yazar Ryszard Kapuscinski (1932-2007), araştırmacı gazeteciliğin fenomen bir ismi olarak kabul edilmektedir. Kuru bir gazetecilik diliyle değil de, yüksek bir edebiyat dili ve edebi bir kurguyla kaleme aldığı çalışmaları ona tüm dünyada, bu arada ülkemizde de ün ve hatırı sayılır büyüklükte bir okuyucu kitlesi kazandırmıştır. Önemli kitapları Türkçeleştirilmiştir¹ (Polonya yazının en çok Türkçeleştirilmiş yazarlarının başında gelir). Bu çeviriler yapıtlarının orijinal dili olan Lehçeden değil, üçüncü bir dil aracılığıyla, İngilizceden yapılmış çevirilerdir. Kapuscinski'nin 1982'de yayınladığı, İran İslam Devrimi'ni ve devrimi getiren aşamaları konu alan kitabı “Şahların Şahı” da dilimize İngilizceden kazandırılmıştır.² Ancak burada, bu kitap özelinde farklı bir durum söz konusudur, zira kitabın dilimize çevirisi, 1985'te Amerika'da yayınlanmak üzere İngilizceye çevrilirken Anglosakson okuyucuya uygun hale getirilmiş “özel” bir versiyonundan yapılmıştır. Lafı dolandırmadan söylemek gerekirse; çeviri sırasında metnin orijinalinden yaklaşık bir on beş küsur sayfa (kitabın Lehçedeki bütün yeniden basımlarında ve doğrudan Lehçeden yapılmış çevirilerinde varlığını koruyan bir on beş küsur sayfa) atılmıştır.

Sansür mü, oto-sansür mü?

Yazarların, kitaplarının yeniden basımlarında bazı değişiklikler, düzeltmeler yapmaları olabilecek bir şey. Kitaplarının kendi bildikleri dillere yapılan çevirilerine müdahale etmeleri daha sık rastlanan bir durum ve bunun sonucunda bazen orijinal dildeki metinden bayağı farklılaşmış, ama belki hedef dildeki okuyucu için daha anlaşılır metinlerin ortaya çıkması da mümkün.³ “Şahların Şahı”nın İngilizceye çevrilmek üzere hazırlanan metninde de bu türden, “kozmetik” denilebilecek bazı değişiklikler yapılmış. Örneğin, bazı bölümler olduğu gibi alınıp kurgusal anlamda daha iyi işlev görecekleri düşünülmüş olabilecek yerlere taşınmış, gerçi bu türden “kozmetik” müdahalelerin,

1 Gül Çağalı Güven'in çevirisiyle Om Yayınevi'nden çıkan üç kitap: “İmparatorluk” (1999), “Afrika Aslanı” ve “Futbol Savaşı” (2000).

2 “Şahların Şahı”, Çeviren: Oktay Döşemeci, Birinci Basım: 1989, Metis Yayıncılık, İkinci Basım: 2012, Habitus Yayıncılık.

3 Bunu tamamen kendi deneyimlerime dayanarak iddia edebiliyorum. Örneğin, Profesör Kolodko'nun “Wędrujący świat” başlıklı kitabının Lehçeden yapmış olduğum çevirisi [“Gezici Dünya/Geçmişten Bir Bakışla Şimdinin ve Geleceğin Ekonomi Politikası”, ODTÜ Yayıncılık, Ankara 2011] ile kitabın İngilizceye yapılmış çevirisi [“Truth, Errors, and Lies: Politics and Economics in a Volatile World”, Columbia University Press, New York 2008] kıyaslandığında, başlıktan itibaren birçok bölümün bütün bütün farklı olduğu görülebilir.

kitabın içeriğindeki başka bazı büyük değişiklikleri maskeleyerek için yapılmış oldukları da düşünülebilir. Zira özellikle bazı sayfaların CIA'nin kitaptan kendi izini silmek için yayıncıya yaptığı baskı sonucunda çıkartılmış olduğu rivayet edilir. Başka bir rivayete göre; Kapuscinski, CIA'yi işkillendirmemek için bir oto-sansür uygulamasıdır.⁴ Ancak sansürün kimin tarafından uygulandığının —kanımızca— ilkesel bir önemi yok. Ortada kalan soru şu: Kitabın İngilizceye çevirisindeki o kayıp sayfalarda Amerikan toplumunun öğrenmesinden rahatsız duyulabilecek (CIA'yi ya da Kapuscinski'nin kendisini tedirgin eden) ne vardı?

Bir başarı öyküsü: Mr. İran

Başbakan Muammed Mussadık'a karşı yapılan askeri darbenin tarihi, "(...) 19 Ağustos 1953 — İranlıların belleğinde Şah Rıza Pehlevi'nin tahta gerçekten geçtiği gün; kanın ve korkunç baskıların eşlik ettiği bir tahta geçiş günüdür." (Kapuscinski, 2008, s. 37) Bunu, halk Şah'ın gizli örgütü Savak'ın baskısı altından inerken, saraya yakın bir elit askeri tabakanın, petrol zengini kompradorların ve elbette emperyalist güçlerin keyif çatacağı bir "Büyük Uygurluk" dönemi izleyecektir. Mussadık'ın iktidardan indirilişi, "Britanya ve Amerika hükümetleri tarafından ortaklaşa" alınmış bir karardır. (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.35) Mussadık bağımsız ve antikomünist bir yurtsever olmasına rağmen, Eisenhower, her nedense, onun komünist olduğundan kuşkulmaktadır, "değil mi ki daha zayıf ülkelerin yurtseverleri bu dünyanın güçlülerinin gözüne güvenilmez görünürler" (Kapuscinski, 2008, s. 30-31) ve değil mi ki Mussadık'ın demokratizmi Tudeh'e, yani İran Komünist Partisi'ne de hoşgörülle yaklaşmaktadır. Bu son durum, İngiltere ve Amerika

4 2010 yılında Polonya'da gazeteci Artur Domosławski tarafından bir kitap yayınlandı: "Kapuściński: Non-Fiction" [Kitaba ilişkin Türkçede ayrıntılı bir bilgi Yasemin Çongar'ın *Gazeteciliğin utancı, edebiyatın şaheseri* başlıklı köşe yazısında bulunabilir: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/yasemin-congar/makale-gazeteciligin-utanci-edebiyatin-shaheseri.htm> (son erişim: 24.09.2013)]. Bu kitap birçok karşıt görüş doğurduğu gibi, Kapuscinski'nin dul eşi tarafından da dava konusu yapıldı ve yazarı —Kapuscinski'nin yetiştirdiği bir gazeteci olması sebebiyle— "baba katili" olmakla suçlandı. İşte bu kitaptan şöyle bir sonuç çıkartılıyor: "1985'te sıra Şahların Şahı'nın İngilizceye çevrilmesine geldiğinde, özgün metnin —Muhammed Musaddık'ın azli için CIA'nin yaptığı meşum komplonun anlatıldığı— 15 sayfası kaybolur. Her ne kadar Kapuscinski sonradan bu sayfaların çıkartılmasını Amerikalı yayıncıların talep ettiğini ima etmiş olsa da, yayıncılar herhangi bir yönlendirme yapmış oldukları iddiasını kesin bir dille reddetmektedirler ve uzun sorup sormuşmaların ardından Domosławski de Amerikalıların doğru söylediklerine kanaat getirir. Kapuscinski'nin paranoid bir "Doğu Avrupa" mantığı içine düşmüş olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Kapuscinski, istihbaratla bağlantılı gizli rolünü CIA'nin çoktan öğrenmiş olduğundan kuşkulananarak, CIA'nin geçmişte İran'da yaptığı kirli işleri açık ederse, servisin de onu bir "komünist ajan" olarak ifşa edeceğinden çekinmişti. Ve böylece İmparator 'la Batı'da kazandıği yeni ve büyük başarı da anında tuzla buz olmuş olacaktı." Neal Ascherson, *How It Felt to Be There: Ryszard Kapuściński*, 2 Ağustos 2012, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n15/Neal-ascherson/how-it-felt-to-be-there> (son erişim: 24.09.13). Basılı kaynak için bkz.: "London Review of Books" Vol. 34, No. 15, 2 August 2012, pages 10-12.

açısından, İran'ın zengin petrol yataklarına Rusya'nın da el atması riskini doğurmaktadır ve dolayısıyla Mussadık'ın darbeyle indirilmesi ve yerine de General Feyzullah Zahedi'nin⁵ geçirilmesi düşünülür. CIA de operasyonun başarılı olacağı değerlendirmesini yapmıştır (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.35):⁶

“1953'te Başbakan Muhammed Mussadık'ı deviren ve Şah Muhammed Rıza Pehlevi'yi tahtta bırakan darbeyi CIA'nin örgütlediğine ve yönettiğine hiç kuşku yoktur.” (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.34)

Ancak bu darbenin başında bir Roosevelt'in bulunduğunu pek az kişi bilir. Operasyonu Başkan Theodore Roosevelt'in CIA ajanı torunu Kermit Roosevelt yürütmüş ve neredeyse tek başına, çok az destekle öyle başarılı —başka bir CIA ajanının hayranlık dolu ifadesine göre “James Bond'un yaptıkları ayarında” (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.34)— bir operasyona imza atmıştır ki darbe sonrasında teşkilatta uzun yıllar “Mr. İran” olarak anılmıştır. Roosevelt, İran'a sızar ve Şah'ın görevden azletme kararnamesinin, Savak'ın gelecekteki şefi Albay Nematullah Nassiri eliyle Mussadık'a verildiği gün olan 13 Ağustos 1953 tarihine

5 Kitaptan çıkartılan Zahedi portresi: *“Başbakan Mussadık'ın yerine geçecek kişi olarak CIA'nin işaret ettiği General Feyzullah Zahedi de bir casusluk romanına kahraman olmayı hak eden bir kişiliktir. Bolşeviklerle savaşmış, ardından Kürtler tarafından yakalanmış, 1942'de ise onun Hitler'in ajanı olduğundan kuşkulanan İngilizler tarafından tutuklanmış, uzun boylu, yakışıklı bir hovardaydı. İkinci dünya savaşı sırasında İngilizler ve Ruslar İran'ı beraberce işgal etmişlerdi. Zahedi'yi içeri tıkan İngiliz ajanlar, yatak odasında şunları bulduklarını iddia ederler: Bir Alman otomatik silah koleksiyonu, ipek kadın külotları, biraz ayfon, dağlarda faaliyet gösteren Alman paraşütçülerine yazılmış mektuplar ve Tahrân'daki en aşüfe fahişelerinin resimlerle süslenmiş sicili.”* (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.34-35)

6 Kapuscinski'nin bu yazdıkları daha yenilerde, bu yıl içerisinde CIA tarafından resmen kabul edildi ve Türkiye'deki gazetelerde de haber oldu. Sağlaması oradan yapılabilir: *“İran'ın eski Başbakanı Muhammed Musaddık'ın darbe ile devrilmesinin 60'ncı yıldönümünde Amerikan Merkezi İstihbarat Teşkilatı CIA'den önemli bir itiraf geldi. CIA, darbedeki rolünü gösteren belgeleri ilk kez yayınladı. İran Başbakanı Muhammed Musaddık 60 yıl önce İngiliz ve Amerikan istihbarat örgütlerinin ortak operasyonu ile devrilmisti. Gereğesi ise Musaddık hükümetinin, daha sonra BP adını alacak İngiliz-İran petrol şirketi kontrolündeki petrol endüstrisini millileştirme kararıydı. CIA, bu darbedeki payını itiraf eden belgeleri ilk kez kamuya açtı. ABD Başkanı Barack Obama 2009 yılında Kahire'deki konuşmasında ABD'nin bu darbedeki rolünden bahseden ilk başkan olmuştu, ancak CIA konuyla ilgili sessizliğini koruyordu. Yayımlanan belgeler, darbeyi gerçekleştiren CIA Sorumlusu Kermit Roosevelt'in telgraflarını ve olayların CIA tarafından yazılmış kısa tarihçesini içeriyor. Tarihçede operasyonun amacının “yasal veya yarı-yasal yollardan Musaddık hükümetini düşürmek” olduğu belirtiliyor. Belgeye göre Musaddık'ın devrilmesiyle “Şah'ın liderliği altında Batı yanlısı bir hükümet” kurmak mümkün olacaktı. Bir başka belgede, Musaddık “ABD ve İngiltere'nin uğraşmak zorunda olduğu en provokatif liderlerden biri” olarak gösteriliyor ve hükümete karşı bir “sinir harbi başlatmak” gerektiği vurgulanıyor. Petrol endüstrisinin millileştirilmesine karşı çıkan İngiliz ve Amerikan istihbarat servisleri “Operasyon Ajax” koduyla 19 Ağustos 1953'te Musaddık'a karşı bir darbe gerçekleştirdi. Darbenin ardından İran yönetimi 1979'daki İran İslam Devrimi'ne kadar Şah Muhammed Rıza Pehlevi'nin kontrolünde kaldı. Bu darbe, İran İslam Cumhuriyeti'nde bugüne uzanan ABD karşıtlığının temelinde yatıyor.”* CNN TURK, CIA'den belgelerle “İran” itirafı, 20.08.2013, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/dunya/08/20/ciaden.belgelerle.iran.itirafi/720164.0/> (en son erişim 26.09.13). “Hürriyet” ise aynı konudaki haberin sonuna bir de “İran, 19 Ağustos 1953'te tarihinin önemli dönüm noktalarından birini yaşamıştı. Ülkede Amerikan karşıtlığının büyük bir hızla yayılmasına neden olan darbe, 1979'da Şah Pehlevi rejiminin yıkılmasına ve aynı yıl Tahrân'daki Amerikan Büyükelçiliğinin işgal edilmesine yol açmıştı.” yorumunu eklenmiş ki İran'da daha sonraki yıllarda yaşanan gelişmeler açısından çok açıklayıcıdır. Hürriyet, CIA, 1953 İran darbesini düzenlediğini resmen kabul etti, 20.08.2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planeti/24547063.asp> (son erişim: 29.09.13).

kadar bir süre (darbeyi getirecek mekanizmayı kurmak için) gizlice faaliyet gösterir. “Şahın kararını protesto etmek için yığınla insan sokaklara çıkmıştır. Bu durumda Şah ve karısı Süreyya uçakla Bağdat’a, oradan da Roma’ya kaçarlar.” (Kapusinski, 2008, s.35). Roosevelt, işte bu noktada devreye girer ve temasta olduğu İranlı ajanlar⁷ ve suç örgütü liderlerinin, bunlara Amerikan Büyükelçiliği aracılığıyla büyük paralar aktararak, Şah karşıtlarına karşı bir grup örgütlemelerini sağlar.⁸ İki grup Parlamento önündeki meydana çatışır. Askerin müdahalesi için şartlar oluşmuştur; tanklar meydana girer —ki “az biraz romantik” bir şehir efsanesi göre, ajan Roosevelt elinde tabanca ile bu tankların birinin üzerinde operasyonu yönetmektedir⁹ (Kapusinski, 2008, s.34)— ve muhaliflerin üzerine ateş açar. “On iki kişi oracıkta öldürülmüş, beş yüzden fazlası da yaralanmıştır. (Kapusinski, 2008, s.36) “Saat dörtte her şey sona erer ve Zahedi, Şah’a dönebileceğini bildiren telgrafi çeker.” (Kapusinski, 2008, s.36)

“Şah sürgünden döndü. Mussadık hapsi boyladı. Tudeh liderleri öldürüldü.” (Kapusinski, 2008, s.36)

Yukarıdaki fragman, yani Mussadık darbesine ilişkin olarak bütün bu anlatılanlar, herhalde şu kodlara da indirgenebilirdi: Amerika, kendi çıkarları için başka bir ülkenin iç işlerine karışmış, halkı ve yönetimi manipüle etmiş, yapay yoldan iktidarı kendi çıkarlarına uygun olarak belirlemiş, derin devlet yapıları ve çetelerle ortaklık kurarak kanlı ve kirlili eylemler gerçekleştirmiş, halkına karşı acımasız bir iktidarı desteklemiş ve de bütün bunları Amerikan vergi mükelleflerinin parasıyla yapmıştır. Gerçekten de bunların Amerikan toplumuna duyurulmasından endişe edilmiş olunabileceği düşünülebilir. Ama bu düşünce acaba sonuna kadar açıklayıcı olabilir mi?

7 “Ona beş Amerikalı, başta da Amerikan Büyükelçiliği’nden CIA ajanları yardım ediyordu. Bunun dışında birkaç yerel ajan da onunla işbirliği yapmaktaydı ki bunlar arasında İran gizli servisinin araçlar vasıtasıyla bağlantı kurdukları iki yüksek rütbeli yetkilisi de vardı.” (Kapusinski, 2008, s.34-35)

8 “İki Fransız muhabir Claire Briere ve Pierte Blanchet “Iran: la révolution au nom de Dieu” (Paris 1979) başlıklı kitaplarında şunları yazmaktadırlar. “Roosevelt, «Beyinsiz Habahan» dedikleri, Tahran’da bir sokak çetesinin lideri, milli görüş sporu Zuhhan ustası Habahan Bimor’un birliklerini saldırıya geçirme zamanının geldiği sonucuna varmıştı. Habahan, insanları dövebilecek, gerekirse de vurup öldürebilecek üç yüz, dört yüz arkadaşını toplayabilecek. Elbette, silah alması şartıyla. Birleşik Devletler’in yeni büyükelçisi Loy Henderson, Mell Bankası’na gider ve arabasına dolduracağı Dolar paketlerini alır. Dediklerine göre, dört yüz bin Dolar. Bunları Riyal’e çevirir. 19 Ağustos’ta İranlı küçük gruplar («Beyinsizin» adamları) banknotları çıkartırlar ve çığlıklar atarlar: «Hadi, bağırın, yaşasın şah!» Bu çığlığı atanlar onar Riyal almaktadır. (...)” (Kapusinski, 2008, s.36)

9 “Ancak olayların nasıl geliştiğini iyi bilen başka bir ajan, bu hikâyeyi “az biraz romantik” olarak tanımlamış ve «Kermit, bütün bir operasyonu büyükelçiliğimiz alanından değil, ancak Tahran’da bir bodrumdan yönetti» demiş ve hayranlıkla eklemiştir: «Gerçekten de James Bond avarında bir operasyondur.» (Kapusinski, 2008, s.36)

İki Kitap

Kapuscinski, Mussadık darbesinin perde arkasını yazarken, mutlaka kendi gözlem ve araştırma sonuçlarıyla da zenginleştirmiş olmakla birlikte, anlattıklarını aslında kendi kitabından önce yayınlamış iki çalışmaya dayandırmıştır: 1) “Amerikalı muhabirler David Wise ve Thomas B. Ross, “The Invisible Government” (Londra 1965) (...)” (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.34) ve 2) İki Fransız muhabir Claire Briere ve Pierte Blanchet “Iran: la révolution au nom de Dieu” (Paris 1979) (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.36) Yani Kapuscinski’nin anlattıkları o tarih itibariyle sır değildir; Amerikan toplumunun öğrenmiş olabileceği, belli ölçüde yazılıp çizilmiş şeylerdir. Kaldı ki Mussadık’ı devirecek güçlere para yardımı yapıldığı konusunun 60’ların başında Amerikan kamuoyunda tartışıldığı ve konudaki en yetkili ağızca, yani CIA’nin eski şefi Allen Dulles tarafından doğrulandığı da anlaşılıyor:

Bu konuda nispeten en çok şeyi Dulles’in kendisi, CIA’den ayrılmasının ardından 1962’de CBS televizyonunun bir programına çıktığında söylemişti. “CIA’nin sokak gösterileri yapacak insanların tutulmasına ve Mussadık’ı düşürmeyi hedefleyen diğer eylemlere milyonlarca Dolar harcadığı” iddiasının doğru olup olmadığı sorulduğunda, “OK — demişti. — Sadece şu kadarını söyleyebilirim ki bu amaçla sanki çok büyük paralar harcamışız gibisinden bir iddia tamamen asılsızdır.” (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.36)

Demek ki Amerikan yönetimi, CIA’nin İran’da yaptıklarının işitilmesinden aslında pek de çekinmemiş, bunların yazılmasına da engel olmamıştı, çünkü —herhalde— bu bir başarı öyküsüydü. Yani, Amerika, tıpkı James Bond filmlerinde olduğu gibi, bir adamını bir ülkeye göndermiş ve o adam orada (yanına Büyükelçilikten beş ajan, bir de iki tane yerel ajan alıp) iktidarı değiştirmişti. Öyleyse, özde tekrar niteliğindeki bu bölümlerin Kapuscinski’nin kitabındayken sakıncalı görülmesinin nedenini başka bir yerde aramak gerekiyor.

İran, İran, İran Chung o marg o osjan (İran, İran, İran, kan, ölüm ve isyan)¹⁰

“Şahların Şahı”nda olayların kronolojik sırası izlenilmez. Kitap, sonuçtan başlar: (ŞAH) GİTTİ, (HUMEYNI) GERİ DÖNDÜ.

¹⁰ (Kapuscinski, 2008, s. 53)

(Kapuscinski, 2012, s.9) Bu gazete başlığının peşi sıra anlatım serbest çağrışımlarla, handiyse bilinç akışı yöntemiyle (ki edebi kurgu da işte budur) sürdürülür ve birbirleriyle ilintisiz gibi gözükən tanıklıklar kopuk kopuk sıralanır. Bu kimi zaman bir röportajdan alınmış bir parça, kimi zaman eski bir fotoğraf ya da o fotoğrafa bakılırken televizyon ekranından geçiveren bir kare vs. olurken, başka bir yerde İran tarihine ilişkin olarak düşünülmüş bir not, sonra bir gözlem, duyum ve yorum, hemen ardından belki bir duygu ya da İran'daki Amerikan etkinliğine ilişkin kitaplardan alınmış bilgidir. Gelişigüzel sıralanmış ve sanki birbirleriyle ilintisiz gibi gözükən bu parçaların her biri aslında en başta verilen sonucun nedenlerinden biri olarak tutarlı bir bütünlük oluşturmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, sonucu getiren nedenlerden biri de CIA'nin İran'daki faaliyetleri olmaktadır, sonuçsa İran İslam Devrimi'dir ki Amerika açısından elbette bir başarısızlıktır; sırf istemediği bir rejim iktidarı ele aldı diye de değil, ama iktidarı ona bir hatalar zinciriyle bizzat kendisinin sunmuş olmasından ötürü...

Kanımızca, Kapuscinski'nin kitabından silinmek (ve böylece de Amerikan kamuoyuna ulaşmasına engel olunmak) istenen asıl şey, işte bu yorumdur. O tarihler itibariyle bile başkalarınca açıkça yazılmış olan bazı şeylerin kitaptan çıkarılması, belki de bunların çok net ve de rahatsız edici bir yoruma (yani Amerika'nın siyasi öngörüsüzlüğü, İran'ı tanımaması, oraya gönderdiği uzmanların —“James Bond ayarında” işler yapabilecek düzeyde olsalar bile— İran'daki dinamikleri doğru okuyamamaları sonucunda kendi eliyle —ve halkının parasıyla— kendi aleyhinde bir durum yarattığı yorumuna) bağlanmış oluşları gerektirmiştir.

Özetle: CIA'nin oradaki faaliyetlerine, özellikle Mussadık'a karşı yapılan darbedeki rolüne ilişkin olarak kamuoyunca önceden öğrenilmiş olması zaten muhtemel bazı gerçekler, sanki Kapuscinski'nin aşağıdaki yorumunun silinmesiyle birlikte metindeki işlevlerini yitirdikleri için, kitaptan çıkartılmış gibi gözükmektedir. Şöyle:

“Camilerin görece bir serbestliğin keyfini sürmelerinin başka bir nedeni daha vardı. Şahı kumanda eden Amerikalılar (ki monarşi için bundan sırf talihsizlikler çıkmıştır, zira onlar ne İran'ı biliyorlar ne de orada ne olduğunu sonuna kadar anlıyorlardı), Muhammed Rıza'nın tek karşıtının komünistler, Tudeh Partisi olduğunu düşünüyorlardı. Dolayısıyla Savak'ın bütün ateşi komünistlerin üzerine çevriliyor. Ancak o dönem komünistler çok

da fazla değiller, paramparça edilmişler, öldürülmüşler ya da sürgünde yaşıyorlar. Rejim, gerçek ve komünist oldukları uydurulmuş komünistleri izlemekle öyle bir meşgul ki tümüyle başka bir yerde ve başka sloganlarla diktatörlüğü alaşağı edecek bir gücün büyümekte olduğunu fark etmiyor". (Kapuscinski, 2008, s.76)

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KİTAP TANITIMI

Özge ÖĞÜTÇÜ
Uzman
AVİM

AZA BEAST : SAVAŞIN KÖKLERİNE İNMEK

Yazar: Colum Murphy

Çeviri: Sina Baydur

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Yakın tarihin en acımasız savaşlarından birisi Avrupa'nın göbeğinde, Balkanlarda, Bosna'da cereyan etmiş bu savaş sonrasında etnik temizlik ve soykırım (Srebrenitsa) uluslararası toplumun gözleri önünde gerçekleşmiştir.

Colum de Sales Murphy şu anda Cenevre Diploması ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Okulu Başkanı olarak görev yapmakta olan İrlandalı bir yazardır. Bosna savaşı döneminde Yüksek Temsilci'nin Özel Danışmanlığını ve Sözcülüğünü yapmış, Bosna'da dört yıl yaşamıştır. Hem akademik alanda hem de diplomasi alanında uzun bir geçmişe sahip olan Murphy, Bosna ile ilgili anılarını 2013 basımı olan "Aza Beast – Savaşın Köklerine İnmeK" başlıklı kitabında paylaşmıştır. Kitap, Büyükelçi Sayın M. Sina BAYDUR tarafından Türkçeye çevrilmiştir. Bu konu hakkında birçok kitap yayınlanmış ve yazılar yazılmıştır. Fakat bu kitabın en büyük özelliklerinden birisi o dönemi birebir yaşayan bir yetkili tarafından olayların bütün çıplaklığı ile kaleme alınmış olmasıdır. Murphy, görevi nedeniyle bu sürecin hem diplomatik hem de insani tarafını kendi deneyimlerinden ve yaşanmışlıklarından yola çıkarak okuyucularına aktarmıştır. Farklı bakış açısı sayesinde zaman zaman eleştirel bir dille Bosna'da yaşananlardan çıkarılması gereken derslere, nelerin yanlış yapıldığına, nelerin bir daha yapılmaması gerektiğine ve

örneklerle o dönemde yaşanan aksaklıklara değinebilmiştir. Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) nezdinde aldığı görev sayesinde yaşananların bürokratik tarafını da gözler önüne sermiştir. Yazar bu süreçte BM'nin harekete geçme konusunda ne kadar hantal kaldığını, sistemin en hızlı şekilde olaylarla baş etmede eksik olduğunu ve kitap sunumu sırasında da, kitabın içinde de BM çalışanlarının yansızlık-tarafsızlık ikilemi konusunda kararsız kaldığını dile şu şekilde getirmiştir:

“NATO'nun tüm ağırlığını gösterecek faaliyetlerinin düzenlenmesine destek veren Birleşmiş Milletlerin, saygın “tarafsızlık” tutumu çerçevesinde, sadece insani yardım dağıtımını üstlenerek bir yandan da siyasi anlaşmayı teşvik etme çabaları yalnızca çok yanlış değil, aynı zamanda Birleşmiş Milletler için yıpratıcıydı.”¹

Ek olarak, yazarın anlatımlarından yola çıkarak dönemin BM Genel Sekreteri olan Butros Gali'nin Bosna'daki durumu “zengin adamın savaşı”² olarak nitelendirdiğini ve daha kötü durumda olan başka bölgeler bildiğini dile getirerek, zaten yavaş işleyen sistemde, Bosna'daki sorunların bu yaklaşımla kötü yönetildiği sonucuna varmanın mümkün olduğunu değerlendirmektedir.³ Hem sistemin içinden hem de dışından bir gözle aktardığı bilgi birikimini, insani açıdan da deneyimlerinin üzerinde bıraktığı etkileri anılarına harmanlayan Murphy, uluslararası toplumun kayıtsızlığı, geçtiğimiz yüzyılda alınması gereken dersler ve bunların önümüzdeki yüzyıla uygulanması, konusunda önemli mesajlar vermektedir. Özellikle bu alanda çalışan ya da bu alana ilgi duyan insanlara büyük katkıda bulunacak bir kitaptır. Büyükelçi Sayın Oğuz DEMİRALP de kitabın bu özelliğini şu sözleriyle açıklamaktadır:

“(...) Bir tarafta insani duyguların, vicdanın gereklilikleri, öbür tarafta uluslararası politikanın ve diplomasinin gerçekleri. Korkunç bir çelişkidir bu. Her diplomatın yaşaması, bilmesi, anlatması gereken bir çelişkidir. Column Murphy kitabın hemen her bölümünde bu çelişkiyi öne çıkarıyor”⁴

Murphy çok şeffaf bir şekilde özeleştiri yaparak gerek uluslararası

1 Murphy, C. (2013) “Aza Beast - Savaşın Köklerine İnmek”, s. 66

2 Murphy, C. (2013) “Aza Beast - Savaşın Köklerine İnmek”, s. 54, s. 337

3 Murphy, C. (2013) “Aza Beast - Savaşın Köklerine İnmek”, s. 337

4 Murphy, C. (2013) “Aza Beast - Savaşın Köklerine İnmek”, s. 14

toplumun gerekse aksaklıklarıyla uluslararası kurumların ders çıkarması gereken noktaları çok yönlü bir bakış açısıyla okuyucusuna sunmuş ve sistematik bir şekilde hem yaşadıklarını hem de olguları harmanlamayı başarmıştır. Olayların başlangıcından en çok yoğunlaştığı dönemlere kadar, başta Birleşmiş Milletler, Amerika, İngiltere, Fransa ve NATO gibi uluslararası toplumun tepkilerini ve tavırlarını irdeleyerek, Dayton Konferansı ile sonuçlanan önemli gelişmeleri kaleme alan Murphy, kitabın sonuna Bosna'da Yüksek Temsilcilik Sözcüsü olarak yapmış olduğu konuşmaları içeren bir bölüm eklemiştir. Böylece bizlere geniş ve bütün resmi yansıtan bir bakış açısı sağlamıştır.

AVİM TOPLANTI

Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi (AVİM), Ankara Üniversitesi Sanat Evi'nde (ANKÜSEV) 21 Ekim 2013 tarihinde moderatörlüğünü Aslan Yavuz Şir'in yaptığı, Cenevre Diplomasi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Okulu Başkanı Dr. Colum de Sales Murphy tarafından yazılan “‘Aza Beast’. Attacking the Roots of War. A Bosnian Journal” başlıklı kitabın Sayın (E) Büyükelçi M. Sina Baydur tarafından yapılan Türkçe çevirisinin tanıtımı için yapılan ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı Balkanlar ve Orta Avrupa Genel Müdür Yardımcısı Büyükelçi Murat Karagöz'ün de konuşmacı olarak katıldığı bir toplantı gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Büyükelçi Murat Karagöz
Balkanlar ve Orta Avrupa Genel Müdürü
Dışişleri Bakanlığı

Çok teşekkürler. Büyükelçi Sina Baydur'a ve Bay Murphy'e teşekkür etmek istiyorum ve ayrıca Bay Şir'e bu organizasyonu düzenlediği için teşekkür ederim. Beni davet ettiğiniz için de teşekkür ederim; böylece sadece kitap hakkında değil aynı zamanda Bosna-Hersek hakkında da konuşmak için şansım olmuş oldu. Aslında buraya kitap hakkında eleştiri yapmak için ya da düşüncelerimi ya da yorumlarımı söylemek için değil de daha çok Bosna-Hersek'te neler olduğu ve sonrasında karşılığında Türkiye'nin bakış açısı hakkında konuşmak için çağrıldım. Ancak öncelikle kitap hakkında gözüme çarpan noktalardan bahsedeceğim. Nazım Hikmet'ten bir eklemede bulunabilir miyim? “Yaşamak bir ağaç gibi tek ve hür ve bir orman gibi kardeşçesine.” Sanırım Balkanlar için ihtiyacımız olan şey bu. Müsteşar Sinirlioğlu bir yıl önce kadar Washington'dan beni aradığında, - tam olarak hangi mevkide olduğumu

hatırlamıyorum, sanırım bir şekilde Orta Doğu ile ilgili bir şey olmalı eğer Washington’da Türkiye’nin İran, Irak, Suriye vb. ülkelerle olan ilişkileri ile bağlantı halindeysem – bana Balkan Bölümü’nün başına geçeceğimi söyledi. Ama bunun düzgün olduğunu düşünmüyorum çünkü hem Bakan Davutoğlu ve hem Türk Politik Liderliği olumlu bir şeyler yapmak ve olumlu katılımlarda bulunmak adına çok heveslilerdi. “Büyük bir istek var Murat. Unutma. Bu yüzden senden lütfen iyi bir performans bekliyoruz.” dediler. Bense “Vay canına!” dedim. Bunu en iyi kitabı yazarı Malezyalı ve birçok kez orayı ziyaret etmiş olan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Başbakan vs. gibi orayla gerçekten özel akrabalıkları olan büyükelçi bilir. “Tamam.” dedim. Başlangıç olarak Georges Castellan’ın “Balkanlar” (The Balkans), New York City University’de benim tez danışmanım olan Susan Woodward’un “Balkan Tarihi” (Balkan History), Ivo Andriç’in “Balkan Trajedisi” (Balkan Tragedy), “Balkan Günlüğü” (The Balkan Chronicle) gibi bazı kitaplar aldım. Ancak sonra üçlü süreç, İstanbul Zirvesi, Bosna Zirvesi, Cumhurbaşkanının Belgrat’a ziyareti, bakanların gezileri vs. gibi günlük işler başladı. Balkanlara başkanlık eden bir memur için bir eksiklik ancak 7/24 günlük işlerle ilgilendiğim için okuyacak pek zaman bulamadım. Sonra, sanırım bahardı Bayan Büyükelçi beni aradı ve “Murat Bey, sizden kitabı okumanızı ve yorum ve analiz yapmanızı isteyebilir miyim?” dedi. Nasıl reddedebilirim? Öncelikle, bu rica Bayan Büyükelçi Baydur’dan geliyordu. İkinci olarak Balkanlar hakkındaydı. Üçüncü olarak ise Bosna-Hersek benim günlük rutininim %50’sini kaplıyordu. Bu doğrultuda bende “Zevkle.” dedim. Kitabı okudum, gerçekten de beğendim. Bayım lütfen tebriklerimi kabul edin. Kastettiğim, tarihe katkıda bulunan, gerçekten önemli bir kitap. Bir çeşit savaş günlüğü. Ben İngilizce çevirisini okudum ve samimiyetle çevrilmiş olan duygular içeriyor. Bayan, bu başarıya için size de çok teşekkürler.

Bütün bunlar beni 1995 yılında Sofya’dan NATO’ya gönderildiğim, NATO’daki ilk günlerime geri götürdü. 1995 Temmuzunda insanlık için kötü bir trajedi olan Srebrenitsa soykırımı ve ardında da bir market bombalanma olayı gerçekleşmişti. Başkan Clinton’ın savaş kayıtlarının açığa çıkarılması gerektiğini söylediği yakın zamandaki bir konuşmasında da bahsettiği ve kitapta da çok iyi açıklandığı gibi uluslararası toplum ne yapılması, nasıl müdahale edilmesi gerektiği ya da müdahale edilip edilmemesi konusunda bir çeşit çözülme yaşadı. İkinci olarak da Amerika’yı müdahale etmesi konusunda ikna etmenin kolay olmayacağını söyledi. Hakikaten de kolay bir iş değildi. Çünkü hepimiz biliyoruz ki bazı uluslar arası aktörler Bosna-Hersek’e müdahalede bulunulması için yanlış bilgilendirildiler ve o günlerde de

sabah 10.00 ile akşam 11.00 arasında çalışıyoruz NATO’da, çıkışta ben St. Pierre Bulvarı’na geri dönüyorum. Daireme döndüğüm bir akşam, alarm ötmeye başladı – NATO Genel Merkezi bize alarm vermişti – ve bende Balkan yangınında görevliydim. Resmen bir durum komedisiydi. O zamanlarda da ne akıllı telefonlar ne de cep telefonları vardı. Sadece ‘bip bip bip’ diye alarm ötüyordu. “Peki.” Deyip bütün yolu geri gittim. Merkezler Bosna-Hersek hakkında durum raporu geçiyorlardı. Bir bomba, ölümler, bu ve şu... Tüm bunlar bana eski kötü günlerin trajedisini hatırlattı. Brüksel’de NATO’dan ayrılırken dedim ki “Balkanlar hakkında bu kadar çalışmak yeter.” Ama tabi ki bir gün eğer kader beni geri o işe götürürse – yani tekrar Balkanları idare etmeye – ilk ve en önce hakkında sadece güzel şeyler duyduğum Bosna-Hersek’i ziyaret etmek isterim. Sanıyorum ki bahsettiğim “kader” Bakanın kararıyla geldi ve çalıştığım yaklaşık dört yıl boyunca çalışmaktan hep zevk aldığım Balkan Bölümü’ne yönlendirdi ve yaklaşık yirmi kere Bosna-Hersek’e gidebildim. Tabi ki şehir manzaralarının rapor edildiği her bir köşesini gezemedim ama çok güzel şeyler gördüm. Bu yüzden de tüm o dört yıl bahsettikçe duygulanacağım unutulmaz anlarla dolu. Belki Bakanın kendisinde de duymuşsunuzdur, 2011 Temmuzunda sadece Sarajevo’yu değil Prizren, Priştine, Konstanz başka diğer Balkan şehirlerini de geziyorduk. Eid al-Fitr’in ilk günüydü. Kurban ya da Ramazan tam hatırlamıyorum. Tüm otelle beraber uyandık. Ağırıklı olarak Müslüman olan bir Balkan şehriden bekleneceği gibi Sarajevo Cami’sine gittik ve hep beraber dua ettik. İnsanlar, kendinizi Türkiye’deymişçesine hissedebileceğiniz gibi giyinmişlerdi. Tüm bunlar bize büyükanne ve büyükbabalarınızla geçirdiğimiz güzel Bayram vakitlerini hatırlattı. Sonrasında Bakan bizi onur konuğu olarak davet etti. Toplantıda bakan için bir çevirmen vardı ve bir çeşit yönetici ya da arabulucu rolü belediye başkanı tarafında üstlenilmişti. Bakan konuşurken özellikle Bosna-Hersek’ten bahsetti. Konuşmasının bir yerinde bir alıntı yaptı ve dedi ki “Eğer bir gün medeniyet sonlanırsa, eğer bir gün insanlık yıkılırsa, eğer yeryüzünde can verecek şehirler olursa onlardan biri Sarajevo.” Binlerce insan dakikalarca şiddetle alkışladılar. Bakan devam etmek istedi ama sonra dedim ki “İzninizle bir şey sorabilir miyim Sayın Bakan? Dürüst olalım. Bildiğim kadarıyla Boşnaklar Türkçe konuşamıyorlar. Ama siz Türkçe konuşuyordunuz. Ama nasıl oldu da insanlar çeviriyi beklemeden tezahürat edip, sempati duyup sonrasında da alkışlamaya başladılar?” Bakan dedi ki “Bu tür toplanmalarda insanlar dudaklarıyla konuşur ama biz burada Boşnaklarla kalpten kalbe konuşuyoruz.” Bu da Türkiye ve Bosna-Hersek arasındaki büyük temasın bir kanıtıdır. Bu bana bir atasözünü hatırlattı. Görevim sırasında söylenirken duymuştum ama hata yaparsam

lütfen beni düzeltin Büyükelçi Damir. Atasözü şöyleydi: “İnsanlar konuşur, kader gülümser.” Yani “Narodigovori, sutbinesemiju.” Sonra düşündüm de arkadaşça hatta kardeşçe konuştuğumuz bu insanlar da bir gün gülmeli ve bir gün sonsuza kadar farklılıklarının üstesinden gelecek duruma gelmelidir. Onlarda büyük çapta uluslararası topluluğun bir parçası olmalı. Birleşmiş Milletler, Avrupa Birliği ve NATO tabi ki Bosna-Hersek’le ilgili ödevlere sahip. Ama bunları yerine de getirmeli. Dolayısıyla, çok zamanınızı almadan –belki birkaç dakika- bu üç dört yıllık zaman aralığında Bosna-Hersek’le ilgili olarak neler yaptığımız ve Bosna-Hersek’in Türk Dış Politikasında nasıl özel bir yere sahip olduğu hakkında birkaç söz söylemek isterim. Ama bunu yapmadan önce sizleri tekrar tebrik etmek istiyorum. Bayım siz gerçektede çok önemli bir savaş kaydı yazmışsınız ve içinde tam olarak da bizim Balkanları içeren politikamızın omurgasını oluşturan insan sıcaklığı var. Orada bir sürü etnik köken, bir sürü grup, bir sürü topluluk var. Ancak önemli olan insan sıcaklığı çünkü eğer biz Balkanlara yönelik insan sıcaklığı olmayan bir politika üretirsek, bu insanlığın ihtiyacına cevap vermez. Sanıyorum ki böyle bir politika başarısız olmaya mahkûmdur. Bu yüzden de politikamızı insanlık üzerine kurmaya çok büyük önem veriyoruz. İçerisinde her zaman insan sıcaklığı barındırmalı.

Balkan politikası dört sütun üzerine kurulmuştur. Birincisi, herkes için güvenlidir. Bu da her bir ülke ve etnik grup bu güvenlikten yararlanmalıdır. Bir tür OSCE ilkesi gibi, bundan kastettiğim bir ülkedeki güvenliğin artışı diğerinin alanlarına girmemelidir. İkincisi, politik temasların en üst seviyede olmasıdır. Çünkü Türk politik liderleri Cumhurbaşkanı, Başbakan ve bakanlar kurulunun tüm üyeleri, tabi ki de uzmanlık ve bürokratik seviyede, sadece Bosna-Hersek için değil tüm ülkeler için bu ilkeye en büyük önemi vermektedir. Üçüncüsü, genel anlamda bütün ülkelerle ama tabi ki de özelde Bosna-Hersek ilke bir çeşit karşılıklı ekonomik dayanışmanın olmasını amaçlıyoruz. Sonuncu sütun ise Balkanlardaki birçok etnik kökeni, kültürü ve dini barındıran sosyal halkı korumaya büyük önem vermektir. Çünkü Bosna-Hersek; Müslüman, Ortodoks, Katolik, Boşnak, Hırvat ve Sırp’tan oluşan 4 milyonluk az sayıdaki nüfusuyla adeta Balkanların küçük bir modelidir. Bu yüzden 2009 yılının sonlarında yaptığımız ve Bosna-Hersek’te bir çeşit yol haritası oluşturma politikamızla birlikte buradaki insanların barış ve uyum içerisinde yaşaması bizim nihai amacımız. Bosna otoritelerinin bu yol haritasını getirmeyeceğinden ya da kayda düşmeyeceğinden değil ama bir kere daha düşünme ya da yeni bir gündem olmadan Bosna-Hersek’le olan bu yakın ilişkilerin gösterilmesi ihtiyacı bir şekilde doğmuştur ve en önemli araçlardan biri de elbette Bosna-Hersek’in üyelik

hareket planı doğrultusunda NATO haritası için yolu açmak olmuştur. Çünkü Montenegro 2009 Aralık ayında kabul edilmiş, ancak Bosna 2010 Nisanında yerine getirebileceği halde bir şekilde bazı şartları yerine getirememiş ve kabul edilmemişti. Tallinn'deki NATO Bakanlık Buluşması'nda, üyeliğin kabul edilmesi meselesi için hareket ettirilemez nakliye konusunu çözmek şartı ile bazı NATO ülkelerinin direnmesine rağmen sanıyorum ki bütün NATO müttefik ülkelerini ikna edebildik. Bu bir tanesiydi. İkincisi ise diğer birçok Balkan ülkesinin dâhil olduğu Bosna-Hersek'i AB Schengen Listesi'ne katabilmektir. Ancak Arnavutluk ve Bosna-Hersek o ya da bu sebeple bir şekilde bu listenin dışındaydı. Ayrıntıya inmek istemiyorum ama kastettiğim bir şekilde bu ülkelere ayrımcılık uygulandığıydı ve biz Batıdaki ortaklarımızla bu konuyu görüşebildik - illaki Avrupa değil ancak Atlantik'in diğer tarafıyla yani Amerika ile- batıyı küresel bir katılımcı olarak düşünmek lazım. Yine bu dönemde gerçekleşen ve söylemekten gurur duyduğumuz diğer bir önemli konu ise Türkiye, Bosna-Hersek ve Sırbistan'ın içinde olduğu üçlü bir diyaloga başlamış olduğumuzdur. Bu üçlü diyalog süreci kapsamında Bakan Davutoğlu, Bakan Alkalay ve Bakan Yereviç, ve eski bakanların katıldığı bir buluşma düzenlenmiştir. Seçimler ve Bosna-Hersek'teki diğer meselelerden dolayı kesilme olmasına rağmen şu ana kadar dokuz kez bakanlar toplanmıştır. Üstelik bu buluşmalar sadece sohbet edilen ve kahve içilen içerikten toplanmalar değil, aynı zamanda da somut sonuçların alınabildiği önemli toplantılardır. Örneğin, bu toplantılardan bir tanesinde 2007'ye kadar Sırbistan'da bir Bosna-Hersek büyükelçisinin olmaması konusuna olan müdahalemizle ve bir takım kapalı kapı politikalarımızla Belgrad Sırbistan'a bir Bosna-Hersek büyükelçisi atama sözü vermiştir. Birinci konu kadar önemli olan ikinci konu ise Sırbistan tarafında Srebrenitsa ile ilgili şu ana kadar çıkmış herhangi bir karar ya da bir çözüm yoktu. Bu yüzden 13 Mart 2010'da Sırbistan Parlamentosu çok dostane ve ilerleyici bir adım attı. Srebrenitsa'yı onaylayan bir çözümü kabul ettiler ve orada olanlar için ailelerden özür dilediler ve bence bu da sürece çok önemli bir katkıydı. 24 Nisan 2010'da İstanbul Zirve Toplantısı'nda Bosna-Hersek'in dönem başkanı Slaziç, Sırbistan Eski Başkanı Tadiç ve Cumhurbaşkanı Gül İstanbul'a beraber gelmişlerdir. İnaniyorum ki savaştan bittiğinden beri olan ilk ve en büyük resmi toplanma budur. Sonrasında basın konferansında İstanbul açıklaması bildirildi ve doğrudan Başkan Slaziç ve Başkan Tadiç arasında buluşma sınırları içerisinde bizi çok sevindiren önemli konuşmalar oldu ve yine 2010 Temmuzunda, Srebrenitsa'nın 15. yılını anmak amacı ile Başbakan Erdoğan, Başkan Tadiç ve Başkan Slaziç beraberce Srebrenitsa'yı ziyarette bulundular. Zannediyorum ki bu Balkanlara güveni getirme açısından çok önemli bir adım olmuştur.

Bahsedebileceğim başka bir olay da Bakan Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun 2011 yılının ocak ayında Banja Luka'ya yaptığı mühim ziyaretidir. Diğer birçok ziyaretin arasında Bakan Davutoğlu'nun Bosna-Hersek'e yaptığı gezi de vardır. Sadece Sarajevo'yu görmekle kalmamış, OIC Liderliğini de görmek istemiş ve kanalların resmileştirilmesine açık olduğunu söylemiştir. Bakan Davutoğlu'nun Banja Luka'ya olan gezisi geniş kapsamlı sohbetler yapılması ve Bosna-Hersek ile ilişkilerimizin geliştirilmesinde bir dönüm noktası olması açısından çok önemli bir kazançtır. Ayrıca diğer bir önemli olan konu ise ekonomik açılamdır. Çünkü biliyoruz ki anlaşmazlıklara olan eklentilerden biri de mültecilerle ve ülke içinde yerlerinden edilmiş insanlarla ilgilidir. Bu konularla alakalı çok şey konuşuldu ancak çok az şey yapıldı. Bu yüzden hükümet Yardımcı Bakan Babacan'ın liderliğinde ve zaten Bosna-Hersek'e şube açmış olan Ziraat Bankası dönenleri desteklemek için tarımsal ve kırsal gelişimi desteklemek için tam yüz milyon avro ile uzun vadeli zayıf krediler açmaya karar verdiler. Çok önemli bir pilot projeydi. Bu proje, Balkanların geri kalanı için de güzel bir örnek teşkil etmiş olmalı ki başka bir önemli ve benzer proje ise bazı Balkan ülkelerinin ve Avrupa Konseyi'nin paylaştığı, dönenlerin ve ülke içinde yerlerinden edilmiş insanların barınma problemleri konusunu kapsayan bir milyon avroluk projeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu dört yıl içerisinde tabi ki öncelikle Bakan Davutoğlu, o ya da bu nedenle maalesef sürekli oluşan hükümet krizlerine veya Boşnak Partilerin kendi aralarındaki söylemlere, düzeltme süreci ya da federal düzeyde bir hükümet kurulumu için veya devlet düzeyinde bir hükümet oluşumu için müdahale etmek durumunda kalmıştır. Bu yüzden sanıyorum ki doğrudan kendisi müdahale etmiş ve Bosna-Hersek'in yolunun Avrupa-Atlantik sürecine kaynaşması konusunda daima açık olmasını istemiştir. Biri bana "Türkiye tam olarak ne yaptı?" diye sorsa, sanırım buraya kadar olan şeyler ve OIC Bosna iletişimini tekrar oluşturmak ya da Washington'da iki ayda bir Türk Büyükelçiliği'nin önderliğinde, bazı devlet bölümleri – istihbarat bürolarının, düşünce kuruluşlarının, gönüllülerin - katılımıyla toplanan, Bosna'ya nasıl katkıda bulunulabileceğinin tartışıldığı, herkese açık bir görüşme niteliğindeki Bosna müttefikleri grubunu kurmak gibi diğer şeyler de cevap olarak verilebilir. Tüm bunlara ek olarak, bir şey yarattıysak o da Bosna-Hersek'in diğer ülkeler için uluslararası siyasette farkındalığının oluşturulmasıdır.

Sonuç olarak, buradaki tüm özel dinleyicilere beni dinledikleri için, Büyükelçi'ye ve Bay Murphy'ye sadece Bosna-Hersek'in tarihine değil uluslararası ilişkilere olan katkılarından dolayı minnettarım. Sanırım bundan sonra Bosna-Hersek'te neler olup bittiğini biraz daha uzaktan, Mongolia'dan izliyor olacağım. Çok teşekkür ederim.

Ambassador Murat Karagöz
Director General for the Balkans and Central Europe
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Thank you very much. I would like to thank Ambassador Sina Baydur and I would like to thank Mr. Colum Murphy, Mr. Şir for organizing this event. Thank you for inviting me and I have a chance to talk about the book itself and then Bosnia Herzegovina. I was actually called not to make any criticism about the book and then to have my judgment or any comment on it. But rather on what is going on Bosnia Herzegovina and then Turkish perspective vis-à-vis Bosnia Herzegovina, but before I go to my remarks on the book itself I mean. May I add one thing about Nazım Hikmet? “To live like a tree single and free and like a forest brotherly.” I guessed that that is what we need for the Balkans if I may say maybe to conclude my remarks but maybe since you reminded me about Nazım Hikmet, great poet of Turkish literature of course. So, when undersecretary Sinirlioğlu called me from Washington about four years ago, I did know that which position I would assume. I thought that somehow related with the Middle East since I was linked in Washington with all those matters that Turkey’s relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria, etc. Then, I found out when he turned out to be that you will be leading the Balkan department but don’t think that it is smooth enough, because Minister Mr. Davutoğlu is quite either and the Turkish political leadership is quite either to do something positively and to bring some positive contribution “There is a great appetite, Murat. Don’t forget. So please, we expect that kind of performance.” I said Gosh, but should I expect because it is minister who write the book, he knows by heart that, from Malaysia traveled many times and then who has really special affinity like Vice President, Prime Minister etc. I said ok. But to start with I took some books as reference to the Balkans from Georges Castellan, Balkan History; from Susan Woodward who happened to be my master’s thesis instructor in New York City University, Balkan Tragedy; Ivo Andriç, The Balkan Chronicle, so and so forth. But, and later on, daily job started about the trilateral processes, Istanbul Summit, Bosnia Summit, Presidents travelled to Belgrade, ministers travelled, etc. Then 24/7 I jumped into daily work and I could not find much time to read which a deficiency is for an official who chairs the Balkans. And then, at a certain point, I guess it was the spring and Madam Ambassador gave me a call, “Murat Bey, may I kindly have a request with you would you be so kind to read and to make any comment and make an analysis?” How could I refuse? First of all, this is a request came from Madam Ambassador Baydur. Secondly was about Balkans, thirdly, it is about

Bosnia Herzegovina who occupied about 50% of my daily routine. I said “with pleasure”. I read, I really enjoyed, I mean, if you accept kindly my congratulations sir it is, I mean really really important book I guess contributes to the history, it is a kind of war chronicles. There are emotions in it, which is, I guess most important I did read from English which was faithfully translated, thank you very much Madam for this masterpiece as well. But this all brought me to my early days in NATO in 1995, when I was transferred from Sofia to NATO. In July 1995 this very bad human tragedy occurred of course in July, Srebrenitsa genocide occurred and then the market bombing etc. I mean international which is very well described on the book international community had a kind of dissolution about what to do, how to intervene, whether we should intervene or not as very recently said by President Clinton himself in one of his discussions during which he said that the war chronicles should be released as soon as possible. Secondly he said that it was not easy to convince United States to intervene and it was not an easy job because we all know that some international actors had some misgivings to intervene in Bosnia Herzegovina. And then in all those days, we were working about 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. in the NATO I was going back in Bolivar St. Pierre. When I was going my apartment, the alarm - because NATO Headquarter gave us an alarm- and I was in charge about this Balkan fire. There was a sitcom; there were no smartphones at that time. No cell-phones, but it was in “beep beep beep”. Well, I said that all the way around, without going on I was going back to the Headquarters to receiving the situation centers report about Bosnia Herzegovina. There was a bomb, there was a killing, there was this and that... All reminding me that all bad days’ tragedy, I said one day, when I was leaving NATO Brussels that was enough on the Balkans. But definitely, one day if destiny would bring me back to this job I mean to deal with the Balkans, first and foremost I would like to visit Bosnia Herzegovina about which I heard only beautiful things. So I guessed that “destiny” or “kısmet” came with the Minister’s decision to lead me to the Balkan department which I enjoyed during three years and a half of four years period about nearly twenty times to visit Bosnia Herzegovina. Not necessarily in each and every corner, where the city scenes were reported, however, all these beautiful things. So therefore, I mean, it is in my memory in these four years, Full of unforgettable moments. But, I will be reminiscing which is really made me quite emotional I mean. Maybe you heard it from the Minister himself, we were visiting July 2011, not only Sarajevo combined with some other Balkan cities: Prizren, Pristine, Konstanz from Romania, and Sarajevo, etc. And then, it was the first day of Eid al-Fitr, I don’t remember Kurban or Ramadan. But we all woke up there with the Hotel and then you can

expect in a Balkan and predominantly Muslim city. I mean, people were getting together to pray in the Sarajevo Mosque. People were dressed like and as if that we felt in Turkey. But that all reminded us about these old days, where, we all were enjoying with the second generation with the grandmothers, grandfathers like in that kind of city of that kind of feelings or spirit in a Bairam. So the Minister was invited as a guest of Honor, to address the gathering. When he was speaking there was a translation for the minister and a kind of chair or moderator role was assumed by Mayor of Sarajevo. He was talking about particularly Bosnia Herzegovina. At a certain point, He made an analogy and something like this: (I am paraphrasing of course) If one day the civilization ends, If one day the humanity demolishes, If there are some cities on earth, where they will give birth one of them will be Sarajevo. And there was I mean big applause from thousands of people and cheering but which continued about minutes. The Minister wanted to continue and then may I interrupt Mr. Minister? I mean let's be honest. As far as I know, Bosnian people do not speak in Turkish. But you were speaking about Turkish. But without waiting the translation, they started to cheer and then to show sympathy and then to give their applause. How does it come? Minister said that usually in that kind of conferences people do speak from lips to ear but with here the Bosnian people we are talking from heart to heart. So that was also the big touch between people of Turkey and Bosnia Herzegovina. This reminds me a kind of proverb. If I am not mistaking because I heard, that was repeated during my service, but Damir please correct me ambassador, they say; "İnsanlar konuşur, kader gülümser.", so I mean, "Narodigovori, sutbinesemiju." So, "people talk destiny smiles." something like this. So, I thought that only one day these people you are talking very friendly I mean brotherly should smile as well and then forever should be able to overcome to their differences. And then they should be part of the entirely international community in a bigger sense in the United Nations sense as far as EU has concerned, NATO concerned, of course they had their homework in front of Bosnia Herzegovina. But they have to do this as well. So, let me say a few words. Without taking much time maybe couple of minutes about what we did in this three or four years period vis-à-vis Bosnia Herzegovina then what kind of a special place it occupies in Turkish foreign policy. But before I do so, let me I mean congratulate once again. What is mostly missing in the book are in touch. Sir I mean you have really written a quite important war chronicle, and there is a human touch which exactly constitutes backbone of our policy considering the Balkans. There are ethnicities, there are groups, communities, but what important is the human touch because if you build the policy towards the Balkans which does not base on a human

touch which does not address the need of the humanity generally or the people generally I guess it is doomed to fail so therefore it was quite important we gave utmost importance to construct our policy on humanity and there must be always an human touch.

Balkan policy on four pillars, number one is security for all, which means that each and every country, ethnic group must enjoy from the security, a kind of OSCE principle, I mean an increase in security in one country should not be at the expense of other. Number two principle was that highest level of political contact. Because the Turkish political leadership President, Prime minister and all the members of the cabinet, of course at the expert and the bureaucratic level, we attached the utmost importance both countries not along the Bosnia Herzegovina. Third one is that we wanted to aim to interpret a kind of economic interdependence between Turkey and all those countries generally and Bosnia Herzegovina of course in particular, last but definitely not least, the attach great importance to protect the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, social public in the Balkans. Because Bosnia Herzegovina is a small model of the Balkans where small population about four million but there are Muslims and Orthodox people, Catholics, there are Bosniacs, Croats and then there are Serbs. So They all have to live in peace and harmony this was our ultimate aim actually while pursuing this policy what we did in the end of 2009 was to create a kind of road map in Bosnia Herzegovina. Not those Bosnian authorities were unable to bring this road map or to write it down but, somehow there is a need to show this very close friendship and indeed without having any second thought any other agenda with Bosnia Herzegovina. And one of the most important items was of course at that time first of all to open the road for NATO map, Membership Action Plan from Bosnia Herzegovina, because Montenegro was admitted in December 2009, however, Bosnia was missed without fulfilling some conditions which were able to succeed by the way, in April 2010. In Tallinn NATO Ministerial Meeting despite some the resistance of some NATO like I guess we were able to convince all NATO allies though with one condition to solve the immovable transport issue to open up the way of membership action process. That was one. The second one is to include Bosnia Herzegovina in the EU Schengen List, because most of the other Balkan countries were included. However, Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina were somehow excluded because of this and another conditions. I mean I don't want to go into details but somehow that was a kind of discrimination according to our judgment so we were able all to bring up this issue in our contacts with the Western partners. -You have to take

western as a global actor. Not necessarily the Europe but definitely, in the other side of the Atlantic, I mean that United States. -Another important issue, which with it in this period and we Proud to announce is that to start this trilateral dialogue process among Turkey, Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. Minister Davutoğlu, Minister Alkalay and Minister Yereviç both of them for other two countries. The former ministers, that was an important gathering with in this trilateral process. Though there was an interruption, because of the election process and some other issues in Bosnia Herzegovina, but the ministers met, so far nine times and it was not only a kind of gathering, to have chat and to drink coffee, but there were some really concrete deliverables. One of them was for instance; there has not been any ambassador appointment from Bosnia Herzegovina to Serbia since 2007. So, with our intervention or with a kind of this behind the door diplomacy, so we succeeded that Belgrade give the concurrence to appoint an ambassador Bosnia Herzegovina to Belgrade. Secondly, was definitely as important as the first one maybe we adopted this, there has not been any decision or the resolution on the Serbian side, on the Srebrenitsa. So the Serbian parliament was very forthcoming movement, progressive movement made by the Serbian Parliament on 13th March 2010. They accepted a resolution condemning Srebrenitsa and then expressing an apology in the families what occur there. So that was an important contribution to this process as well. I guess that was an important condition within this process as well. When the İstanbul summit came, in 24th April 2010, President of Bosnia Herzegovina, Slaziç, term president, and then former president of Serbia President Tadiç with President Gül, they came together in İstanbul. If I believe officially a big gathering first time ever and so since the war finished. So, then the İstanbul declaration was issued and then the press conference and among the margins of that meeting important talks occurred directly between President Slaziç and President Tadiç which we really appreciated very much in that time. And then in July 2010 again, with the intervention together with Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Tadiç and President Slaziç, they visited together to Srebrenitsa, in order to commemorate the 15th anniversary of Srebrenitsa. I guess that was also an important step in terms of bringing confidence to the Balkans. Another first I may say was the historic visit of Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to Banja Luka, it was in January 2011, among the many other sets of visits, he pay the visit to Bosnia Herzegovina, but not only in Sarajevo he requested that I would like to see OIC leadership, I want to open to formalize the channels. There have been of course channels. His successor might have visited, Banja Luka, I know that they have visited, some of them, but definitely at the Foreign

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ministry level, that was an important achievement and Minister Davutoğlu paid a visit to Banja Luka, and it was an extensive talk and it was an also important milestone in terms of advancing our relationship with Bosnia Herzegovina. What important was also an economic opening. Because we know that one of the annexes to disagreements was about the refugees, and internally displaced people. Much has been talked about this but less has been done. So we decided I guess, the government with the modest contribution of this department decided, to open up a soft long credit, and Deputy Minister Babacan took the lead, and then ZiraatBankası, who already opened up some branches throughout the Bosnia Herzegovina, decided to open a soft long credit, with a total amount of one hundred million Euros to support returnees through agriculture and rural development. I guess that was an important pilot project. Maybe it could be a good example for the rest of the Balkans. Likewise, for housing problem for returnees and internal displaced people. we also contributed with a total amount of one million Euro, an important project, whose government I mean whose, some foreign countries, governments of Balkan countries, plus the Council of Europe are sharing these projects. Certainly throughout these four years, Minister Davutoğlu, primarily intervened all times in the government crises, unfortunately there are perpetual government crises for this or another reason, For the reform process or for building a federation level government or building state level of government or if there is a discourse among the Bosniac parties themselves. So, therefore, I guessed that he, himself intervened, and he wanted that the path of Bosnia Herzegovina towards integrating with Euro-Atlantic process should be open forever. So, if one can ask me that “what did Turkey do concretely?” I guess that along these things or many other things, like revitalizing the OIC Bosnia contact or creating in Washington, a friends of Bosnia group which being summoned in every two months in the premises of Turkish Embassy still there with the contribution of state department I mean some intelligence agencies, some think tank communities, all together volunteer a kind of open house meeting how to contribute Bosnia in a matter. Besides all these, I guess that if we created one thing, in my judgment that is a creation of awareness of Bosnia Herzegovina in the international policy. So, I guess that I really appreciate this distinguished audience listening to me and then kindly Ambassador, and Mr. Murphy, to have this important contribution not only the history of Bosnia Herzegovina, but I guess the international relations and I will be watching though a little bit far away, from Mongolia, what is going on in Bosnia Herzegovina. Thank you very much.

ULUSLARARASI SUÇLAR VE TARİH DERGİSİ MAKALE ÇAĞRISI

Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih dergisi, akademisyenler ve uzmanlar arasında, derginin ilgi alanına giren konularda, disiplinler arası tartışmaları canlandıracak yüksek kalitede akademik makaleler yayımlamak amacıyla 2006 yılından beri yayındadır.

Hakemli bir dergi olan Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih, yılda bir sayı yayımlanır. Derginin dili İngilizce ve Türkçedir.

Önceki sayılarda tarihsel araştırma, insan hakları ve uluslararası ceza hukuku alanlarında (Prof. Michael Bohlander, Prof. Ivan Simonovic gibi) önde gelen akademisyenler ve uzmanlardan doktora öğrencilerine kadar uzanan geniş bir kitleden alınan yazılar yayımlanmıştır.

Yayın İlkeleri

Makalelerin, e-posta yolu ile Aslan Yavuz Şir'e gönderilmesi rica olunur: ayavuzsir@avim.org.tr (veya info@avim.org.tr)

Makaleler, dipnotlar ve kaynakça dahil, en az 3.000 en fazla 13.000 kelime olmalıdır.

Makaleler, Microsoft Word programında, Times New Roman karakterinde ve tek satır aralıkla yazılmalıdır. Açıklamalar ve kaynak gösterimi sonnot olarak değil, dipnot olarak gösterilmelidir. Metin için 12 punto, dipnotlar için 10 punto kullanılmalıdır.

Başlık sayfasında aşağıdaki bilgiler belirtilmelidir:

- Makalenin başlığı
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- Özet: 300 kelimeyi geçmeyecek olan Türkçe ve İngilizce özet
- Anahtar Kelimeler: İngilizce ve Türkçe olarak alfabetik sıra ile yazılmış 5 tane anahtar kelime. Anahtar kelimeler tercihen başlıkta bulunmayan kelimeler olmalıdır.

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Bu makale çağrısı, dergimizin 15nci sayısına ilişkindir. Makalelerin **son teslim tarihi 1 Eylül 2014**'tür.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND HISTORY

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Manuscripts should range from 3,000 to 13,000 words and be approximately 10-30 single-spaced pages in length including footnotes and bibliography.

Articles must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1 1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially.

The title page of the article should include the following information:

- Manuscript title
- Names and affiliations of all contributing authors
- Full address for correspondence, including telephone and email address
- Abstract: please provide a short summary of up to 300 words. (Both English and Turkish)
- Keywords: please provide 5 key words in alphabetical order, suitable for indexing. Ideally these words will not have appeared in the title. (Both English and Turkish)

ULUSLARARASI SUÇLAR VE TARİH DERGİSİ

ŞEKİL KURALLARI

DİPNOT VE KAYNAKÇA SİSTEMİ

I. Makalenin Düzeni

Başlıklar ve Altbaşlıklar

Makalelerin başlıkları, ortalanmış ve büyük harflerle yazılmış olmalıdır. Yazarlar, tercihen üç kademeli altbaşlık sistemi kullanmalıdırlar. Aşağıdaki örnek temel alınarak, bütün başlıklar metin içinde ortalanmalıdır:

I. Giriş

A. Birinci Altbaşlık

1. İkinci Altbaşlık

a. Üçüncü Altbaşlık

II. Noktalama

Blok Alıntı

Beş veya daha fazla satır olan alıntılar, tırnak işareti kullanmadan, blok alıntı şeklinde (1 cm girinti) gösterilmelidir.

Çıkarılmış Sözcükler

Alıntılanmış bir cümle içinde veya bir cümlenin sonunda kelimelerin çıkarılmış olduğunu göstermek için, üç nokta (her bir noktanın önünde, arasında ve sonrasında boşluk olacak şekilde) kullanılmalıdır.

Alıntı tam bir cümle ile bitiyorsa, orijinal metindeki cümle devam etse dahi, üç nokta kullanmaya gerek yoktur.

Alıntının ilk kelimesinden evvel üç nokta genellikle kullanılmamaktadır (orijinal metindeki cümleden kelimeler çıkarılmış olsa dahi).

Tarih Belirtme

Metin içindeki tarihler şu şekilde yazılmalıdır: Gün Ay Yıl (ör.: 8 Mart 2009). Ancak, İngilizce olarak yazılmış olan metinlerde şu şekil kullanılacaktır: Ay Gün, Yıl (ör.: March 8, 2009).

Dipnot Numaraları

Dipnot numaraları noktalama işaretinden sonra konulmalıdır (ör.: Bu açıklama BM Genel Sekreteri tarafından yapılmıştır.¹)

III. Dipnot ve Kaynakça Gösterme Kuralları

Yazarlar, yararlandıkları referansların doğru şekilde belirtilmesi hususunda azami özeni göstermelidirler.

Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih dergisinin tercih ettiği referans sistemi için, aşağıda dipnotlar için [D] ve kaynakça için [K] olarak gösterilen örnek referanslara bakınız. Dergimizde tercih edilen dipnot sistemi büyük ölçüde Chicago sistemini (Chicago Style) temel almaktadır.

Kitaplar

- [D] Guénaél Mettraux, *International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), s. 114.
- [K] Mettraux, Guénaél. *International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Makaleler

- [D] Rebekah Lee ve Megan Vaughan, "The Future of Human Rights in Europe," *The Journal of African History*, cilt 49 (Kasım 2008): s. 348.
- [K] Lee, Rebekah ve Megan Vaughan. "The Future of Human Rights in Europe." *The Journal of African History*, cilt 49 (Kasım 2008): ss. 341-359.

Derlenmiş Kitaplar

- [D] Ian Scobbie, "Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law," *International Law*, ed. Malcolm D. Evans içinde (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), s. 87.
- [K] Scobbie, Ian. "Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law." *International Law*, editör Malcolm D. Evans içinde, ss. 159-180. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Ansiklopedi Makaleleri

- Not: İyi bilinen ansiklopedi kitapları tercihen kaynakçada gösterilmemelidir.
- [D] The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 15. ed., s.v. "Vietnam war."

Raporlar ve Tebliğler

Konferans Tebliğleri

- [D] Ferdan Ergut, "Surveillance and the Public Order in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918," (Central Eurasian Studies Society, Fourth Annual Conference, Harvard Üniversitesi'nde sunulan tebliğ, 2-5 Ekim 2003), s. 8.
- [K] Ergut, Ferdan. "Surveillance and the Public Order in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918." Central Eurasian Studies Society, Fourth Annual Conference, Harvard Üniversitesi'nde sunulan tebliğ, 2-5 Ekim, 2003.

Doktora Tezleri

- [D] Frederick Carleton Turner, "The Genesis of the Soviet 'Deep Operation': The Stalin-era Doctrine for Large-scale Offensive Maneuver Warfare" (Doktora Tezi, Duke Üniversitesi, 1988), s. 54.
- [K] Turner, Frederick Carleton. "The Genesis of the Soviet 'Deep Operation': The Stalin-era Doctrine for Large-scale Offensive Maneuver Warfare." Doktora Tezi, Duke Üniversitesi, 1988.

Resmi Belgeler

- [D] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), ss. 521-522.
- [K] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*. Staff Report. 99th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1985.

Hukuki Metinler/Hukuk Kaynakları

BM Dokümanları

- Not: BM dokümanları şu sırayı takip etmelidir: yazar (kişi veya kurum), başlık, tarih, doküman numarası. BM dokümanı bir kitap olarak basılmış ise, başlığı italik olarak yazılmalıdır. İlk atıftan sonra, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararları, "UNSC Res." şeklinde; Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurul kararları ise, "UNGA Res." olarak kısaltılabilir.
- [D,K] UNSC Res. 1373 (28 Eylül 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1373.
- [D,K] UNGA Sixth Committee (56th Session) "Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism" (29 Ekim 2001) UN Doc A/C.6/56/L.9.

Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Antlaşmalar

Uluslararası Antlaşma

- [D] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 Temmuz 1951 tarihinde kabul edilmiş, 22 Nisan 1954 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmiştir) 189 UNTS 137 (Mülteci Sözleşmesi), madde 33.
- [K] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 Temmuz 1951 tarihinde kabul edilmiştir, 22 Nisan 1954 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmiştir) 189 UNTS 137.

Bölgesel Antlaşma

- Not: Avrupa bölgesel antlaşmaları belirtilirken, tarihler genellikle yazılmaz; zira bunların tarihlerinin birçok defa değişikliğe uğramış olması muhtemeldir. Antlaşmanın başlığında mevcut ise, tarihin belirtilmesi uygun olacaktır.

[D] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi), madde 3.

[K] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Uluslararası Mahkeme Kararları ve Davalar

Uluslararası Adalet Divanı

[D] *Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Judgment) General List No. 91 [2007] ICJ 1 (26 Şubat 2007), para. 189.

[K] *Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Judgment) General List No. 91 [2007] ICJ 1 (26 Şubat 2007).

Eski Yugoslavya ve Ruanda Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemeleri

[D] *Prosecutor v. Akayesu* (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T, T Ch I (2 Eylül 1998), para. 42.

[K] *Prosecutor v. Akayesu* (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T, T Ch I (2 Eylül 1998).

Sonraki Atıflar

Kaynaklara yapılan ilk atıflar yukarıdaki gibi gösterilecek; daha sonraki atıflarda Latin kısaltmaların hiçbir şekilde kullanılmaması ve aşağıdaki iki örnekte gösterildiği üzere, yazarın ilk ve soy ismi ile çalışmanın kısaltılmış başlığının kullanılması tercih edilmektedir.

Guénaél Mettraux, *International Crimes...*, s. 115.

Rebekah Lee, "The Future of Human Rights...", s. 349.

IV. Kısaltmalar

Referans belirtirken, uygun olduğu takdirde, aşağıdaki kısaltmaların kullanması rica olunmaktadır:

UNGA Res.: United Nations General Assembly Resolution (Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurul Kararı)

UNSC Res.: United Nations Security Council Resolution (Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Kararı)

UNCHR: United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Komisyonu)

UNTS: United Nations Treaty Series (Birleşmiş Milletler Antlaşmalar Serisi)

YILC:	Yearbook of the International Law Commission (Uluslararası Hukuk Komisyonu Yıllığı)
ICJ:	International Court of Justice (Uluslararası Adalet Divanı)
ICC:	International Criminal Court (Uluslararası Ceza Divanı)
ICTY:	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Eski Yugoslavya Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi)
ICTR:	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Raunda Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi)
T Ch:	Trial Chamber (Duruşma Dairesi)
A Ch:	Appeals Chamber (Temyiz Dairesi)
IMT:	International Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals, Nuremberg (Nüremberg Uluslararası Askeri Ceza Mahkemesi)
para., paras:	paragraf, paragraflar
ed., eds.:	editör, editörler

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND HISTORY

STYLE SHEET

I. Layout of Manuscript

Headings and Subheadings

We ask that titles of submitted manuscripts be centered and written in full caps. Authors should preferably use only three grades of headings, although four can be accommodated. The hierarchy shown below should be used with all headings centered in the manuscript:

I. Introduction

A. First Subheading

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II. Punctuation

Block Quotations

Quotations of five lines or more should be presented as a block quotation.

Omission of Words

To indicate material has been omitted within a sentence or at the end of a sentence, ellipsis points (periods with a single space before, between, and after each period) are used.

When quoted material ends in a complete sentence as edited it is not necessary to add ellipsis points even if the sentence continues in the original.

Ellipsis points are normally not used before the first word of a quotation, even if the beginning of the original sentence has been omitted.

Date Format

Dates within manuscript should be written in the following format: Month Day, Year (e.g., March 8, 2009)

Footnote Numbers

Footnote numbers should be placed after the punctuation mark (e.g. This remark was made by the UN Secretary General.¹)

III. References

Authors are asked to pay particular attention to the accuracy and correct presentation of references. As a rough guideline, authors may refer to the Chicago Manual of Style with the exception of subsequent references.

For a guide to the preferred citation style of the *Journal of International Crimes and History* please find below examples of materials cited as footnote entry [N], followed by a bibliographic entry [B].

Books

[N] Guénaël Mettraux, *International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 114.

[B] Mettraux, Guénaël. *International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Articles

[N] Rebekah Lee and Megan Vaughan, “The Future of Human Rights in Europe,” *The Journal of African History*, vol. 49 (Nov. 2008): p. 348.

[B] Lee, Rebekah and Megan Vaughan. “The Future of Human Rights in Europe.” *The Journal of African History*, vol. 49 (Nov. 2008): pp. 341-359.

Edited Books

[N] Ian Scobbie, “Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law,” in *International Law*, ed. Malcolm D. Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 87.

[B] Scobbie, Ian. “Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law.” In *International Law*, edited by Malcolm D. Evans, pp.159-180. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Encyclopedia Articles

Note: Well-known reference books should preferably not be listed in the bibliography.

[N] The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 15th ed., s.v. “Vietnam war.”

Reports and Papers

Conference Papers

[N] Ferdan Ergut, “Surveillance and the Public Order in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918,” (paper presented at Central Eurasian Studies Society, Fourth Annual Conference, Harvard University, October 2-5, 2003), p. 8.

[B] Ergut, Ferdan. “Surveillance and the Public Order in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918.” Paper presented at Central Eurasian Studies Society, Fourth Annual Conference, Harvard University, October 2-5, 2003.

Ph.D. Dissertations

[N] Frederick Carleton Turner, “The Genesis of the Soviet ‘Deep Operation’: The Stalin-era Doctrine for Large-scale Offensive Maneuver Warfare” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1988), p. 54.

- [B] Turner, Frederick Carleton. "The Genesis of the Soviet 'Deep Operation': The Stalin-era Doctrine for Large-scale Offensive Maneuver Warfare." Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1988.

Government Documents

- [N] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), pp. 521-522.
- [B] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*. Staff Report. 99th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1985.

Legal Materials/Law Sources

UN Documents

Note: Cite UN documents in the following order: author, title, date, document number. Italicize the title of a UN document only if it has been published as a book. After the first citation, abbreviate "United Nations" to "UN"; "UN Security Council" to "UNSC"; "UN General Assembly" to "UNGA"; and "Resolution" to "Res".

- [N,B] UNSC Res. 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1373.
- [N,B] UNGA Sixth Committee (56th Session) "Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism" (29 October 2001) UN Doc A/C.6/56/L.9.

International and Regional Treaties

International Treaty

- [N] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention), art. 33.
- [B] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137.

Regional Treaty

- Note: Dates are generally not given when citing European treaties, as they may have been changed several times. Include the year if it appears in the standard title of the treaty.
- [N] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), art. 3.
- [B] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

International Cases and Decisions

International Court of Justice

- [N] *Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Judgment) General List No. 91 [2007] ICJ 1 (26 February 2007), para. 189.
- [B] *Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Judgment) General List No. 91 [2007] ICJ 1 (26 February 2007).

International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

- [N] *Prosecutor v. Akayesu* (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T, T Ch I (2 September 1998), para. 42.
- [B] *Prosecutor v. Akayesu* (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T, T Ch I (2 September 1998).

Cross References

When referring to the same work previously cited in the manuscript, avoid all Latin abbreviations and use the shortened form as provided:

Guénaël Mettraux, *International Crimes...*, p. 115.

Rebekah Lee, "The Future of Human Rights...", p. 349.

IV. Abbreviations

Where appropriate please refer to the abbreviations provided for below when citing references:

UNGA Res.:	United Nations General Assembly Resolution
UNSC Res.:	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNCHR:	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNTS:	United Nations Treaty Series
YILC:	Yearbook of the International Law Commission
ICJ:	International Court of Justice
ICC:	International Criminal Court
ICTY:	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ICTR:	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
T Ch:	Trial Chamber
A Ch:	Appeals Chamber
IMT:	International Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals, Nuremberg
para., paras:	paragraph, paragraphs
ed., eds.:	editor, editors

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- Christer Asp**, The Kingdom of Sweden's Ambassador to Ankara, assessed Turkey-EU relations and Turkey's changing role within the international system.
- Mohammed bin Nasser Hamad Al-Wohabi**, Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman, stated that Turkey is a stabilizing and balancing element in the Middle East.
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